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This thesis probes the conceptual and practical limits of toleration by exploring theories 
that address how modern liberal states should cope with religiously extreme minority 
groups in the light of a concrete case, that of The New Jerusalem, a self-contained 
theocratic community in modern-day Mexico. The thesis analyses some implications of 
the case for understanding how modern liberal states ought to deal with illiberal 
religious groups that do not respect some fundamental rights of their members. It 
questions whether the theories and prescriptions of influential recent liberals and their 
critics, such as Kukathas, Kymlicka, Balint and Ayelet Shachar are adequate to protect 
either the rights of minority groups or the rights of individuals within communities that 
tend to oppress their vulnerable members. The thesis seeks to elucidate difficulties with 
these theories by setting them against the reality of The New Jerusalem. Placing theory 
in conversation with practice, it concludes that, though frequently disregarded in liberal 
literature, moral compromise addresses several of the same questions as political 
toleration, and that it could work alongside policies of toleration and differentiated 
treatment to reach long-lasting agreements where profound differences between 
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In July 2012, I was working for the government of Michoacán as a political adviser at the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. An emergency meeting had been called by the state secretariat in 
response to news of a developing crisis in a remote community. The whole cabinet assembled. 
The governor of the state wanted to know every detail. He was informed that an ultra-
conservative group styling itself “The Loyals”, allegedly instructed by the Virgin Mary, had 
set fire to the local elementary school on the grounds that “the devil was living there” 
(Castellanos, 2012), leaving more than 200 students and 48 kindergarten children without 
viable classrooms. Other less conservative members of the community were furious.  Tensions 
were rising and the situation threatened to escalate into a violent conflict, not for the first time 
in the history of The New Jerusalem. 
Yet in the immediate aftermath of the fire, no action was taken by local or federal 
authorities. No attempt was made to investigate the events that led to the destruction of the 
school, the only one in the community, or to prosecute the perpetrators. Over the next weeks, 
growing pressure from civil society groups, human rights organisations, the press, and the 
affected population—in particular, the aggrieved parents—finally spurred the federal 
government to act. It eventually despatched investigators into the community, who quickly 
gathered overwhelming evidence—videos, photographs and eyewitness reports—that a Mr. 
Cruz Cárdenas (La Jornada Online, 2012:35) led the attack on the school. In the disorder that 
had ensued, several people were killed and many others had been expelled from the community 
by force. Indeed, over the years, hundreds had been expelled and ostracised from the 
community at various points for refusing to obey the Virgin’s direct orders, the instruction to 
set fire to the school (and to dismiss the teachers) being only the latest.  
Presented with this evidence, the minister of the interior decided that something needed 
to be done. His action was framed in constitutionalist terms, recognising the children’s right to 
receive “neutral, secular and compulsory elementary education.”1 This was to assert a principle 
and to affirm a statutory commitment. The practical solution deemed compatible with this 
principle was to have the children of the community walk to the elementary school in a nearby 
village called “La Injertada” (The Inserted), so that they could attend their lessons there. 
 
1 The Third Article of the Mexican Constitution guarantees the right of every Mexican to have access to free, 




One week later another meeting was called to discuss a new crisis. It transpired that the 
“nearby village” was separated from The New Jerusalem by a river. To go around it, the 
children had to walk about three kilometres. Some children had attempted to cross the river by 
swimming it instead. Two small children had gone into the water and had not come out. Their 
bodies were still missing.  
 At that time, like many others, I had no specialist knowledge of the community and its 
highly unusual character. I had assumed that the rule of law would be enforced—that a new 
school would eventually be built, that in the meantime appropriate temporary solutions would 
be put in place, that the guilty parties would be punished. What I witnessed in the wake of the 
second meeting was a marked reluctance at every level of government to act. In place of action, 
there were words, from the governor of the state, high officers in the central government, and 
even the federal sub-secretariat of Religious Affairs, mostly excusing inaction and advocating 
tolerance. The governor of Michoacán was explicit that the policy being pursued was one of 
toleration: “They deserve our prudence and respect; we don’t mean to disrupt nor we want to 
interfere with their community’s life. That is why we have been tolerant”2 (Martínez Elorriaga, 
2012).   
After weeks of pressure from the media and much negative public opinion, the minister 
of the interior of the state of Michoacán announced that a utility bridge would be built to enable 
the children to cross the river safely. The uneasiness I felt about the initial government response 
meant that I wanted to see the solution for myself. When I visited the community, one month 
later, I was taken aback to find a flimsy, rickety construction that already seemed on the brink 
of collapse. I was especially surprised and dismayed that the sequence of highly provisional 
and shifty accommodations I had witnessed was being justified by appeals to toleration. How 
was it possible, I wondered, that toleration, an idea that implied to my mind protection against 
religiously-inspired zealotry, an ideal routinely invoked as central to the liberal tradition, one 
of the defining values of classical and modern liberalism, and a necessary constituent of any 
liberal society, could be invoked to justify quiescence in the face of violations to the 
fundamental rights of adults and children? What conception or conceptions of tolerance, or 
toleration, licensed this (what seemed to me) deceitful form of indifference to manifest 
injustice?  
 These thoughts and experiences were the seeds out of which this thesis grew. The thesis 
strives to understand the theoretical interaction between toleration and indifference, to take a 
 




closer look at how, in practice, one modern liberal state actually dealt with a religiously extreme 
minority group, and to assess the adequacy of its practice in the light of the best recent 
normative work on toleration and the rights of minority cultures. 
 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The core research question of my work, the guiding thread that connects the different 
debates, reflections and theories I engage with in these pages is: How should modern liberal 
states deal with religiously extreme minority groups that do not respect the fundamental rights 
of their members? This primary question implicates others that are closely related to it: what 
are the limits of toleration and according to which criteria are they drawn? At what point does 
toleration—or at least do particular conceptions of toleration—begin to slide into indifference? 
How does The New Jerusalem pose a problem to the idea of toleration in general, and to the 
Mexican liberal state in particular? Is the appeal to toleration used by the Mexican state to 
justify non-intervention in The New Jerusalem wrong? If so, why is it wrong? 
 
One thesis, two aims 
 
In addressing these questions, the thesis has two aims. The first aim is to provide a 
normative analysis of a specific case, The New Jerusalem, a millenarian and messianic 
community located in the western state of Michoacán, Mexico. Its members are faithful to the 
Virgin of The Rosary. They believe the end of the world is coming soon, and that members of 
the community alone will be saved: ergo, exclusion from the community implies exclusion 
from paradise. In discussing the disputes that have arisen between the community and the 
contemporary Mexican state, exploring their grounds and the principles adduced when 
resolution was pursued, the thesis brings the case to the attention of a wider academic audience 
and demonstrates its interest to scholars working on the political life of modern Mexico. It also 
shows some of the ways in which Mexican intellectuals and political actors have approached 
questions of diversity and difference in the setting of the modern liberal state. 
The second, more ambitious aim, is to bring to bear some lessons of the case for current 
thinking about multiculturalism, toleration, and diversity, and to enrich and develop the 
existing academic literature on these topics. The intricacy and complexity of the case, and 
indeed its extremity, drive home the difficulties that arise when contemplating both in practice 




the rights of the state. Reflection on the case, I argue, brings to light some of the shortcomings 
of both multicultural and liberal contemporary theories that seek to resolve conflicts between 
individual rights and group rights through the lens of political toleration. By setting such 
theories against reality, my work brings to light conceptual and practical gaps that only become 
apparent when confronted with the intricacies of truly complex cases, such as the case of The 
New Jerusalem, where secular imperatives of order and justice are regarded as irrelevant or of 
secondary importance both in theory and in practice.  
It is important to emphasise that while the argument of thesis proceeds from the analysis 
of a specific case, it is not a “case study” in the technical sense of that term.3 I am not attempting 
to identify patterns in, nor gathering data about, the detailed nature of the state of affairs at The 
New Jerusalem. Instead, I am interested in the idea invoked by the Mexican state to imbue its 
treatment of the members of the New Jerusalem community with moral authority, the idea of 
toleration, and in what toleration means in practice for people inside the community. i.e., I ask: 
“Does this particular state’s toleration in situ mean indifference to the fate of its own citizens?”, 
not “how do the members of the community experience and/or rationalize their situation”? In 
other words, I examine the problem from the perspective of the state, not from the perspective 
of those affected by the state’s decisions. Likewise, my methodological framework is 
theoretical, not empirical, because it concerns a political-moral question: what states ought to 
do, not what states happen to do. However, in order to frame the theoretical point appropriately, 
it is necessary to engage with some empirical work (requesting, organising and reviewing a 
number of official documents related to The New Jerusalem’s crisis in 2012 that provide details 
of the Mexican state’s response to the crisis) that will be further described below. 
To bring my materials under control I come at the problems raised by the New Jerusalem 
through the classic debate between liberals and multiculturalists over the rights of minority 
groups (as communities) versus the rights of their members (as individuals), which I 
supplement with more recent discussions over the duties of states towards such groups and 
towards individuals, especially children. I also go beyond the Anglophone literature to Mexican 
debates which provide a local context for ways in which the crisis in The New Jerusalem was 
construed.   
My argument moves through three stages. First, I establish the precise character of the 
problem posed by The New Jerusalem, which has been addressed normatively with reference 
to the idea of toleration.  Next, I clarify the normative questions it raises, before turning to 
 




consider whether the justifications offered in the existing literature adequately cover the 
problem in view and if not, why not.  Last, I begin to outline in response an approach that is 
more adequate to the problem than those I met within the literature hitherto.  
This thesis makes several relevant contributions to the existing academic literature. The 
first contribution relates to the fact that my work is doing something that has never been 
attempted before: to explore and analyse The New Jerusalem from the perspective of political 
theory. To date, The New Jerusalem has been largely neglected by academic writers. There are 
a few interesting ethnographic works, mostly made by journalists and a few anthropologists 
(e.g., Varela 2012; Warnholtz 1988; Del Val 1986; López Castro 1984), but none from the 
perspective of the normative political theory. This approach is valuable, first, because it allows 
for more refined normative distinctions between different kinds of toleration; and second, 
because it clarifies just what is at stake in the current political impasse over the holy city. 
The second contribution of this thesis lies in the fact that I have given an English voice 
to an almost unknown case that, owing to its exceptional complexity and its distinctive 
characteristics, has the potential to shed light on instances where modern states have to deal 
with ultraconservative insular religious groups within their jurisdictions. This work also seeks 
to make The New Jerusalem visible and academically available beyond the local realm as a 
live example of how Mexico’s last and only theocracy has managed to survive within a modern 
liberal order creating a state of exception; a real instance where fundamental rights, even 
children’s rights, are being overlooked for the sake of political expediency.  
A third and related contribution of this thesis is to address the problem normatively and 
in doing so to look again at the idea of toleration and issues of difference and religious diversity. 
There have always been problems with appealing to toleration, and The New Jerusalem is a 
way of exploring some of those problems. At the same time, there are hard questions to 
confront about the relationship between theory and practice and whether, and how far, appeals 
to toleration, in theory, imply compromise in practice, specifically compromising the moral 
ideas that the modern liberal state, in its stated commitment to the rule of law, claims to uphold 
as indefeasible. The theoretical connection made between the problem posed by The New 
Jerusalem and the response allows us to question if political toleration is always the most 
adequate solution to the problem of accommodating diversity when accommodation in practice 
means going against values and rights that are considered fundamental both by the law and by 
the wider community. 
This thesis also contributes theoretically to the ongoing debate on the dispute between 




theorists (see Kukathas 2003, 1992a, 1992b; Williams in Heyd 1996; Balint 2018, cf., 2017, 
2013) to be a sufficient condition to secure the individual value of autonomy, may mean 
nothing for practical proposes when the members of the religious minority group happen to be 
millenarians. This work establishes how, in at least one case, the right of exit is insufficient to 
protect vulnerable members of a religious minority. They strongly believe that the end of the 
world is about to come and that leaving the community would equal death and eternal 
damnation. One might deal with this problem at the level of theory by stipulating that the agents 
in question fail to meet the criteria identified as meriting the use of the epithet “autonomous” 
to describe them, but that does nothing to address the practical problem. 
I do not pretend that this thesis can or does provide a theoretical model that resolves the 
tensions between group rights and individual rights in practice. Neither can it offer universal 
solutions to the problems that contemporary theories of toleration make it their business to 
consider. Instead, this work contributes to ongoing normative discussions of toleration by 
scrutinising and making explicit some of the shortcomings of those theories in the light of 
practice: this research brings to surface difficulties that only become evident when they are set 
against real complex cases that challenge the capacity of modern states to accommodate 
illiberal diversity. The pure light of ideal theory dazzles the eye, but it can obscure as much as 
it reveals. I modestly offer a glimpse at a rather general level of how moral compromise could 
work alongside policies of toleration to provide both principled and practical support for 
agreements between individuals and groups who remain deeply divided in practice and at the 
level of ultimate principle. How to shape and implement those arrangements, however, is 
beyond the scope of this work. Still, I hope my research could be a point of departure for other 
endeavours that continue to grapple with the extremely demanding practical challenge of living 
civilly and tolerantly with others whose beliefs and practices we find obnoxious. This challenge 
seems likely to be with us for as long as there are human beings living in proximity with one 




In pursuing its aims, the thesis moves through six thematically consecutive chapters:  
The first chapter, The New Jerusalem and the Crisis of 2012, provides a brief historical 
account of the community, its character, and its fortunes. It introduces the case of The New 
Jerusalem alongside an analysis of the policy implemented by the Mexican government to deal 




Jerusalem and how does it pose a problem to the idea of toleration in general, and to the 
Mexican liberal state in particular? When did the crisis begin? Who are the main actors? What 
was the Mexican government response to the crisis of 2012, in what terms did it seek to justify 
that response? And finally: what does the millenarian character of the community imply for the 
adequacy of that justification, given the demands laid on the actions of its members and their 
interactions with the outside world by the impeding threat of divine judgement and the 
impossibility of salvation beyond its walls? This chapter shows how the problem of The New 
Jerusalem came to be connected to, and construed through, the idea of toleration via official 
representatives of the Mexican state and so provides a bridge to the more theoretical 
discussions that comprise the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 2, The Idea of Toleration, offers a conceptual analysis of the notion of toleration, 
the idea invoked by state actors to justify their response to the crisis at The New Jerusalem. 
This analysis is given not because toleration somehow determined the Mexican state’s 
response—I am not making any claim to that effect—but because articulating and demarcating 
the complex of principles being invoked by the state authorities under the rubric of toleration 
brings out more clearly than the messy adaptations to the circumstance of professional 
politicians could ever hope to do the moral structure of the severely limited range of 
fundamental options open to them. In addition to emphasising the importance of understanding 
toleration as a political practice, rather than as a moral virtue or as an attitude, this chapter 
locates the theoretical differences between tolerance and toleration, repressive tolerance, false 
tolerance, and toleration as indifference, drawing out some of the ambiguities in the idea the 
Mexican government is evoking in its stance towards The New Jerusalem. I reflect on whether 
we could talk of “over-tolerance” and how, if at all, we might pin down the “elusive” nature of 
the term (Heyd, 1996). Finally, I address critiques of toleration made by authors such as 
Marcuse and Arteta, while I also advance my criticisms of certain understandings of toleration 
that verge on indifference or modern forms of relativism. At the same time, it sets the scene for 
the third chapter by clarifying the conceptual character of toleration before turning to its role 
in wider argument between liberals and multiculturalists about the appropriate response to 
diversity and difference in modern states.  
Chapter 3, The Rights of Minorities and the Rights of their Members, aims to clarify the 
role of toleration in the arguments of seminal authors such as Chandran Kukathas 
(2003;1997;1992), Brian Barry (2001), Will Kymlicka (1999; 1997;  1996; 1995; 1994; 1992; 
1989), Michael Walzer (2006; 1997) and Charles Taylor (1994; 1992; 1989) who address the 




the rights of individuals inside those groups. It does so by working through a series of questions 
in turn: are there any group rights? can the rights of religious minorities (as communities) trump 
the rights of their members (as individuals)? In the end, which claim, the individual’s or the 
group’s, should prevail? This discussion connects the case of The New Jerusalem with the 
notion of toleration as it figures in wider discussions of the problems of granting minority 
groups special rights. At the same time, it provides the necessary intellectual context for an 
investigation into the precise forms this debate has taken in Mexico, analysed at length in the 
fourth chapter. 
In Chapter 4, The Debate on Group Rights in Mexico, I explain how the contemporary 
debate between group rights and individual rights explored in chapter 3 played out in Mexico, 
where it has come to focus ever more sharply on the group rights of indigenous peoples. The 
disputants in Mexico range from liberal theorists such as José Antonio Aguilar Rivera and Jesús 
Silva-Herzog Márquez, on the one side, to communitarians like the philosopher Luis Villoro 
on the other, sometimes reproducing, sometimes departing from the arguments made by the 
Anglophone scholars discussed in chapter 3. Taken together these ongoing debates provide the 
terms which help me to parse the core question of my research: what should modern liberal 
states tolerate and why? The Mexican debates provide, in addition, the background against 
which the decision of the Mexican state authorities to justify their workings in the language of 
toleration appears in its proper light. For the Mexican debates were not conducted primarily in 
the pages of academic journals and monographs, but rather in the pages of a national 
newspaper. They involved the public expression of political and moral opinions that aimed to 
shape the public culture and generate support for particular men, parties and groups as much 
or more than they aimed to articulate conceptual truths. In other words, the Mexican 
government, while formally appealing to principle, was at the same time appealing to existing 
constituencies of opinion and popular conceptions of what the Mexican state was like and what 
it had sufficient political license to do and to avoid doing. 
Chapter 4, then, plays a dual role in the thesis.  On the one hand it extends the range of 
theories being discussed; and considers the implications, if any, of discussions of indigenous 
rights for the case of the New Jerusalem; at the same time, it reinforces a point that the thesis 
wishes to emphasise about the relationship between theory and practice, namely that it is 
complex, and that in politics what is done in practice is never the simple embodiment of 
principle.  
Chapter 5, Theory vs. Practice: Toleration and The New Jerusalem,  doubles down on 




to the problems posed by the crisis in The New Jerusalem. It focuses in particular on the 
difficulties posed by religious groups for whom the costs of exit are always and necessarily too 
high to make any supposed right to exit meaningful. In this chapter, I survey the theories and 
prescriptions of some outstanding contemporary political theorists, such as Kukathas, 
Kymlicka, Balint, and Ayelet Shachar and critically assess how adequate their models are to 
protect individual rights within minorities that tend, like The New Jerusalem community, to 
oppress their own minorities. I include a brief explanation of some important judicial cases, 
such as the well-known Yoder case (1972), and the not so well-known cases of Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez (1978), and the United States v. Wheeler (1978), where individuals sought 
the state’s protection against their own communities, as these help to clarify the ways in which, 
historically, liberal constitutional states have endeavoured to rationalise their practice.  
These cases also raise doubts about whether and how far jurisprudence can succeed where 
political theory fails in offering clear-cut answers to the kinds of question, about the rights of 
individuals versus the rights of groups or corporate bodies like the state, with which this thesis 
is concerned.  Much recent writing on multicultural rights—Shachar 2008, 2001; Festenstein 
2005; Spinner-Halev 2000, 1994—relies on jurisdictional arguments which distribute rights to 
agents in different spheres of activity, but if and when jurisdictions are multiple and 
overlapping, such arguments, by themselves, merely push the problems back a step, because if 
and when jurisdictions do overlap we still need to know which claim, the individual’s, the 
group’s, or the state’s, ultimately trumps its rivals and why. 
This penultimate chapter, by bringing to light some of the shortcomings and theoretical 
loopholes of the aforementioned theories, sets the scene to propose a normative solution to the 
puzzle of how Mexico, or any other modern liberal state should best address cases as complex 
as The New Jerusalem: how and when they should intervene in cases where rights of different 
sorts are prima facie in conflict and where harms of various sorts seem unavoidable. 
The sixth and final chapter, Compromise and Toleration: A Normative Proposal, offers 
a sketch of one possible normative solution in cases of this kind. Approaching the theoretical 
problems that became evident in chapter 5 from a different angle, it suggests that that the idea 
of compromise, suitably understood, brings added value when put to work in tandem with 
toleration. The tendency in the existing literature has been to construe toleration as 
an alternative to compromising; as something required in the absence of compromise. My 
provisional suggestion is that a form of moral compromise, complemented by a conditional 
arrangement of political toleration, could be a feasible way to deal with complex cases where 




minority groups that tend to oppress their minorities and compromise, as conventionally 
understood, seems to require the differing parties to acquiesce in the violation of their own 
rights.  
I attempt to substantiate this suggestion by advancing my own account of what I believe 
could and should be done in The New Jerusalem to improve the life of its inhabitants, 
emphasizing children’s rights. Concrete examples are provided of how to implement a 
comprehensive form of political compromise which will, I hope, shed some helpful light in 
similar cases where liberal states have to deal with insular religious groups that hold illiberal 
values and practices. But in order to make sense of the solution, it is necessary to begin with 





























THE NEW JERUSALEM AND THE CRISIS OF 2012 
 
 
Those who can make you believe absurdities 
can make you commit atrocities. 
 
                —Voltaire 
 
 
This chapter provides a historical account of the origins, character and crises of The New 
Jerusalem, a millenarian religious community founded in 1973 by a defrocked priest who 
discovered via an intermediary that his dislike of the present state of the world and of changes 
in the Catholic Church post-Vatican II was shared by the Virgin Mary. The chapter explains 
what has occurred in The New Jerusalem since its foundation and how it poses a problem for 
the idea of toleration. It focuses in particular on the crisis of 2012, when some community 
leaders objected on religious grounds to the secular education provided by the state and 
expressed their objections by attacking parents, burning down the local state school, and 
locking the gates of the community. I examine the Mexican government’s response to the crisis 
and set out the route by which it came to be connected to the idea of toleration via official 
representatives of the Mexican state. The remainder of the thesis analyses the normative 
implications of the case for thinking about multiculturalism, toleration, and diversity.  
The New Jerusalem has passed under the radar of most political scientists and political 
theorists. What attention it has attracted over the years has come mostly from journalists 
conducting interviews and reporting from the field. Correspondents working for local diary 
columns and the national press have written features, opinion pieces, and dispatches, producing 
cumulatively an ongoing contemporary history of The New Jerusalem: giving voice to what 
they heard, describing what they saw and what they found out during their intermittent visits 
to the community. Martínez Elorriaga (2012, 2007) and Rodríguez Lozano (1982), from the 
Mexican national newspaper La Jornada, carried out long interviews with the residents of The 
New Jerusalem. The latter wrote a chronicle of the city to which the present account of its 
history and goings-on is indebted. In a different idiom, writer Jesús Lemús published a novel 
called “Cara de Diablo” (Face of de Devil) that combined anecdote and detailed description in 
developing a vivid picture of what he calls “Mexico’s only and last Theocracy” (Lemús, 2014). 
Some academic writers have gone beyond journalism and imaginative prose to explore 
the workings of the community through a disciplinary prism. Among these worth mentioning 




1988 study “The New Jerusalem: A Study of Millennialism in Mexico” where, in addition to a 
historical account of its origins and development, an analytical description of the community’s 
complex social structure is provided. Another outstanding ethnographic work (perhaps the 
most illuminating of all) is that of Leatham (1997, 1993), who carried out extensive fieldwork 
with frequent visits to the walled city, often disguised as a pilgrim. To this list, I must add the 
work of López Castro (1984), a researcher from El Colegio de Michoacán, whose article, “The 
New Jerusalem: a town from the unknown”, sought to reconstruct the cosmogony of its 
inhabitants. Del Val (1986) published an outstanding research paper called “The New 
Jerusalem: a reactionary experience?” which included statistical data about the city’s economy. 
There is also the extended article by the anthropologist Varela (2012), that explores in depth 
the anthropological and sociological situation in The New Jerusalem.  
Each of these works elucidates different aspects of the community’s life, but no extant 
work explores analytically the moral-political problem posed by the mere existence of The 
New Jerusalem within, and formally under the jurisdiction of, the Mexican State. It is my aim 
to fill this gap, but I must begin with a brief account of the city, its origins, and the practical 
response of governmental officials at local, regional, and federal levels to the crisis that 
eventuated there in 2012.  This descriptive account provides the springboard for a philosophical 
analysis of the normative problems which the case brings sharply into focus. The link between 
these two stages in the argument is provided by the idea of toleration, which was invoked, more 
as a self-exculpatory slogan than as a philosophical term of art, by officials who wished to 
justify their inaction.  
This point needs to be made emphatically and kept in mind throughout the thesis. I am 
not suggesting that the invocation of the word “toleration” implied a worked-out philosophy 
on their part, or that the course of inaction that they preferred was somehow caused by a 
principled commitment to the idea of toleration. Political action has its own conventions, rules, 
and institutions around which other conventional structures build up over time. The language 
of principle abounds but when those engaged in practical politics—the taking and executing of 
everyday decisions about government and administration—appeal to principle, they tend to be 
describing the commitments which guide their preferences in that particular set of 
circumstances. They are saying, in effect, “I do not propose (or I am not authorised) to shift 
from this position at this time”. Rather than positing a pre-formed, universally right 
embodiment of principles formulated by means of philosophical reflection, they are justifying 




situation demands, what their superiors require or expect, and what a given constituency is 
likely to accept as legitimate, as by some universal ideal of conduct.  
The point may be put like this. What, as a matter of fact, is done, is one thing.  How what 
was done is justified, or how those who did what they did attempt to justify it, is another 
thing. Whether what is done is or was justified, whether it was the right thing to do, is 
something else again.  This chapter is concerned with what was done, the ways in which 
political actors attempted to justify what was done, and the ways in which that justification was 
received by commentators and other political actors and representatives of organised civil 
society institutions. In the subsequent chapters, I turn to the normative questions at the heart of 
the thesis, questions about the philosophical validity and moral acceptability, the rightness or 
otherwise, of the purported justifications. Accordingly, the later chapters address the idea of 
toleration and the wider normative theories in which it can be implicated. 
As I explained in the prologue, the subject of this thesis is not only The New Jerusalem 
or the unique character of this community but the normative problems raised by the presence 
of a millennialist city and the activities of its leaders within a modern state like Mexico, a state 
that boasts a liberal constitution and a formal commitment to the rule of law applied equally to 
all. As the problems flow from the character of the community and the dislocation between the 
ways of life it imposes on its members and the ways of life valorised and protected under the 
Mexican constitution, to understand these problems aright it is necessary to understand the 
community and its workings.   
This is not an easy task. The community is closed to outsiders and driven by internal 
factions. Partisan perception colours every account that has emerged from within and even 
those given by outsiders. Much of the story of the community strains the credulity of modern 
readers, for whom accounts of divine apparitions, if they are not laughed out of court, tend to 
reveal more about the unhappy state of mind of those who claim to witness them than they do 
about the activity of God in the world.   
The account I provide as an introduction to the central arguments of the thesis is meant 
to be as factual as existing research and reportage permit. I begin by setting out the key actors 
in the story of the community, before giving an account of its origins and development through 
the sequence of crises that brought it to the attention of the Mexican state authorities. This is 
not to say that the community had ever been unknown to the authorities. Rather, over time, 
events moved in ways that first unsettled, and more lately made impossible, the studied (and 
perhaps corrupt) inadvertence they had displayed until that point. The New Jerusalem became 




primary focus of this thesis, but it does provide the cue for the normative analysis that 
constitutes the bulk of the thesis, and so constitutes a necessary point of departure as well as 
context.  
As the story of the community, its origins and its bloody recent history are both arresting 
and little known outside a small circle of Spanish-speaking journalists and readers, there may 
also be some independent interest in giving an English language account of it, which I do below. 
To assist the reader in following the story, I begin by outlining the dramatis personae.      
     
The key actors 
 
Papá Nabor: A former catholic priest who became the founding father and supreme 
leader of the community. 
Mamá:  
(Salomé) 
The first and most important seer of the community. Claimed to have the 
capability to be contacted by the Virgin and to reproduce her messages. 




Second in importance as a clairvoyant. She had the same powers as Mama 
Salomé and claimed to have the ability to reincarnate the Virgin. 
Mamá Margarita: A nun, recognised as a seer by many, but not by Papá Nabor. She was a 
contemporary of Mamá Chuy and acted concurrently as an unofficial seer. 
Santiago:  
“El Mayor”  
(“The Greater”) 
He was chosen as a successor to become the new supreme leader by Papá 
Nabor but never took office as he was dispossessed of his rightful position 
by the seer Agapito Gómez Aguilar. After surviving an assassination 
attempt, he became the leader of “The Dissidents”. 
Agapito Gómez 
Aguilar: 
He managed to persuade Papá Nabor that he was the most powerful seer 
and became second in command. After Nabor’s death, he overthrew 
Santiago “El Mayor '' as the legitimate successor and became the new 
supreme leader of the community. 
Saint Martín de 
Tours: 
Inherited power from Agapito, despite being snubbed as Nabor’s successor 
by Nabor himself when on his deathbed. Currently the supreme leader of 
The New Jerusalem and the “official” successor of Papá Nabor.  Martín of 
Tours is a (self-aggrandizing) nom-de- théâtre, borrowed from St. Martín 
of Tours (ca. 316-397).4  
Mamá Catalina: Daughter of the seer Agapito Gómez and currently the official seer of The 
Holy City. She claims to have the power of hearing, seeing, 
communicating and interpreting the words of the Holy Virgin. Under her 
clairvoyance, the messages of the Virgin have struck a harsher note. 
The Loyals: Constituting around 75% of the total population. They follow St. Martín 
de Tours’ leadership and claim to be the loyal followers of Papá Nabor. 
 
4 St. Martín of Tours (ca. 316-397) became the most visible protester against the torture of the followers of 
Priscillian, Bishop of Ávila, whose views (he promoted a very strict Christian asceticism) had disturbed the 
Church in Spain. Priscillian was charged with sorcery and executed on the authority of the Emperor Maximus, a 
Spaniard. Two Spanish priests, Ithacus and Idacus, had clamoured for similar punishment to Priscillian’s 




They are the most conservative group and have a very narrow and 
intransigent view of what sort of moral behaviour is acceptable. 
 
The Dissidents: They are a minority group of about 25% of the entire population. They 
follow Santiago “El Mayor” and have more liberal views in general. They 
allow and seek school education for their children and they do not oppose 




The fuller story of The New Jerusalem begins on 13 June 1973. On that day, it is said, Mary, 
the mother of Jesus, appeared to Gabina Sánchez, an elderly woman making her way through 
a very rarely used passageway, known as “El Callejón” (The Alleyway), about three kilometres 
from Puruarán township, in the state of Michoacán, the western central region of Mexico. Mme 
Sánchez went immediately to the municipality of Turicato, the nearest large conurbation, to the 
parish church at that time under the ministry of the local catholic priest Father Nabor Cárdenas 
Mejorada, to tell him that the Virgin had revealed that she wanted them to build a chapel at the 
top of the hill called “El Mirador” (The Lookout). She warned Father Nabor that the end of the 
world was imminent, and she urged him, as the Virgin had commanded her, to found and 
establish a holy city in that place before the end of days.  
Completed only a few months after the Virgin’s appearance, the city was named by 
Father Nabor “The New Jerusalem” (López, 1984). Thousands of pilgrims, hearing about the 
miraculous visitation, flocked from the most impoverished areas of the southern states of 
Oaxaca, Guerrero and Chiapas. They came to visit the chapel known as “La Ermita” (The 
Hermitage), in the hope of seeing the Holy Virgin for themselves. Some of them decided to 
stay on and make the most holy and newly-founded city their home (ibid.).  
According to the beliefs summarised in Papá Nabor’s writings (Nabor, n.d.), the Virgin 
had conveyed to Mme Sánchez the vision of a holy city freed of all sin and moral decadence 
and she continued to communicate with her. Natives and recently arrived outsiders started to 
call the clairvoyant “Mamá Salomé'', the godly name she had begun to adopt. They held her in 
very high regard, referring to and treating her respectfully as an oracle (Rodríguez, 1982).  
Meanwhile, Father Nabor visited the Catholic bishop at the nearby city of Tacámbaro to 
warn him that the end of the world was nigh and to urge him to find shelter in The New 
Jerusalem. The bishop, understandably, was taken aback and expressed concern that nearly 
9,000 residents, sharing the euphoria of the appearance, were already living in the recently-
built city. Nabor explained to the bishop that his mission was to found a city most holy, 




clairvoyant, “Mamá Salomé” and, of course, via his own mediation. Nabor urged the bishop to 
join the holy assignment. The bishop accused Nabor of being an impostor and called Mamá 
Salomé a “lunatic old lady”. He threatened ex-communication and Nabor is yet to be reconciled 
with the Catholic Church (Lemús, 2014). In response, Nabor founded his own Church, “The 
Catholic, Orthodox, Traditional ‘New Jerusalem’ Church”.  From that moment, he stopped 
being a Catholic priest and he started to be known simply as “Papá Nabor” (Father Nabor), the 
highest authority within The New Jerusalem (Varela, 2012).  
To walk through the city is to enter a world that is usually brought to life by medieval 
paintings and works of fiction: nuns are everywhere, watching over children that run barefoot. 
Young monks in brownish-grey hoods and robes avoid the gaze of visitors. Women are mostly 
dressed in long skirts and have their heads covered, while men are cautious never to wear shorts 
or anything “improper”. The city walls guarantee that nobody can get out without permission 
and the main and only entrance is jealously guarded. The only visitors allowed are pilgrims to 
The Hermitage Chapel. Written or oral permission from the holy authorities of the city is 
required before they can leave (ibid.). The New Jerusalem’s inhabitants have minimal access 
to education, health services, nor do they have the right to interact with other communities. 
There is no civil government, no electricity (though the holy authorities—Papá Nabor’s 
successors and their very small group of close collaborators—do have access to electricity and 
a few modern devices). There are no motor vehicles, nor any other obtrusive symbols of 
modernity (the occasional lorry, owned by contractors engaged to do building or repair work 
may be seen) (ibid.).  Work is conducted during the harvest in the sugar mill “Pedernales”, a 
few miles from the village. Otherwise, it is a closed world and eager to remain so; in the present 
day, in a democratic and liberal country with the 15th largest economy in the world.  
The line that separates insiders from outsiders is very clear: access to the village is 
carefully watched over 24 hours a day by guards and a large chain secures the narrow entrance 
to the city each night. Next to the checkpoint, there is an advertisement addressed to “The 
Living” (the official name used by the holy authorities to refer to lay inhabitants). One reads: 
“Dating: Forbidden / Alcohol: Forbidden / Makeup: Forbidden”. Still, there are further 
prohibitions: neither listening to the radio nor watching TV is allowed (Lemús, 2014).  
Almost 20 mass services are held every day. It is mandatory to attend at least two (Lemús 
2014:398). The Living have, it is claimed, recovered the colour, the ceremonies, the rites, even 
the magic and apocalyptic energy that during the 16th century evangelised the indigenous 
peoples in Mexico and South America; an energy that according to The Holy City authorities, 




New Jerusalem celebrate the holy mass in Latin, for they disapprove of all the reforms 
promulgated during the late sixties by Pope John XXIII during the Second Vatican Council. 
They also make enthusiastic use of traditional Catholic rites such as exorcism, about which the 
Church is nowadays extremely reticent. Around 3,000 peasants both from the surrounding 
areas and from the south-eastern regions of Mexico (Guerrero, Chiapas, Oaxaca and Hidalgo) 
have moved to The New Jerusalem in the past four decades. Since then, Father Nabor and his 
successors have educated, lectured and appointed monks, priests, and bishops in the religious 
school he personally established to guarantee the continuity of the project (Varela, 2012). 
Order in the city is preserved through a very stringent discipline, following rules dictated 
by the Holy Virgin and other saints and transmitted by the oracles and clairvoyants (Rodríguez 
Lozano, 1982). Murals depicting Father Nabor, noticeboards with rules and prohibitions, 
religious propaganda, an extended and loud active speaker system, and continuous patrolling 
groups (armed and unarmed) guarantee the observance of law and order in the community 
(ibid.). Residents believe that only their prayers and a total rejection of modern ways of life 
will hold back the Apocalypse for another 40 or 50 years, but not more. “Knowledge has 
become satanic, is no longer sacred” (Lemús, 2014) said the seer Agapito Gómez Aguilar in 
February 1998. At that time, Lemús describes, he was acting as a conduit to a spirit named 
Oscar. “FAX, computers, television, modern devices... all that is satanic stuff. We are in the 
end of times when everything is satanic”. Given the coming apocalypse, residents were 
forbidden to have children: “What's the point of procreating, if the world is ending?”—
questioned Agapito Gómez, Papá Nabor’s first successor (Ibid.). To speak of succession 
advances our narrative, from origins to subsequent developments within The New Jerusalem. 
 
The Death of Mamá Salomé and the Two Mamás 
 
The first great crisis that confronted The New Jerusalem came with Mamá Salomé’s 
death in 1982 because Papá Nabor, inspired by a message from the Virgin, ran two candidates 
for succession: “Mamá Margarita” and “Mamá Chuy”. The race between the two clairvoyants 
split the community. Papá Nabor himself ended up backing Mamá Chuy. He could not know 
that his decision would divide the people for years to come. 
When certain uncomfortable details about the past of Mamá Chuy became public, such 
as the fact that during her youth she had been a sex worker in the northern city of Monterrey, 
more than two hundred nuns decided to form a convent inside the village and were followed 




and defying Mamá Chuy’s authority. Papá Nabor sought direction from the Virgin and reported 
that she had threatened to leave the town unless an early settlement was achieved. Matters came 
to a head in November of 1982: in a single night, about 4,000 of the nearly 9,000 men and 
women living there at the time were expelled by force from their properties, deprived of their 
possessions and driven out in a mass exodus (Del Val, 1986). A mob set fire to the convent of 
Mamá Margarita and many homes of her followers. The New Jerusalem that night witnessed a 
modern form of pogrom, and its population became “Fuenteovejuna”5.Once the succession was 
secured, Papá Nabor decided, again at the Virgin’s command, to implement stricter measures 
of control within the city: he went on to prohibit recreational sex and clarified that the 
prohibition would last until the end of the world. The crisis ended with the withdrawal of Mamá 
Chuy from public life, and her internment in the cloistered convent of La Ermita, where she 
was confined by Papá Nabor, who argued that she had reached such a high degree of holiness 
that it was necessary for her to devote entirely to contemplative veneration of the Virgin and 
renounce to all forms of human contact.  
It has been suggested that the real cause for the withdrawal of Mamá Chuy from public 
life lay in the fact that her messages had begun to threaten the power of Papá Nabor. For 
instance, at that time, employing her clairvoyant Mama Chuy, the Virgin had exempted The 
Living from paying mandatory taxes and required the return of fees and “voluntary” quotas 
requested by Papa Nabor of all migrants who had entered the community to see their relatives 
(Del Val, Op. cit.). The cloistering of Mamá Chuy consolidated Nabor’s power. In 1999, 
Miguel Chávez Barrera was consecrated by him as bishop of La Ermita. Barrera then took the 
name of Santiago “El Mayor” (Santiago The Greater) and became second in command with 
the approval of the community and the newly appointed “Third Seer", Agapito Gómez Aguilar, 






5 The Spaniard dramatist Lope de Vega in his play “Fuenteovejuna” (1619) tells the story of a small town called 
Fuenteovejuna. After the murder of certain despicable high officer, known as “The Commendator”, guards from 
the King of Spain and many officers arrive to conduct investigation and prosecution. When the special prosecutor 





The Decline of Papá Nabor and the New Balance of Power 
 
After 2005 Papá Nabor retreated from public view, afflicted with multiple health 
conditions and of the effects of old age. The sedan chair he used to be transported around the 
city, so as not to touch the impure ground, was seen rarely. In his absence, Agapito began to 
impose his law in Papá Nabor’s name. To enforce compliance with this new law he formed 
“The Celestial Guard", a security force composed of a shifting number of heavily armed 
individuals under his command. Since its creation, The Celestial Guard has been accused of 
several murders. In May 2005, for instance, Mrs Bartola Cruz was shot to death for attempting 
to defend her family from expulsion (Marrero 2014; El Informador 2012). 
As a result of several previous confrontations and murder investigations, two members 
of The Celestial Guard, Federico Rodríguez and Leonardo Jiménez, were prosecuted and 
sentenced to twenty years in prison. Agapito was exonerated in the absence of proof that the 
said Guard was acting on his command. They claimed they had acted entirely under the direct 
command of the Virgin. Even so, a growing body of accusations of sexual assaults on young 
girls in the community, including rape, eventually made him leave The Holy City for a 
while. Agapito’s chequered past lends credence to the accusations. He was once imprisoned 
for a few months on charges of homicide, being released on license after paying a bond of three 
million Mexican pesos (120,000GBP, approximately). In 1998, he had been to jail for rape and 
murder after he had expelled 150 families and 31 priests. Surprisingly, the government of 
Michoacán paid the bond for him and Agapito was released (Marrero, 2014). The primacy 
assumed by Agapito in The New Jerusalem caused friction with bishop Santiago El Mayor, 
who, followed by thirty priests and hundreds of families from The Living, tried to assert his 
pre-eminence against the rule of Agapito. This led to the further polarisation of the people, so 
much so that Santiago and his followers in 2007 adapted a private home as the new 
community’s holy chapel, where they began to worship the Virgin away from the hermitage. 
There was a further escalation of violence when Agapito—who had returned to the 
walled city after his hiatus—taking advantage of his privileged position as a seer, persuaded 
his followers in early March 2007 to attack bishop Santiago The Greater and his priests. The 
seer Mamá Catalina had forewarned that Santiago was not a bishop but “a disguised snake that 
should be eliminated” (Lemús 2014:359). Agapito, sensing the opportunity to dispossess his 
formal superior from his position when Papá Nabor was too weak to intervene, decided to 




Agapito’s followers. Had they not taken shelter in their new chapel, they would have probably 
been killed.  
Santiago and his men were given an ultimatum: to leave the community within 10 days 
or to be burnt alive inside their chapel (Lemús, 2014). The government of the state of 
Michoacán, being made aware of the seriousness of the conflict, appointed Antonio Prado, a 
senior official, to act as a conciliator. However, his mediation was rejected by Santiago’s 
faction, who requested the intervention of the Head of Religious Affairs, a centralised office of 
the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Meanwhile, the print media began reporting the conflict in 
The New Jerusalem, attracting the attention of both the federal and the local government. 
On Sunday 11 March 2007 the ultimatum given to Santiago by Agapito passed. Tensions 
mounted. The people of The New Jerusalem saw for the very first time military personnel and 
army vehicles in the environs of The Holy City. The official explanation attributed the 
deployment of patrols to a raid performed by the local and federal government agents for the 
detection and prevention of drug trafficking, but the official show of force was enough to 
persuade Agapito to pause.  
Two days later, in the city of Morelia—the capital city of the state of Michoacán—the 
head of The Federal Office for Religious Affairs, Mr Servando García Pineda and Michoacán’s 
Minister of the Interior, Ms Guadalupe Sánchez Martínez, met to discuss the case of The New 
Jerusalem. No agreement was reached. In the meantime, the protesters—led by Santiago, who 
had managed to slip out of the city—travelled to Mexico City for an interview with the 
Directorate of The Federal Office for Religious Associations. They had already been calling 
for an urgent meeting with Mr Pineda, who had postponed the meeting on several occasions. 
Eventually, they were received by second-level officials but, once more, a solution was neither 
mooted nor promised. In his absence from The New Jerusalem, the followers of Santiago were 
reallocated near the walls with others who had faced ostracism before, living in shanty houses 
around the city walls.  
It may be wondered at this point why Santiago’s followers did not simply leave the 
New Jerusalem; why, like other dissidents and expellees, they preferred to live inside the 
community in proximity to the city’s walls as outcasts and renegades than to exit the 
community to join or form another.  The answer is that their belief system made it impossible 
for them to leave.  This system of belief, which they shared with the rulers of the community, 
was millenarian in character and its character had profound implications both for their own 
actions and for their interactions with wider society outside the walls of the city.  It was, as it 




rest of Mexican society—from the rest of humanity—and from other religious groups and 
associations that did not share the same character. For this reason, it is necessary to say more 
about what it involves and what it implies. 
 
Millenarianism and The New Jerusalem. 
 
The idea of millenarianism, frequently referred to as millennialism, is not a new one6. 
It is as old as religions themselves and it belongs to both monotheistic religions and polytheistic 
traditions. Though it is not exclusive to Christian religions, it is commonly associated with 
Protestantism and with conservative Catholic groups that regard the apocalyptic expectation as 
part of the unavoidable destiny of the world. Within the Christian tradition, millenarianism is 
referred to as “chiliasm” (chilia being the Greek word for “one thousand”). It assumes that the 
present order will be closed by a cataclysm and that a new supernatural order will take its place, 
preceding a final day of judgement (Cross 1915: 3-6).  It has its origins in the Judaic notion of 
the Messiah as one sent by God to vanquish the enemies of Israel and build the kingdom of 
God anew. At his coming, the prophet Jeremiah foretells, “shall Judah be saved, and Jerusalem 
shall dwell safely”.7 In the Christian tradition, this view finds universal expression in the Book 
of Revelation, which recounts a series of visions of St. John the Divine, in which an angel 
descends from heaven and binds Satan for a thousand years as Christ reigns on earth over those 
who have witnessed his truth. “And when the thousand years are expired”, John continues, 
“Satan shall be loosed out of his prison, And shall go out to deceive the nations…to gather 
them together” to bring battle to the city ruled over by Christ;8 and fire shall come down from 
God out of heaven and devour them, and the devil with be cast into the lake of fire and be 
tormented forever. And then all the dead “small and great [will] stand before God” and be 
judged according to their works, and death and hell with it will be cast into the lake of fire,9 
and there will be a new heaven and a new earth, and a new city “the Holy Jerusalem, descending 
out of heaven from God”.10  
 
6 Though academically and historically are used almost interchangeably, there is a slight difference between the 
terms. While “Millenarianism” refers to the violent cataclysm that will bring to an end the current state of affairs, 
“Millennialism” focuses more on the period of (at least) one thousand years of peace that will replace the present 
circumstances after that cataclysm. 
 
7 Jer. 33:16. 
8 Rev. 20:1-10. 
9 Rev. 20:11-15. 





Within mainstream Christianity, the early expectation of Christ’s imminent return to 
this world to liberate Christians, initially from Roman oppression, was replaced by St. 
Augustine of Hippo’s allegorical model of an other-worldly City of God anticipated in the 
Christian Church on earth. On this view, the Day of Judgement will not be preceded by a future 
millennium. Millenarian Christian beliefs thereafter became associated with dissident groups 
or sects and retained their appeal most strongly among those who were dispossessed, both 
culturally and economically. Perhaps reflecting the precariousness and misery of their current 
situation, many such groups espoused what Wessinger (2011: 718) calls “catastrophic 
millennialism”, that is, the belief in a major transformation of society that is about to come 
after a massive wave of destruction. The current world’s state of affairs is regarded as decadent 
and morally corrupted beyond any possible salvation. Therefore, only through a violent 
annihilation of the current social order can the Kingdom of God return. A convulsive cataclysm 
is necessary to fulfil the divine plan of God for The Earth. Divine action requires to make way 
for a perfect city. In the meantime, the group must expect persecution and oppression at the 
hands of God’s enemies, witnessing His truth until they are liberated from their oppressors. 
The crucial feature of this liberation is that it is collective in character.  By definition 
the transition anticipated is a transition to collective salvation in which the faithful, and only 
the faithful, will experience eternal well-being; all the unpleasant limitations of the human 
condition will be eliminated, but only here, only for us. The “here” and the “us” are decisive. 
Salvation is not something that can be achieved or experienced by individuals alone on a 
spiritual plane. The righteous city, on this view, is like Noah’s Ark before the deluge: it is a 
bounded physical space and only those inside it can escape destruction. The effect is to tie 
together the fate of individuals with the fate of the group; or more precisely, to subsume the 
ultimate concern of the individual into that of the group, because the salvation of the individual 
cannot be separated from group belonging. As Wessinger notes, this structure of beliefs tends 
towards fundamentalism and fanaticism, because its cognitive components include “absolute 
confidence that one has the truth and that others are wrong and evil”; “no openness to 
considering other points of view”; “radical dualism”, that is, the conviction that there is a battle 
between good and evil and that evil is everywhere; and a tendency to think that “the end 
justifies the means”, such that one is willing to kill or die to protect the ultimate concern 
(Wessinger 2011: 719-20). 
 For much the same reasons, she continues, millennial groups are prone to fall into 
violence due to “internal factors and stresses combined with the experience [or expectation] of 




Given the marginalized position of many such groups, the violence often is directed inwards, 
towards group members who are felt to be endangering the group’s collective fate, or ultimate 
concern (Wessinger 2011: 719; and at length Wessinger 2000).  It will be seen that the New 
Jerusalem, so-named for reasons which become plainer in light of what has been said above, 
falls almost perfectly into this pattern.  
The members of the New Jerusalem anticipate the total physical destruction of the 
world as we know it. Every single city and house elsewhere in the world will be destroyed with 
the sole and only exception of the holiest city of The New Jerusalem (Nabor, n.d.). Everyone 
outside the city shall perish and only the truly faithful citizens that happen to simultaneously 
be in the grace of God and also physically located in the grounds of The New Jerusalem will 
survive the cataclysm that will consume the entire world (Nabor, op cit). 
      In this respect, The New Jerusalem is in keeping with many other millenarian groups. They 
all claim that since the world and its rules are full of immorality of all kinds, the only way to 
be preserved from moral decadence is to ignore the surrounding rules and laws and to observe 
only God’s, or in this case, the holy virgin’s ones. The dramatic final event to come is 
anticipated to bring chaos and destruction but, eventually, the instauration of a renewed, 
purified society in which only the true believers will be rewarded with survival. The victory of 
the divine forces is considered as predetermined and the only way to benefit from that expected 
victory is the rejection of the world, that is, by voluntary isolation and withdrawal.  
Many New Jerusalems have existed throughout History, with the same or similar 
names: The Holy City, The Tabernacle of God, The Heavenly Jerusalem, Zion, The Celestial 
City, The City of God and others besides. Apart from “The Catholic, Orthodox, Traditional 
‘New Jerusalem’ Church” that Papa Nabor established in Michoacán in 1973, there are other 
churches that also bear the “New Jerusalem” denomination. For instance, “The General Church 
of The New Jerusalem” is a Swedenborgian Christian Episcopal Church that was founded in 
1890. It distinguishes itself from other Swedenborgian churches by its strong beliefs and 
teachings on the Second Coming. In other words, by its millenarian nature. There is a rather 
discreet Christian church called “The New Jerusalem Ministries International Christian 
Church” in Cape Town, led by self-called Prophet V. Dyani and Prophetess A. Dyani. The 
information about their theological convictions is almost inexistent but its name and quasi 
clandestine character make it likely to be of a millenarian order too11.   
 
11 Their online page available only allows to make donations to a bank account but fails to provide further details 




Every “New Jerusalem” looks backwards as well as forwards; forwards to the end of 
days, but also backwards to the Old Testament and the restoration of the Jewish Temple 
describted by the prophets Ezekial, Zechariah, and Isaiah.12 The Book of Zechariah (2:4-5) 
establishes God’s intervention in the founding of the city of Jerusalem. Zechariah describes 
and details a wall13 surrounding the city, specially designed to protect its massive population. 
In the Book of Isaiah (54:11-14) the city is referred to as a place free from moral decay and 
full of righteousness. On these grounds Papa Nabor, allegedly urged by the holy virgin herself 
through her clairvoyant Mamá Salomé, decided to build up a high wall to preserve the purity 
and the holiness of the sacred city—a mirror of the original Jerusalem and the heavenly 
Jerusalem to come—as a means of protection from the outside world’s impurity, keeping its 
evils at bay until the day of deliverance (Nabor, op cit). 
To summarise: the city itself, on this view, is sacred.  It is the only site of salvation on 
the earth, a salvation that is corporate or collective in character. For the followers of the group, 
to live and remain in the city is a matter of ultimate concern, because salvation involves both 
group membership and geographical location. It is necessary to be inside the city walls when 
the fateful day comes and, as that day is at once imminent but known only to God, to leave the 
city is never a viable option: “Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will not pass 
away. But as for that day or hour, nobody knows it, neither the angels of heaven, nor the Son; 
no one but the Father”.14  
The importance of this point for assessing the adequacy of the “right of exit” that figures 
centrally in much liberal and multicultural literature on minority groups will be obvious. Such 
an assessment will be offered in chapter 5, below.  What matters for present purposes is that it 
explains what is otherwise so difficult to understand, namely, why the members of the 
community refused to leave despite the depredations, violence, and misery to which they and 
their children were endlessly subjected. 
The history of the community, as we shall see, is a history of violence and the violation 
of rights: after the disaster that divided the community in 1982 during the battle for succession 
of Mamá Salomé; the internal dispute over the leadership of the community in 2008 in the 
aftermath of Papa Nabor’s decay and death, and during the crisis that confronted the 
community in 2012 over the burning of the school, hundreds of families were forcibly evicted 
from their homes.  Yet their exodus led them not into the desert but no further than the vicinity 
 
12 See Eze. 40-48; Zech. 2; Isa. 54:11-14). 
13 Originally described in the Hebrew Bible as a wall of fire. 




of the city, at the foot of its walls, clinging to the only geographic space that could offer them 
salvation in the last days. They were expelled but they did not leave because they could not 
leave. They stayed, stacked on the periphery, in ever more precarious living conditions, lacking 
all sorts of services and facing every day the embarrassment of ostracism, because such 
deprivations were as nothing when set against their ultimate concern. They remained because 
they came to stay and be saved. Salvation is collective, not individual; their ultimate concern 
as individuals, paradoxically, cannot be realized as individuals. It requires them to share the 
fate of their community, whatever direction it takes in the meantime, until the apocalypse 
comes. 
 
The Death of Papá Nabor 
 
After 32 years of charismatic rule15, Papá Nabor was in physical and mental decline. 
Several times between 2005 and 2008 news of his alleged death spread like wildfire. He 
eventually passed away, aged 97, on 19 February 2008, after a long period of illness in which 
Parkinson’s disease and other infirmities had rendered him oblivious to the chaos that his 
declining health and vitality had brought to the community. Yet, perhaps confusingly, the 
struggle to succeed him that accelerated in his last years implied no diminution of his 
authority.  His name retained the power to command and to impose discipline, at least among 
the wider population, and to do so legitimately (Lemús, Op. cit.).  
Papá Nabor was regarded not only the founding father of The Holy City but also the Holy 
Father too. In the Spanish language, Papa can mean “Pope” and he was indeed addressed and 
often treated as such. Oral tradition maintains that this status was acknowledged by an 
unexpected source: in 1983 the bishop Néstor Guijarro González, a member of “The Old 
Traditional Orthodox Apostolic Holy Catholic Church of Mexico16” came to The New 
Jerusalem to dispossess Nabor from his religious office for his heretical assertion that the 
Virgin had appeared in The New Jerusalem. It was said afterwards that Papá Nabor was waiting 
 
15Charismatic Authority was defined by Weber (1968) as: “resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism 
or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by 
him.” 
16Apart from the Roman Catholic Church, there are a few non-Roman Catholic churches. In Mexico, at least five 
are registered. Formally, The New Jerusalem should be registered as one of them. Still, until present The New 
Jerusalem Church (TNJ) has no interest in registering before the Sub secretariat of Religious Affairs that belongs 
to the Ministry of the Interior. As a result, the Sub secretariat declares itself incompetent to hear about the business 





for the bishop as if he had been expecting him for a long while (Lemús 2014:388). The two did 
not pass a word until they were locked in the priest’s hall. After four hours, the bishop did not 
dispossess Papá Nabor of any position. Instead, he got down on his knees to kiss Nabor’s ring.  
 The memory of Papá Nabor is everywhere. More than two decades since the priest 
passed away, his presence remains ubiquitous inside the walls of The Holy City. He has a 
temple of his own, where he is remembered and given the treatment of a saint: there are pictures 
and portraits of him on the altar and candles burn ceaselessly. In the collective imagination, the 
spirit of Papá Nabor can travel from house to house. He can even stay as a visitor for a while 
in those homes where the behaviour of their inhabitants is pure and honest. Only those who 
have lived according to the strict rules he laid down on the Virgin’s behalf have had the 
privilege to see him. Or so they say (ibid.). 
After Nabor’s death, the question of succession could not be avoided. The pre-eminent 
claimant, by virtue of present possession, was Agapito, The Blessed, originally a pilgrim from 
the state of Hidalgo and now self-appointed heir presumptive to Papá Nabor. Aguilar was third 
in a line of seers going back to Mamá Salomé. The Blessed not only talked to the Virgin, but 
also claimed to communicate with the spirit and voice of General Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (a 
former and beloved Mexican president who was also born in the state of Michoacán), who 
supposedly instructed him on how to govern wisely. Yet Santiago had been appointed as second 
in command and favourite for succession by Papá Nabor himself.  Before carrying on with the 
narrative, it is important to understand that nowadays the distribution of power of The New 
Jerusalem is heavily concentrated in the hands of the bishop Saint Martín de Tours and the 
figure of the holy seer Mamá Catalina. Therefore, I need to devote a few words to the nature 
of these leaders before delving into the crisis that motivated this thesis. It is imperative to state 
at the very onset that the power of these two is absolute. Since they took office after the death 
of Papá Nabor, they have met no limits to rule the destiny of the inhabitants of The New 
Jerusalem. Apart from The Dissidents, who only reckon the authority of bishop Santiago El 
Mayor, Saint Martín de Tours has the power to sanction, impose new rules or change the 
existing ones, expel people from the community, order new priests, remove someone from their 
position and so on. The only counterbalance to his power is the voice of Mamá Catalina. Both, 
however, draw their powers from different sources. While the bishop derives his authority from 
the Holy Father Nabor, the power of the seer comes from her direct communication with the 
Holy Virgin of El Rosario.  
Mamá Catalina is the daughter of the former seer Agapito, The Blessed, who died of 




secured his succession: he managed to impose Martín de Tours as the new leader of The Holy 
City and her daughter, Catalina, as the legitimate new seer (Varela, 2012). It was claimed that 
her ability to be contacted by the Virgin came directly by the grace of her father who was the 
first man to have communicated with Her. She had started to hear the Virgin’s voice as a child; 
as she grew older, she began to have divine apparitions. The messages she communicated were 
typically uncompromising. The Virgin, she recounted, wanted to kill the “evil snake” (Lemús 
2014:359) incarnated in Santiago. She had ordered the expulsion of 150 families who had 
become “impure” by following him (Ibid.). 
The New Jerusalem, not surprisingly, quickly split into two camps. On one side were 
“The Loyals”. They accepted every prophecy coming from the current seer without question, 
regarding her as the voice of the Virgin herself. (Varela, 2012). The only source of authority 
that they recognised and respected, besides hers, is that of Saint Martín de Tours, whom they 
venerate as the rightful successor of Papá Nabor. The Loyals called themselves such because 
they had “had the courage” (Lemús 2014:387) to remain loyal to the founding ideals of the 
city, which they continued to control. 
On the other side were those known as “The Dissidents”, who constitute a minority 
(between a third and a quarter) of the total population. These were followers of Santiago who 
rejected the authority of Saint Martín de Tours and of Agapito, whom Santiago accused of 
usurping power during Papá Nabor’s last days. The Dissidents questioned Mamá’s prophecies, 
especially when they seemed to encourage people to violence. They constituted a more liberal 
group inside the community. They wanted their children to be educated in a formal school and 
took a more relaxed view of pastoral and religious discipline.  
Yet for all their differences with the Loyalists, and scepticism about the authority of their 
seers, the Dissidents share the same millenarian viewpoint: there will be an end of the world 
and it is nigh. However, they look forward to its coming as a time when the wrongs they have 
suffered at the hands of The Loyals will be retributed. Not surprisingly, tensions within the 
community remained high, kept in check only by the imbalance of power between the Loyals, 
who comprised around three quarters of the population, and the Dissidents, who were pushed 
to the margins.  
The period of relative stability that followed was upset in 2010, when the Mexican state 
authorities built the first elementary school in the community, provoking a second crisis that 
continues to this day. In the beginning, the school ran quite smoothly (Varela, 2012). However, 
The Loyals quickly decided that the school could continue to operate only if the teachers 




they ought to wear long skirts down to the ankle and they should cover their heads with a veil 
at all times. It was the Virgin’s will that children should have their hair cut very short and that 
they would not be allowed to practise any kind of sport since it was against her commandments. 
After an official demand was handed over to the School Principal, seeking adjustments to 
students’ uniform, the school refused to follow the sacred regulations commanded by the 
Virgin. Aggrieved, The Loyals invaded the school and from August 2011 inhibited its teaching 
activities (Marrero, 2014). 
From that date, “obedient” children were allowed to attend what was now the only 
authorised school in the village, the religious institute San Juan Bosco founded by Papá Nabor. 
In this school, children were taught how to read and write, but all books apart from The Bible 
were forbidden with the exception of the catechism written by Papá Nabor (itself heavily 
indebted to Ripalda’s traditional catechism)17. To join the school a recommendation letter 
written either by one of the priests or by three nuns was needed. After the seer Agapito warned 
Papá Nabor that the devil would enter the community through science and technology, 
electronic devices and other educational aids were banned. As he had put it, “Children do not 
need schools because schools are tools used by the devil to pull up the souls of the holy people 
of The New Jerusalem” (Lemús 2014:394). For similar reasons, there was no curriculum to 
speak of, because the only valid knowledge was said to come from the inspiration of the Virgin.  
The messages received from the Virgin by Mamá Catalina were often inflammatory. At 
least on five occasions, according to Lemús (op. cit.), she urged the Loyals to set fire to the 
temples of The Dissidents because their services offend her. She commanded the “The Guards 
of Jesús María” (the current armed group of The Loyals that replaced the former “Celestial 
Guard” commanded by Agapito) to use their weapons against The Dissidents if they resisted. 
 
“The Virgin wants blood!” 
 
On 6 July 2012, it came to light that Mamá Catalina had told Bishop Saint Martín de 
Tours that the Virgin had commanded the destruction of the school because the devil had taken 
refuge in the classrooms. 24 men were dispatched with the task of burning the school to the 
ground. 
 
17Jerónimo de Ripalda (1536-1618) was a Spaniard theologian who wrote The Catechism with a short Introduction 
of The Christian Doctrine in 1591. His Catechism was favourite in Southern Spain and was used vastly during the 
colonization of the New World. It was translated to many Mexican languages and used for centuries. His stark 
vision of hell and heaven and punishment for the sinners terrified children and adults for centuries and has been 




Saint Martín de Tours had interceded on previous occasions to restrain the more 
belligerent messages conveyed by Mamá Catalina from the Virgin, urging that further signs of 
her will were needed to confirm the messages. On this occasion, such a sign was received. A 
newspaper reported that a prisoner in Livingston, Texas, facing the death penalty, was spared 
after his lawyer persuaded the judge that new evidence on the case had been found and should 
be taken into consideration. The bishop interpreted this event as a clear sign that the world 
itself was closer than ever to the end. “If criminals are being released —he thought—it means 
that the end of the world is coming”. Thus, he gave his consent for the school to be destroyed 
(Marrero, 2014). 
The order to burn the school was passed on to the sheriff Carlos Cruz Cárdenas, 
nominally the highest civil authority within the city but actually under the aegis of the bishop. 
Immediately the sheriff sought the help of the Guards of Jesús and María, and the armed guard 
of the bishop, to execute the task.  The message was conveyed, “The Virgin wants blood!” 
(Lemús 2014:401). Apparently, this formula was very successful, since it took the men less 
than four hours to reduce the school to ashes. It was said that the nuns played an enthusiastic 
supporting role, for they reportedly prayed, sang, and cheered the demolition on (Ibid.). They 
also reminded the men that by doing this work they were preserving their holy traditions and 
warranting their place in heaven. The Dissidents called for help from the federal authorities, 
but none was forthcoming. 
On the contrary, the followers of Mamá Catalina now demanded that the government of 
Michoacán take immediate action to cleanse the Holy City of all the Dissidents, so that The 
Loyals’ tradition could remain untouched. The Dissidents were accused of not following the 
instructions of the Virgin and inducing her displeasure, as evidenced by the particularly dry 
season that they experienced in 2012 and other natural disasters in the surrounding areas 
(Lemús, 2014). However, their petition was not accepted by the authorities of the state.  
To avoid further conflict and controversy, the governor’s administration (at the time 
Fausto Vallejo, an infirm local politician, accused of corruption and reportedly having links 
with organised crime, was in office) started a foot-dragging process of mediation, in parallel 
authorising the construction of some prefabricated classrooms in the nearby village of La 
Injertada for the children of the burned school. The Secretary of State, an experienced politician 
named Jesús Reyna (also accused of corruption and years later imprisoned), was charged with 
de-escalating the conflict at The New Jerusalem. This response needs to be seen against the 




The New Jerusalem has a total adult population of approximately 2,533 people18, which, 
according to Varela (2012) and Lemús (2014) is basically the same number of voters that 
support the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in every election. Traditionally, PRI has 
used “Clientelismo” (political patronage) to co-opt voters all over the country. PRI ruled 
Mexico for over 77 years, 71 of those uninterruptedly. Since the Virgin appeared in 1973, she 
has evinced clear political preferences and communicated those preferences to her followers 
succinctly and, it seems, unanimously. Normally, owing to vote concentration for Governor 
elections in the state of Michoacán, the difference between the winner and defeated in the 
electoral district where The New Jerusalem is located (District XIX Tacámbaro/Turicato)19 is 
very small, often the gap is around 3,000 to 5,000 votes. With such a tight political race, and 
by a quirk of demography, the candidate who has the Virgin’s favour in The New Jerusalem 
tends to be the one who wins Tacámbaro District and, owing to vote’s concentration and a 
variety of political and geographical factors, often also the state’s election. All the recent 
governors of Michoacán have found it prudent to visit the Virgin of El Rosario and ask for her 
blessing before the elections and have endeavoured to make this their only engagement with 
the community once they have secured office.  
The result is a tacit understanding between the self-called Holy City authorities and the 
state’s authorities, a kind of “give and take” agreement: if the governor turns a blind eye to 
what happens inside the walls of The New Jerusalem, then that government secures the votes 
of the community with the Virgin’s favour.20 (see IEM 2001, 1995, 1992). The second crisis 
brought this non-explicit agreement to an end, for events turned in a way that created a public 
outcry for action. Let us see how the Mexican authorities responded to that call. 
 
The Mexican Government’s Response to the Crisis 
 
Newspaper reports made the wider public aware of the events and the state authorities 
were compelled to act. Under the federal system in Mexico, state power is devolved or diffused 
down to a proliferation of intermediate bodies, political and judicial, each with its own sphere 
of responsibility for administration at different levels of government. 
 
18 INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography). Census 2010. The data is clearly outdated but the holy 
authorities of the city have refused to grant public access to the community to update demographic data since 
2010. 
19 IEM. Distritos Electorales Locales (Electoral Institute of Michoacán. Local Electoral Districts).  
20We could say that The New Jerusalem behaves, in electoral terms, in a rather similar way to a “hinge party” as 
it sells its political support at a very high price: the candidate favoured by TNJ will look away from the city’s 




Mexico is a federal republic, in which all its 32 states are sovereign and have full 
autonomy to rule themselves. Each state or province has its own executive, legislative and 
judicial powers21. The executive power is headed by the governor of the state; the legislative 
power operates through a local congress and each state also has its own High Court of Justice. 
The local judiciary deals with common crimes, but not with more serious offences such as 
murder, kidnapping or drug trafficking, as they constitute federal crimes that fall under the 
jurisdiction of the National Supreme Court of Justice22. There are certain realms, such as 
migration, national security or religious affairs that belong exclusively under the central 
federation. The Mexican federal structure has been strongly influenced by the American model 
but the former is more of the “holding together” type, rather than the “coming together” kind 
that defines American federalism (see a concise differentiation between the two systems in 
Stepan 1999). Many of the most important decisions still depend on a heavily centralised 
system. 
Since the situation at The New Jerusalem is a religious conflict, it was the federal 
government, in particular The Ministry of the Interior through The Under Secretariat of 
Religious Affairs that was formally responsible for addressing the crisis. However, the central 
government, adducing a respectful exercise of federalism, managed to pass on the issue to the 
local government via a technicality that turned a federal problem into a local matter. 
To structure my account of the governmental response to the crisis in The New 
Jerusalem, I will explore the words and actions of key actors within three widening circles of 
government, starting from the inner circle, namely the municipality of Turicato, represented by 
its mayor. Geographically, the Holy City falls within its territory and therefore under its 
juridical administration. Then, I will analyse the local response addressing the intervention of 
a few high-ranking officers who were engaged with the problem, starting with Michoacán 
state’s minister of education, Teresa Guido; the governor of the state, Fausto Vallejo Figueroa 
and his spokesperson; the Secretary of the State of Michoacán, Jesús Reyna; the local congress, 
represented by the comments of some deputies from the main political parties, and the local 
High Court of Justice. Finally, I will explore the performance of the federal institutions and 
their officers and the national political actors that played a significant role during the crisis. 
 
21 Mexican Political Constitution. Article 40: “It is the will of the Mexican people to become a representative, 
democratic, secular, Federal Republic, composed of free and sovereign States in everything concerning their 
internal regime; but united in a National Federation established according to the principles of this fundamental 
law”. (Translation is mine). 





The Mayor of the District of Turicato 
 
Salvador Barreda, mayor of Turicato, was openly hostile to the community and its 
authorities from the very beginning. He expressed a desire to break up the community and to 
send its spiritual leaders to prison. He never acknowledged the rights or even the existence of 
a community that, for him, was not part of the rule of law. (Proceso, 2012). He construed the 
crisis at The New Jerusalem as a political competition between fanatic political chiefs over 
control of the city. When the elementary school was burned, he demanded that the executive 
and judicial powers of Michoacán produce necessary arrest warrants against the leaders of The 
New Jerusalem and those responsible for the destruction of the school: “I have always said the 
government cannot yield for the rule of law is not to be negotiated but imposed. We, as legally 
elected authorities, are here to guarantee the observance of the rule of law”23 (Rosiles, 
2012:1)24. Barreda accused the spiritual leaders of The Holy City of having links with the local 
drug lords25 and even asserted that they had built a clandestine runway inside the walls of The 
Holy City to facilitate drug trafficking (Álvarez, 2012). 
Some political analysts have suggested that Barreda, the political rival of the ruling 
government at the time, was exploiting the case to score political points. He was overcritical 
of the state’s officers, the governor himself and particularly Jesus Reyna, the Secretary of the 
State, his sworn political enemy. In contrast, other authorities in the state opposed the mayor’s 
position as they understood that bloodshed would hardly be a desirable solution to the conflict. 
As time passed and the clashes in The New Jerusalem dragged on, he moderated his 
speech and even asked the state’s authorities to slow down the judicial procedures against the 
people implicated in the crimes committed inside the community, in order to win some time to 






23 The translation into the English language, as all translations from the Spanish language made in this document, 
is mine.  
24 Cited in Marrero (2014). 




The Congress of Michoacán 
 
The left-of-centre Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), at the time the ruling political 
force in the state of Michoacán, also used jurisprudential arguments to justify their position. 
They criticised the violations of several authoritative legal regulations by the self-styled holy 
authorities of The New Jerusalem. For instance, they quoted Article 26 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1949), which states that “Everyone has the right to education”, 
that “Elementary education shall be compulsory”, and that “(…) parents have a prior right to 
choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children”26. Some deputies drew 
attention to the abuses of women’s rights that were known to be ongoing in The New Jerusalem. 
Deputy Cristina Portillo, for example, argued that in The New Jerusalem the rule of law was 
not applied universally but inverted: women had many obligations but no rights at all. She 
added that when she was head of The Secretariat of Woman’s Affairs, she unsuccessfully 
sought to prosecute seer Agapito Gómez over the rape of two daughters of Mrs Georgina 
Vigueras (El Informador, 2012).  
Yet, despite many deputies criticising The New Jerusalem’s regime, the effect of the 
speeches from all sides was more rhetorical than practical. They expressed strong disapproval 
but they did not propose any solution other than demanding the local executive powers enforce 
the rule of law without delay.  
 The National Action Party (PAN) made it clear from the beginning that it was not the 
responsibility of the Michoacán’s congress in general, nor their party in particular (either at the 
federal or the local level) to solve the crisis. According to them, the responsibility of doing so 
lay entirely with the government of Governor Fausto Vallejo. The local deputies participated 
in a debate organised in the local congress only to clarify that they had no legal or moral 
obligation to intervene. They argued that the congress had no jurisdiction over The New 
Jerusalem, and so no right to intervene, even if they wished to do so. On similar grounds they 
excused their federal colleagues at the national congress’ assembly from getting involved. 
(Martínez Elorriaga 2012b:45). 
Congresswoman Laura González, at the time president of the local congress’ 
Commission on Human Rights, accused the state’s executive of maintaining a superficial and 
 
26 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was approved by The United Nations General Assembly in Paris 
on 10 December 1948. The version cited here was released in January 1949 and published by the U.S. 




self-serving policy towards the conflict in The New Jerusalem. (La Jornada Michoacán, 2012). 
She criticised the slow response which, in her view, expressed indifference to the violations of 
fundamental rights committed in The New Jerusalem. For González, as for the vast majority of 
members of the local congress, what was occurring at La Ermita—the name she and others 
used metonymically for The New Jerusalem—contravened parents’ and children’s rights and 
there was not much to be added (Ibid., 2012). The state should impose its authority and 
guarantee the immediate return of children to classes. 
 Deputy Selene Vázquez, also a member of the left-wing party PRD, was particularly 
fierce in her condemnation of the de facto autonomy of the Naborist community27: “It is the 
sovereignty of the state that has been violated. The state cannot protect its citizens because it 
seems they are a separate republic where they do not follow the rule of law nor the constitution, 
but they only follow their pseudo-prophet”. (La Jornada, 25 August 2012). 
 The congress demanded action by the governor of the state and his secretaries. 
However, they absolved themselves on legal grounds from involvement in the negotiations 
around a solution to the crisis, and did not acknowledge that the piecemeal response that they 
were criticising had at least one merit – it had prevented further violence and bloodshed, even 
if this was more by luck than judgment. They commended the use of force by the state as a 
matter of principle: fundamental rights were being violated, the authority of the state was being 
mocked, ergo the state must resort to the use of force and bring The New Jerusalem into line 
with the norms of the wider society in which the rights being violated were protected. This 
principled posture glossed over the right to freedom of belief consecrated in the Political 
Constitution of The United Mexican States28, nor did it explicitly consider the human costs of 
a coercive intervention in a fundamentalist community, some of whose members were ready 
to give their lives to defend and preserve their beliefs and ways of living.  
 
The Ministry of Education  
 
The state’s Minister of Education, Teresa Herrera Guido, when first asked about the 
situation in The New Jerusalem, denied that the school had been destroyed. When a day later 
journalists showed her videos and pictures of the incinerated school, she accepted that she had 
 
27 “The Naborist community” is another way to refer to The New Jerusalem, standing for “Papá Nabor’s 
community”. 




been misinformed (Marrero, 2014). She said that as they had successfully done in other 
communities, they were in a position to build classrooms using prefabricated material that 
eventually could be collapsible and portable. She was unable to confirm where the new 
structures would be located (García M., 2012). 
When, as the public official responsible for education in Michoacán she was asked when 
the classrooms were to be rebuilt and classes resumed, Guido replied, “In the community what 
is needed first is to pacify both groups. I think we first need to secure peace and then we should 
worry about the school. The school is just the tip of a deeper conflict in The New Jerusalem”. 
(El Informante Jalisco, 2012). This position was more cautious than the view expressed by 
Jesús Reyna, who affirmed that the classes would be resumed that very month. Guido’s position 
was that more fundamental problems had to be dealt with first: “inside the social tissue of the 
community there should be an internal agreement that makes for peaceful coexistence. The 
problem is that I do not think it is time to impose a school inside a town where its inhabitants 
are suspicious of each other. The parties should come closer before we can just go and re-plant 
a school” (cited in Marrero 2014:173). Guido was even ready to offer the Dissidents lessons 
for their children directly in their homes, all meant to avoid bloodshed at all costs.  
Guido showed a broader understanding of the conflict when she was interviewed on the 
question by a local diary: “It is a cultural question that we should try to understand. It is a war, 
a modern clash, a religious one, and this is quite common, more common than we think. It is 
all about beliefs. When beliefs become dogma, we tend to fail to listen to the other. We do not 
listen enough because we believe that our beliefs are the right ones”. (El Informante Jalisco, 
2012). Unfortunately, the local press (Mi Morelia daily newspaper, amongst others) chose to 
misconstrue her words and reported that the Minister was proposing a religious war as a 
solution when she merely tried to draw attention to the already brewing religious confrontation 
that led to the destruction of the school (Vanguardia, 2012).  
Other confrontations, administrative and bureaucratic rather than religious, were brewing 
between different governmental bodies too. A call was raised by the National Commission on 
Human Rights (CNDH), exhorting the state government and Ministry of Education to take 
immediate action to protect the citizenry and to guarantee fundamental rights such as education, 
freedom of belief, freedom of transit and the right to live in a safe environment (Cruz, 2012). 
Moreover, the state’s Human Rights Commissioner, Mr Jorge Cázares Torres, criticised the 
inaction of Guido and indicated that she might have to step down (Arias, 2012). Guido came 
to know about the Human Rights Commission demands only through the press and she retorted 




was necessary to wait for the conflict to settle down (Marrero, 2014).  However, she accepted 
the recommendation of the Human Rights body and said that classes were going to be resumed 
inside the Dissidents’ homes.  
The local executive did not approve that recommendation, because the press had 
meanwhile reported that children were facing the aggression of The Loyals, who were unhappy 
with the shift to Home school policy. They accused the Dissidents of profiteering by asking the 
state government to pay them rent for using their houses as classrooms. The Ministry of 
Education, which had earlier stated publicly that classes were to be resumed in people’s houses, 
was forced to an inelegant volte face. The very next day the spokesperson for the governor 
denied that this had ever been contemplated. This turnabout further worsened the conflict and 
soon The Dissidents let it be known that they feared further violence. 
The response from the local official institutions was extremely uncoordinated. The lack 
of inter-institutional communication was reflected in the daily news that kept reporting chaotic 
and contradictory information from different official bodies. While some observers tried to 
follow the conflict through the press, others quickly concluded that whatever was published 
one day would be denied the next, adding to the uncertainty and confusion of the unusual 
situation in The New Jerusalem.  
In the following weeks, the violence the Dissidents had predicted materialised. The 
Loyals physically assaulted the Dissidents and pelted them with rocks. These events ended 
every trace of hope of the children enrolling in time for the new academic term in time. A 
powerless Minister of Education admitted, “we cannot resume lessons (...) we tried our best to 
settle down (the conflicting parties) and offer an alternative for the children but we do not meet 
the minimum safety requirements to make that possible” (Martínez, 2012).  
These words stood in striking contrast to the confident attitude of the local executive. 
Through his state secretary, Governor Fausto Vallejo had been saying that the situation was 
under control and that the classes were going to resume normally. Reyna, Secretary of the State 
of Michoacán, kept saying the same thing until he was contradicted by Teresa Guido. Guido 
became a target for criticism from a very well-known teacher’s union leader in Michoacán, 
Jorge Cásarez. He accused her of incompetence, of being incapable of providing even a 
temporary structure for children. He called her a “mythomaniac” (Ramos, 2012) and demanded 
her resignation. The conflict had reached a stalemate, but the main actors in Michoacán were 






The Secretary of State 
 
For many, Jesús Reyna, Secretary of State and former powerful leader of the local 
congress, was the real governor of Michoacán. He was a well-known, highly experienced 
politician who had been deputy many times, high officer of several administrations under PRI’s 
(National Institutionalist Party) rule and, it must be added, accused of corruption and heavily 
linked to the local mafia. His charismatic personality and the ineffectiveness of then Governor 
Fausto Vallejo, ageing and unwell, made him a powerful Secretary of State and the leading 
candidate to be the next Governor. Eventually, he became an acting governor for six months 
as Vallejo became seriously ill and had to step down. In all probability Reyna would have 
continued in office, had he not been imprisoned in 2014 for his alleged links to some of the 
most heinous organised-crime gangs in Michoacán29. 
Reyna was a de facto leader of the pragmatic wing of the state. A highly contradictory 
man, he proved to be stubborn and insensitive, especially in the early stages of the conflict. In 
time, he became more aware of the complexities of the situation (Martínez, 2012). By the 
beginning of August 2012, Reyna was negotiating with both groups, trying to convince them 
to coexist peacefully. He held meetings with representatives of both factions and he urged them 
to live amicably “without having to share exactly the same beliefs” (NTR Zacatecas, 2012). He 
failed because the groups were becoming more and more polarised, the loyal Traditionalists 
rejecting the public school and the Dissidents demanding its reopening. Reyna, meanwhile, 
was trying to impress the people of La Ermita by adopting an unyielding position. Like most 
rural leaders in central and southern Mexico, he wanted to play up to his “macho” image: 
always demanding instead of suggesting, imposing rather than bargaining, giving ultimatums 
and deadlines30. He announced that the academic year was to be resumed by 29 August inside 
the community. He assured everyone inside and outside The New Jerusalem that lessons would 
resume normally in a few days in La Ermita. He went on record with the same message. He 
even claimed that a police station was going to be opened in the community to ensure that his 
order was upheld.  
 
29Jesús Reyna was released from prison in 2018 (after spending five years in jail) for lack of evidence to condemn 
him. He claims to have been a scapegoat that was made to pay for Governor Fausto Vallejo’s son. A video of 
Vallejo’s son negotiating with several crime lords of Michoacán became viral after Reyna’s imprisonment. 
However, the Governor’s son never went to jail. 
30 To see more about the authoritative nature of the Mexican political culture see Camin and Meyer (1993); Marvan 




Notwithstanding Reyna’s claims, no agreement had been reached. The Traditionalists 
were adamant that the school would not be relocated inside The Holy City: the Virgin had 
forbidden it. The Dissidents, contrariwise, were appealing to the Mexican Constitution, saying 
that their children had the right to access education inside their community. Violent clashes 
were not ruled out and the community was on high alert, especially at night when tensions 
came to the surface (Marrero, 2014). When questioned, Reyna denied any previous knowledge 
of episodes of violence in The New Jerusalem. He also confirmed the resumption of classes on 
20 August (although he knew such a thing was impossible) and when asked by the press how 
the government would deal with potential riots and violence, he mockingly responded, “by 
force” (Cano, 2012). When asked about the nature and dimension of that “force”, he was 
offhand: “we can leave up to a thousand men if we want” (Cano, Op. cit.). 
It is surprising that Reyna adopted this line when he knew beforehand that the 
government he represented had neither the infrastructure nor the minimal conditions to offer 
such a commitment. Soon enough it was clear that the government of the state had been unequal 
to the case and that the internal communication, the coherence of the strategy to deal with the 
problem and the real capacity to solve it had fallen far short of expectations.   
It was at this point that Reyna, with Fernando Cano (his right-hand man) and Julio 
Hernández, the governor’s spokesperson, visited The New Jerusalem. They were accompanied 
by a large group of mass media workers. This visit—that took place around July 2012—was 
unprecedented and it is unique since, after this brief incursion, the community decided to 
become even more closed. They made sure the media was never allowed inside the community 
again. The Loyals accepted the visit, in part because they hoped that they could still negotiate 
legal pardons with Michoacán’s highest authorities, since arrest warrants had been dispatched 
against some of their members as a result of their collusion to destroy the school.  
After that meeting, the state authorities realised that the Naborists were too rigid to 
mitigate the situation and agree with the restoration of the school within the community. Reyna 
leaned towards defending the installation of the school outside the walls. The long-questioned 
option of the prefabricated classrooms, about which he had earlier expressed grave doubts, 
became his new best bet (Marrero, 2014). Later this month, on 14 July 2012, during a press 
conference Reyna announced that peace had been reached between the two groups; that they 
had agreed to accept a police station inside the community and that children would be attending 
classes the next day. They did not.  
The violence exploded during late July and early August through street quarrels and 




could not get out of the community to take lessons elsewhere. They built two gates in the only 
entrance to replace the old chain and exercised 24-hour control over pedestrian traffic in and 
out of La Ermita. On 29 October, the police were expelled from The Holy City by 500 fanatical 
women acting at the Virgin’s command (Martínez, 2012). It became clear that the children 
would not be resuming classes any time soon. At this point, Reyna began to moderate his 
position. He said that it was necessary to move towards a peaceful coexistence between the 
groups, that the conflict was so deep and culturally entrenched that it could not be solved by 
force and that the community could not live harmoniously except by consent. His speeches 
started to sound uncannily like Guido’s speeches (the departed Secretary of Education) and it 
became clear that his position was moving away from that of the Governor. 
For Governor Vallejo, the expulsion of minorities remained a standard move to deal with 
extremist groups in ethnic or religious conflicts. A charitable interpretation of his position is 
that in raising this possibility he was playing “bad cop” to Reyna’s “good cop” in order to move 
the parties to compromise. Reyna had come to see that the Dissidents could not just be expelled 
out of the community and the school cast out with them: that would represent an egregious 
violation of the rule of law. A growing body of notes, memos, speeches and newspaper articles 
provided more detail and nuance about the position of Reyna. The compromise he proposed 
was the installation of classrooms outside the community, despite the reluctance of the 
Dissidents and the fierce criticism of both the local and federal press. He recognised that the 
alternatives were worse. When asked about a possible armed intervention inside the walls, 
Reyna was succinct in his response, “This group, The Loyals, are ready to do anything to 
safeguard their beliefs and what they consider sacred. Their Virgin is calling for ‘martyrs’ and 
they will consider it a privilege to become part of this martyrdom” (NTR Zacatecas, 2012). 
 
The Governor  
 
 When questioned about why his government had not stopped The Loyals from preventing 
the resumption of classes inside The Dissidents’ private homes, Governor Vallejo declared, 
“We have been largely prudent by deciding not to disturb the life in this particular community; 
we have been tolerant but do not confuse tolerance with weakness” (Informador, 2012). 
 Vallejo’s opening gambit had been that there was no religious problem in The New 




of their flock. During an interview with López Dóriga in the National Radio System, 
transcribed in the daily newspaper La Jornada Michoacán (22 August 2012) he stated: 
 
There is not a single day without something new appearing in the scene, sometimes 
incomprehension, sometimes there are people or mass media ready to take this (The 
New Jerusalem crisis) as a scandal. Hidden behind a desk these people want us to 
enforce the law brutally… but … I am neither irresponsible nor naïve. Of course, I 
am in favour of guaranteeing the rule of law but first there are problems and 
situations that must be solved. We have to see under which conditions and when it 
is timely to enforce the rule of law. The problem in The New Jerusalem is related to 
fundamentalism. There is not a problem of laymen versus fanatics: there are two 
fundamentalist groups disputing for power in La Ermita after the death of Papá 
Nabor. That is it31. 
 
He talked tough: “I am asking the people who actually guide this community to take 
immediate actions to pacify the conflict. If they do not choose to do so, with all respect, we 
will have to take action against them” (La Jornada Michoacán, 20 August 2012). Yet despite 
his frequent public dismissals of the significance of The New Jerusalem, many locals and 
commentators were aware that the governor had visited La Ermita during his political campaign 
and that he had knelt as a pilgrim in front of the Virgin of El Rosario to ask for her blessing. 
He spoke in private for two hours or more with Papá Nabor before the elections that made him 
Governor (Marrero, ibid.).  
Vallejo made noises about meeting in person with both bishops. He said he would 
confront them and make them subscribe to arrangements of coexistence. The meeting never 
took place. On the other hand, external pressure began to mount from the left-wing parties, the 
Unions, political rivals, and the press, all calling for a decisive, strong intervention. All this 
pressure, his defenders would claim, was bravely resisted by Vallejo’s administration. The 
Governor did not give up on his steadfast determination to be prudent, for “too many lives are 
at risk” (La Jornada Michoacán, 20 August 2012), he used to say. He repeatedly argued that 
classes were a secondary priority compared to the security of the population. “(...) it is better 
to lose one day of classes than one life” (Fisher, 2012b) and he was consistent with this 
understanding. This line of defence was echoed by his Secretary of State and his 
Undersecretary Mr Cano, the main negotiator between The New Jerusalem authorities and the 
government.  
 




Vallejo insisted that those found responsible for the destruction of the school would be 
prosecuted and punished with the full force of the law. Yet, deliberately, his government made 
the judicial process very slow, perhaps because he wanted to keep the threat of judicial 
proceedings in hand and use it as a bargaining chip while negotiating with the Naborists. It was 
Fernando Cano, Reyna’s fixer, who finally concluded the negotiations, getting permission from 
and paying compensation to the people of La Injertada for allowing the installation of 
prefabricated classrooms in their territory; he persuaded The Dissidents to send their children 
away from the community; he obtained an undertaking from The Loyals not to interfere with 
the children attending a public school outside the community. On 10 March 2013, he unveiled 
the solution to the press (Cambio de Michoacán, 2013). “The solution is temporary, it does not 
mean by any means a halting of the state’s government (and so of the rule of law). What 
interests this government is that there can be harmony in the community and security for the 
families” (Ferreyra, 2012). It is to the role of the law I turn next. 
 
The High Court of Justice 
 
Alejandro González, President of the High Court of Justice of Michoacán, during a 
conference in Morelia, the capital of the state, asserted that customary law, such as the common 
law system observed in the “uses and practices” scheme, should respect human rights. The 
“uses and practices” law scheme consists of a body of federal legislation that recognises the 
right of indigenous communities to observe their own traditional uses and practices according 
to local law32 (for those states that explicitly recognise such rights in their own legislation and 
subject to the restrictions and boundaries set by the federal constitution). The “uses and 
practices” extend limited self-determination to certain communities within the southern states 
 
32 This body of federal legislation is constituted by a set of amendments and additions to: The General Law of 
Ecological Balance and Protection of the Environment; the Organic Law of The General Congress of The United 
Mexican States; the Federal Public Defensory Law; the Social Security Law; the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation 
and Peace in Chiapas; the General Education Law; the Agrarian Law; the General Law of Human Settlements; 
the Forest Law; the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration and the Law of the National Indigenist 
Institute. However, all these reforms (most of them implemented over the last 25 years) derive from the Political 
Constitution of The United Mexican States, which in its First Chapter “On Individual Guarantees'', Article 4, 
states: "The Mexican nation has a pluricultural composition sustained originally in its indigenous peoples. The 
law protects and promotes the development of its languages, cultures, uses, practices, resources and specific 
formations of the organization they may have to access the state jurisdiction. In all agricultural judgments and 
those judicial procedures they take part in, their own traditional uses and practices will be taken into account in 





of Mexico with significant indigenous populations, such as Oaxaca, Chiapas, Michoacán and 
Guerrero. The magistrate warned that the Federal Ministry of Education should not seek to 
evade its responsibility in the conflict in The New Jerusalem. This federal office, along with 
those in charge of prosecution, should act immediately after the violation of fundamental rights 
at La Ermita. Community autonomy, he declared, did not justify acting against fundamental 
rights. “Even communities such as The New Jerusalem should observe the rule of law and 
comply with the current legal framework, especially in terms of human rights” (NTR Zacatecas, 
2012). During the conference, he also expressed surprise that after the events at La Ermita, the 
local judge of Tacámbaro (which had jurisdiction over the territory of The New Jerusalem) had 
received no claims or petitions seeking redress. 
“I have come to know [he said] that this very peculiar community has been there for 
decades but, in a constitutional state where human rights are taken seriously, there is no room 
for such [a] community” (Ibid.). Expanding the argument to both the acknowledged and self-
styled autonomous communities, the attorney affirmed that “it is not possible, even within a 
‘uses and practices’ system to ignore the fundamental rights and constitutional guarantees” 
(Ibid.). He compared the situation to that of African-Muslim communities that declare female 
genital mutilation as a communitarian law (see Dunn 2016:147). Such laws are not compatible 
with the human rights system and therefore are illegal. Yet this opinion was never translated 
into action. The state High Court of Justice played no significant role in either the diagnosis or 
in the solution to the problems at The New Jerusalem. It would fall to other bodies to work 
through the implications of the opinion expressed by González about the relationship between 
customary law, constitutional law, and fundamental rights. 
 
The Commissions on Human Rights 
 
In Mexico, there are two entities in charge of defending human rights: the federal and the 
state commissions. Neither has legal powers. They cannot produce resolutions to be executed, 
only recommendations to be considered. Nonetheless, the interventions of the Human Rights 
Commissions had an important bearing on the resolution of the problem at The New Jerusalem. 
They pressured the government into finding a peaceful solution which at the same time 
guaranteed the right of children to attend the school (Cruz, 2012).  
After the events on 20 July 2012, the National Commission on Human Rights issued a 




Education concerning their duty to secure children’s access to education. The National 
(Federal) Commission suggested that the state authorities allocate an adequate police force to 
enable both students and teachers to resume their lessons. Likewise, the government was urged 
to carry forward the negotiation with the main actors involved, prioritising the principles of 
legality, necessity, rationality and proportionality. (Radiofórmula, 2012).  
The Commission on Human Rights of the State of Michoacán likewise claimed to have 
received many reports of violations of human rights within the community. They proposed the 
construction of a parallel infrastructure outside the city where children could attend lessons 
peacefully. On 1 August 2012, the local commission conducted an inspection within the city, 
concluding that “there was no security available and that their classrooms had been totally 
destroyed” (Marrero 2014:217). They emphasised that such conditions were clearly violating 
the Mexican Constitution and other international laws concerning children’s rights agreements 
signed by Mexico.  
 
The Federal Ministry of Education 
 
A few days after the crisis of 20 July, Córdova Villalobos, at the time Federal Minister 
of Education, announced that he had been in touch with the government of Michoacán. He was 
worried about the likely loss of school time for the children in the community. Villalobos 
supported the negotiations carried out by the state government and pledged that there would be 
buses and transport available to bring the children out of the community, either to Puruarán, 
one of the nearest villages, or to La Injertada. He admitted that there was a high risk of violence, 
which could be sparked even by accident, and that the authorities were trying hard to avoid it. 
He added that “it is a local problem of fanaticism, of radicalism” and that it should be solved 
through dialogue with the parties involved (El Universal, 2012).  
Yet, Villalobos’s position was ambiguous. On the one hand, he was ready to imply that 
it was not legally valid to try to impose secular education on communities that rejected it, while 
asserting, in other statements, that it was unacceptable that internal religious conflicts were 
interfering with children’s education. In an interview, he said that the community problem was 
basically religious in nature, “It has nothing to do with education (…) it is not about having 
classes at all costs, we don't want people to be physically assaulted. We are looking for a 
peaceful solution without risks for anyone. We cannot solve only the problem of the need for 




take place” (Quadratín, 2012c). The conflict had to be solved by negotiating with the 
community before the right of children to education could be enforced (Notimex, 2012). 
Villalobos was always measured and cautious in his public announcements. His 
statements invariably called upon the involved parties to engage in dialogue and conciliate their 
differences. However, he did make it clear to reporters that he had absolutely no jurisdictional 
responsibility over the problem: “I remind you that education in Mexico is decentralised” 
(Rivera, 2012). For him, the conflict was a religious issue, rather than an educational one. 
Indeed, he argued that the situation had to be solved entirely by the local authorities (Bañuelos, 
2012), including, where necessary, local law enforcement.  
 
The Federal Police  
 
The lack of any obtrusive police response to the violence in The New Jerusalem was a 
target of persistent criticism from the opponents of the Naborists, left-wing parties, the mayor 
of Turicato and The Dissidents. The criticism did not do justice to a response which, while low-
keyed, had some effect. The sheriff of the community, Cruz Cardenas, who had led the attack 
on the school, was arrested and sent to prison and the police made their presence felt in the 
community. Answering a petition for support made by governor Vallejo on 26 August 2012, 
20 federal police cars arrived at the entrance of the community together with a “rhino” tank. A 
reporter got a street interview with one of the police commanders, Miguel Guerrero, who gave 
little away. They had no orders to go inside the community, only to stay for a time in front of 
the main entrance as a d deterrent to violence (AFP, 2012).  
The police squad remained in front of the “Puerta María” (Holy Mary’s Gate) all day 
while, behind the gate, the celestial guard kept watch and hundreds of devotees sang anthems 
and eulogies to the Virgin. When the police finally left, they began to cheer and praise 
euphorically. From their perspective, the Virgin had triumphed (AP, 2012). 
On 27 August, there was a peaceful demonstration by The Dissidents demanding the 
restitution of the school. Using a loudspeaker system, the voice of Bishop St. Martín de Tours 
urged his followers to stop the demonstration. An anonymous call (presumably made by one 
of The Dissidents’ leaders) alerted the police. A police squad of 200 well-armed men now 
arrived at the entrance of the community, again with an armoured tank and ten semi-armoured 
vehicles (Agencia Esquema, 2012). The display of force was intimidating and some of the 




weapons inside the community. They also had interviews with representatives of the two 
groups. What was said is not entirely clear, but the religious leaders were reported to have been 
given an ultimatum (Reyes, 2012). In any event, The Loyals were convinced that this time the 
armed force was going to enter The Holy City, so they formed a human barricade with hundreds 
of people, mostly women, children and elderly men. The convoy of police vehicles remained 
standing in front of the entrance to the community from about midday until 4pm. These displays 
of force did enough to stop further outbreaks of violence within the community but the 
underlying tensions remained.  The Naborist faction began to raise the height of the city walls. 
The New Jerusalem started to look more like a concentration camp (as it does even in the 
present) than a holy city.   
 
The Federal Ministry of the Interior and The Undersecretary of Religious Affairs 
 
By this time most extra-mural interested parties and commentators agreed that this was 
a religious conflict that needed to be addressed in those terms by the relevant organs of 
government. From August 2012 onwards, Vallejo repeatedly urged the Federal Undersecretary 
on Religious Affairs to intervene in the conflict at La Ermita. Alejandro Poiré, Federal Minister 
of the Interior, at first denied responsibility for dealing with the conflict, arguing that he had 
no jurisdiction in the case because The New Jerusalem was not a religious association, legally 
constituted and registered before the Under secretariat on Religious Affairs. Obdulio Ávila, 
Deputy Minister of the Interior, argued on Poiré’s behalf: “I have to point out that this is a 
problem that has to be solved in the local realm, there is no religious association registered 
according to the Law on Religious Associations, therefore this religious community does not 
have any link nor approval from The Ministry of the Interior to exist (sic)” (Quadratín, 2012a).   
This was special pleading on an impressive scale. The secretariat’s remit lay with intra-
religious conflict. The argument was that the conflict in the New Jerusalem did not fall under 
its remit because the Naborist movement did not exist qua a religious community (because it 
had not registered as such), therefore its internal affairs could not be a religious problem but 
only a congeries of “private issues between individuals” (Quadratín 2012b; Marrero 2014). In 
effect, what was being suggested was that for the legal-bureaucratic purposes of the Mexican 
federation, The New Jerusalem community did not exist. As media pressure mounted, this line 
became impossible to hold. Poiré had no other choice but to acknowledge that The New 
Jerusalem conflict was of an ethno-religious nature and that it was a problem in terms of 




constituting the Naborist community kept his hands tied. The Ministry maintained its posture 
of non-intervention.  
   
The General Direction of Religious Associations 
 
Perhaps in reaction to this buck-passing, some of those affected by the violence inside 
the community tried to obtain help from other federal institutions. I reproduce below two 
memorandums obtained by a formal freedom of information request on my part that 
demonstrate how The General Directorate on Religious Associations dealt with the petitioners 
from The New Jerusalem. First, they refused to provide any immediate assistance and repeated 
the legal justification for their lack of action. Second, they proposed to write a memorandum 
to Michoacán’s Director of Religious Affairs urging him to take immediate action on the 
matter.  
The first document was addressed directly to the petitioner, whose name is redacted on 
the original document.33 I give it here in full (The translation is my own).:  
 
Regarding your petition, I inform you that this federal office is currently enquiring about 
the official information available from Michoacán state´s authorities to determine the 
legal actions to be taken in order to preserve and secure the civil rights and freedoms 
consecrated in our constitution. However, no less important are other principles such as 
the separation between the church and the state (Article 130, Mexican Political 
Constitution; Article 1 General Law of Religious Associations and Public Faiths). Such 
articles establish two fundamental aspects: first a positive and consistent aspect referring 
to the competence and duty of the state to safeguard and guarantee the rightful exercise 
of religious freedom, and a negative aspect that implies non-intervention with the 
religious phenomenon itself, nor in the internal affairs of the religious associations. 
On the other hand, the 2nd article of The General Law of Religious Associations and 
Public Faiths states and guarantees the liberties of individuals: not to be subjects of 
discrimination, coercion or hostility as a result of the religious beliefs of the individual; 
similarly, article 37 of the Regulation of this Law defines religious intolerance as every 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religious considerations, 
sanctioned by the applicable law, so that it should be very clear that for any purposes of 
this law, that discrimination or religious intolerance only occurs when there are attitudes 
and consequences derived from such attitudes that show distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference exclusively based on religious considerations. 
Meanwhile, regarding the events that you describe in your letter addressed to this 
federal office, most of them refer to the commission of several crimes and illicit offences 
which, according to article 21 of the Political Constitution of Mexico belongs to the 
jurisdiction and competence of the Public Ministry (prosecution authorities), who are 
 
33 The petitioner’s name, though included in the original document, was removed from the certified copy provided 
for this research, as per the privacy laws applicable. Arguing the protection of personal data, this authority refused 




responsible for the investigation and prosecution of this activities. Consequently, those 
claims should be addressed to such authority. 
 
In the other document—for reasons of space and clarity not reproduced here in its 
entirety—it is possible to read how the federal authority, possessing a panoply of legal, 
economic and coercive resources, delegated all responsibilities to the much smaller and 
relatively under-resourced provincial Directorate of Religious Affairs of Michoacán, an office 
that comprises a small group of young lawyers and two assistant typists. 
The General Directorate instructed the provincial Directorate by letter to solve the matter, 
warning them that they would be monitoring developments in the case. They adduced Article 
25 of The General Law of Religious Associations and Public Faiths, which refers to the need 
for “mutual interagency cooperation between the two realms of government involved.” Both 
legal documents show the ability of higher levels of government administration to use the 
current regulation and the law to avoid taking any action on the matter themselves.  
 
The role of toleration in The General Direction of Normativity 
 
Before ending the second letter, the “Director of Normativity” of the Federal Under 
secretariat on Religious Affairs took the opportunity to lay out the philosophical position that 
underwrote the stance being adopted: 
 
Regarding this letter, acknowledging your valuable collaboration to address the matters 
of our realm, in order to promote respectful coexistence in an atmosphere of tolerance 
between individuals and groups of different beliefs, I kindly instruct you to implement 
the necessary measures to seek a quick and long-lasting solution to this conflict. 
 
Notice that the person in charge of signing the letter was “The Director of Normativity”. 
The title conveys the character of the role, which involved no executive functions but was 
concerned instead with normative solutions. The letter was intended to provide higher 
instructions from the federal office to their state counterparts about the range of appropriate 
options available to solve the situation. Here the limits of what was appropriate were set by 
what ought to be, rather than what was politically expedient. The demand was for a principled 




The letter understands toleration34 as an “atmosphere” that contributes to “peaceful coexistence 
between individuals and groups”. Interestingly, such an understanding comes close to that 
expounded by Walzer: a political practice that amounts to the “peaceful coexistence of groups 
of people with different histories, cultures, and identities” (Walzer 1997:2-3).  
There is an ongoing debate over whether the Mexican state (or any other liberal state) 
has legally the power to coercively oblige parents to send their children to either public or 
private schools35. Apparently, despite the constitutional guarantee expressed in Article 3 of the 
Mexican Constitution, the Mexican state does not and cannot force parents to send their 
children to school if it is against their will, their values and their beliefs. Still, the problem in 
The New Jerusalem is slightly different: it is not whether the Mexican state should force parents 
to send their children to school but that there are hundreds of dissident families who wish to 
send their children to attend classes (a constitutional right) and are being prevented from doing 
so by a majority—according to NTR Zacatecas (2012), after “resolving” the schools’ 
destruction crisis in The New Jerusalem, only 20 children out of 270 Dissident’s children were 
able to receive lessons—.The irony is that non-intervention in this situation by the state was 
being justified by appeals to the idea of toleration. At this point, the orientation of my thesis 
shifts as I follow the bearings set by this letter and explore how, if at all, the idea of toleration 
could reasonably be adduced to justify the state’s refusal to intervene in The New Jerusalem.  
  
 
34 Tolerance and Toleration are here used interchangeably. In Spanish language there is only one word to refer to 
the act of tolerating, “Tolerancia”. 
35 For a landmark case of the rights of parents versus children’s rights for education see Wisconsin v. Yoder 1972, 
and Peters 2003; for a perspective on group rights v. individual rights compare Hardin 1996 and Festenstein 2005; 





THE IDEA OF TOLERATION: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
O Thou God of all beings, of all worlds and of all times 
We pray that the little differences in our clothes 
in our inadequate languages 
in our ridiculous customs 
in our imperfect laws 
in our illogical opinions 
in our ranks and conditions, 
which are so disproportionately important to us 
and so meaningless to you, 
that these small variations 
that distinguish those atoms that we call human beings 
one from another, 
may not be signals of hatred and persecution. 
 
—A. Voltaire (“A Prayer to God” in Treatise of Tolerance). 
Defining Toleration  
 
This chapter provides a conceptual analysis of the ambiguous concept of toleration. It 
aims to draw out some of the polysemy of the concept, emphasizing its understanding as a 
political practice. It makes evident the theoretical differences between toleration and tolerance, 
repressive tolerance, false tolerance, and toleration as indifference, in order to elucidate some 
of the contradictions in the idea the Mexican government is evoking in its stance towards The 
New Jerusalem. It seeks, by this means, to explain the “elusive” quality of the term that some 
writers have identified (Heyd, 1996) and articulates a critique of toleration made by authors 
such as Arteta and Marcuse alongside my own criticisms of certain understandings of toleration 
that verge on indifference or modern forms of relativism. This chapter puts in place a central 
conceptual building block of the thesis, as subsequent chapters link the idea of toleration to the 
contemporary issue of group or minority rights. 
Many scholars have put forward definitions of toleration; some have offered 
straightforward explanations, while others have gone on to problematise the concept. Susan 
Mendus, as quoted by John Horton in Toleration as a Virtue (1996), defines toleration as, “The 
refusal, when one has the power to do so, to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that 
one finds objectionable”. T.M. Scanlon offers a more expansive account: “The tolerant 
person’s attitude is this: Even though we disagree, they are as fully members of society, as I 
am. They are as entitled as I am to live as they choose to live. In addition, (and this is the hard 




Heyd 1996:231). On this account, tolerance or toleration—I will use the terms interchangeably 
for now, though I will refine this basic position as the chapter proceeds—is something that 
requires us (and by extension our political representatives) to permit attitudes and practices of 
people even when we strongly disapprove of them.  
At first glance, toleration might seem to be a topic that involves only a few simple 
elements: a contentious belief, action, or way of life, the individual’s conscience, a set of 
political and social sanctions for holding that belief or acting in that way, and an authority that 
enforces those sanctions. Perhaps for this reason, discussions of toleration in the contemporary 
Anglophone literature often seem to follow a generic pattern. (Sometimes one has the feeling 
of seeing the same group of people saying the same things about toleration over and over 
again). Yet as soon as we ask, how should conscience be regarded? or, what political and social 
sanctions are legitimate, and why? or, what are the origins and character of the authority from 
which they proceed? simplicity gives way to complexity. Debates about the conceptual scope, 
theoretical justification and political function of toleration are bound up with the deep questions 
about the proper relations between individuals and groups, and disagreements over the core 
commitments, principles, or values that structure those relations.  
Depending on the core commitment or commitments upon which one insists—whether 
personal autonomy (Raz, 1987), political autonomy and political respect (Nussbaum, 2011), 
the harm principle (Cohen, 2018), negative liberty (Balint, 2017), or moral autonomy and a 
right to justification (Forst, 2013; 2014)—different regimes of toleration and corresponding 
normative limits of toleration can be justified. Likewise, the specific conception of toleration 
one adopts will reflect not only one’s understanding of liberty (since toleration, whatever its 
limits, implies within those limits an entitlement of some sort to act freely— as one pleases, in 
accordance with one’s own beliefs, principles or preferences, or what have you) and its relation 
to other principles and values (such as equality, solidarity, and authority), but also one’s wider 
conceptions of political value and ideological inclinations (liberal perfectionist, political 
liberal, political realist, socialist, and so on). 
Notwithstanding this diversity of approaches, there is a general acknowledgement that 
liberal conceptions of toleration assume that toleration is required by liberty (however we 
define it) and that it is interference with liberty, not non-interference, that stands in need of 
justification (Balint, 2017). At the same time, there is increasing scepticism about the received 
notion that the justification of toleration depends exclusively on distinctively liberal principles 
and values. As Balint points out, “even if tolerance is understood as distinctively liberal, its 




reasoning” (Balint 2014:273). In modern pluralistic societies we find a multiplicity of different, 
sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting theoretical conceptions and justifications of 
toleration, its value and its practice. Indeed, this “very pluralism seems to require pluralism of 
the ways to toleration” (Khomyakov 2013:237; see also Walzer 1997:94-97).  
Yet any justification of toleration based on a wider conception of moral pluralism which 
assumes that subjective values exist,  is open to the objection that such values may not be shared 
by everyone (Forst, 2013). As such it may reasonably be rejected as a ground for toleration by 
some individuals or groups, including those who, like the inhabitants of The New Jerusalem, 
believe in a single order of value established by divine fiat according to which human life ought 
to be patterned.  
At the bottom what all this implies is that the concept of toleration needs to be analysed 
from multiple perspectives. Theories of toleration necessarily come in different shapes and 
sizes, and it is not merely difficult, but impossible, to reduce all interpretations of what it means 
to tolerate to different species of a single genus. Perhaps one should speak rather of tolerations 
than of toleration. What matters more, however, is to be clear about one’s conception and the 
way one is using it. In what follows I understand toleration in the first place not as an “attitude” 
or as a “moral virtue” (Horton 1996:34) but as an act—a form of political practice that implies 
peaceful coexistence between individuals and groups on terms that respect the fundamental 
rights belonging to each (Walzer 1997:12-13).36 
According to Scanlon (2003) what toleration implies, in practice, is that those whose 
values and practices are objectionable to us, should not be denied legal and political rights, 
such as the right to vote and to be elected, to receive education, public safety, the protection of 
the legal system, healthcare, and access to “public accommodation”. These rights, all things 
being equal, extend to all citizens and cannot be withheld or interfered with either by the state 
or by individuals or groups who find their assertion by others aggravating or repugnant. 
Toleration requires the state not to give preference to one group over another in the process of 
allocating and giving access to privileges and benefits and it requires individuals to respect the 
rights of others who differ from them in the ways in which they choose to exercise those 
 
36 This qualification underlines a point made long ago by Tacitus: experience shows it is possible to bring about 
peaceful coexistence of a kind by exterminating those who dissent and cowing those that remain into compliance, 
but few would call it peace when they see a desert made. What these fundamental rights are remains, of course, a 
matter of dispute; but my argument assumes that there are such rights. See Tacitus (1914: 81 [30:5]): “Robbers 
of the world, now that earth fails their all-devastating hands, they probe even the sea: if their enemy have wealth, 
they have greed; if he be poor, they are ambitious; East nor West has glutted them; alone of mankind they covet 
with the same passion want as much as wealth. To plunder, butcher, steal, these things they misname empire: they 




privileges and benefits. These requirements generate one of the so-called paradoxes of 
toleration, which poses a problem for appraising toleration as a virtue. Horton (1996:28-43) 
identifies two ways in which this problem manifests itself,  
 
(N)ormally, we count toleration as a virtue in individuals and as a duty in societies. 
However, where toleration is based on moral disapproval, it implies that the thing 
tolerated is wrong and ought not to exist. The question which then arises is: why 
shall we tolerate it then? 
 
And again,  
 
There are…two directions from which toleration can cease to be a virtue: On the one 
hand, some things should not be tolerated, on the other, some things should not be 
objected to, hence are not the appropriate objects of toleration.  
 
There is no getting away from these problems, as the history of liberalism shows: they 
lie behind recurrent patterns of argument which purport to show that liberalism au fond inclines 
either to unacknowledged forms of intolerance, affecting neutrality while being, in John 
Rawls’s admonitory words, just “another sectarian doctrine” (Rawls 1985:246), or else towards 
a sceptical indifference to all moral claims and value judgements which renders its posture of 
neutrality vacuous. 
Indeed, it is difficult to separate the idea of toleration from the liberal tradition with which 
it has come to be associated so closely37. David Heyd, in his book Toleration: An Elusive 
Virtue, observes that the idea of toleration has undergone a gradual process of attrition, as the 
meaning of liberalism and its central values have shifted and been contested over time. Heyd 
describes that process as a kind of tug-of-war between the demand not to tolerate the immoral 
on the one side (moral absolutism), and the requirement to accept the legitimacy of the morally 
different on the other (pluralism) (Heyd 1996:4). The thought here is that toleration is pulled 
between two opposing forces which in combination have pared it away almost to vanishing. 
This thought relies for its form, and perhaps for its plausibility, on accepting a certain reading 
of the history of liberalism. 
In this reading, “classical” liberalism, such as Locke’s or Mill’s, rested more heavily on 
the principle of toleration than today’s forms of epistemic liberalism, which are closer to a 
generalised sceptical pluralism. Locke’s argument for tolerance, on Heyd’s account, was based 
 
37 See Mendus 1989; and for the development of liberalism, compare Manning 1976, Kelly 2005, Fawcett 2014; 




on the counter-productiveness of attempting to coerce religious belief (and so believers); Mill’s 
on the trumping value of personal autonomy. “The shift from these views to the modern 
conception, which rests on the easy acceptance of the heterogeneity of values and ways of life, 
pushes the concept of tolerance dangerously close to that of indifference.” (Ibid.). Heyd warns 
us that even if this shift is welcomed by the moral pluralist, it must be clear that much of the 
original value of tolerance is put under threat: it is, one might think, meaningless to speak of 
tolerance in the context of scenarios of which we approve or to which we are indifferent.38  
The distinction between tolerance and indifference is or should be, Heyd argues, an 
important constituent of any theoretical attempt to delineate the contours of toleration. Yet, the 
borders between tolerance and indifference have been constantly shifting in the history of our 
moral and political values. According to Bernard Williams, it is a serious mistake to believe 
that the virtue of tolerance is the only—or even a possible—basis on which to ground practices 
of toleration. As he sees it, toleration as a virtue can only avoid moral paradox if it is rooted in 
some conception of the value of autonomy; for only a belief that it is good for individuals to 
be autonomous gives sense to the postulate that one ought to allow the misguided beliefs or 
practices of others to flourish. But if the practice of toleration is made to rest on the value of 
individual autonomy, then it is indeed vulnerable to the other side of that paradox: “the values 
of autonomy themselves (…) may be rejected, and to the extent that toleration rests on those 
values, then toleration will also be rejected”. The practice of toleration cannot (Williams 
concludes) be based on values such as individual autonomy and hope to escape from 
substantive disagreements about the good. This really is a “contradiction”, because it is only a 
substantive view of goods such as autonomy that could yield the value that is expressed by the 
practices of toleration (Williams in Heyd 1996:25). To avoid the contradiction, Williams 
argues, liberals could appeal to the contested value of autonomy, but if they do so they will not 
have given anyone who does not share that value a reason to accept the practice of toleration, 
and hence the moral basis being claimed for the practice is negated. What prevents the paradox 
of toleration from being fatal to the justification of toleration as a practice is the fact that the 
practice does not and need not rest on the value of autonomy, but on a wider range of resources, 
including power, especially the power of the state “to provide Hobbesian reminders to the more 
extreme groups that they will have to settle for coexistence” rather than heaven on earth.  
(Williams in Heyd 1996:26-27). Some of the ways in which Williams’ analysis has been 
 
38 As it happens, a similar criticism was raised against Mill’s arguments shortly after their appearance by James 




echoed, construed, and challenged, will be explored in chapter 3.  But by way of preface, it is 
necessary to say more about the idea of toleration, its purported grounds, its limits, and its 
antithesis: not only intolerance but also false tolerance.  
 
Tolerance and Toleration 
 
I stated at the beginning of this chapter that I would use the words “toleration” and 
“tolerance” interchangeably. But there are compelling reasons to think that they should not be 
treated as synonyms at all. Some authors happily deploy them as equivalents without comment 
or concern, while others call attention to what they take to be rather significant differences 
between the sense and reference of the two words. Some reckon a difference of degree, while 
others maintain that they do not refer to the same thing at all. I take it that the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle. These words are not exactly synonyms, but they are certainly very 
closely related. The two terms are close enough to be used as alternatives in everyday speech. 
In scholarly literature on the topic, tolerance is more often used to refer to the virtue and the 
attitude; toleration is mainly used to describe the practice, in particular the public policy of 
pursuing peaceful coexistence in a society consisting of heterogeneous groups and individuals, 
and the same policy enacted between different political societies.  
Horton, for instance, (Horton 1996:34 et passim) has proposed that talk about tolerance 
and toleration happens at least at three different levels: tolerance as an attitude, tolerance as a 
moral virtue and toleration as a political practice that amounts—again paraphrasing Walzer 
1997—to peaceful coexistence between individuals and groups; especially between groups. 
Tolerance is more the theoretical aspect of this concept that is not only a “thing” or an “ethos”, 
but an act, a concrete practice per se. Tolerance has necessarily a moral perspective: the virtue 
of being tolerant involves exhibiting self-restraint by enduring that which we would prefer to 
be otherwise. A tolerant person demonstrates that they are willing to put up with this action or 
number of actions of which they explicitly disapprove. We tolerate, in other words, when we 
refrain from impeding or hindering a belief, practice or conduct that is objectionable to us.  
Many factors combine to make tolerance something of a necessity in modern societies, 
and many situations that demand it and test it. The presence of different religious convictions 
and political ideas within the same country as well as diverse minorities can give rise to 
circumstances that demand tolerance. Our age is characterised by the loss of shared normative 
frameworks and the questioning of universal values, the globalisation of habits of life and 




how to organise this plural coexistence without religious pluralism ending up in factionalism 
or fundamentalism. The plurality of cultural ethnicities evolves into a furious confrontation of 
identities and the different ideologies develop into doctrinal fanaticism. It is here that tolerance 
retains a special relevance. 
This continuing relevance should not be taken to imply that tolerance itself has remained 
unchanged in its meaning in political discourse. Like all ideas, tolerance has a history, and it 
bears the marks of its development through a body of substantive thought, from the more 
traditional sense, in which there was a component of condescension to the tolerated subject, to 
today’s approach, that grants a more assertive sense of recognition and respect for the other in 
its freedom and difference. From the grudging acknowledgement of plurality (feared as a 
source of conflict and lamented as a fracturing of unity and truth), it is turning more into the 
appreciation of the value of others’ choices, an appreciation that requires at least some curiosity 
and open spirit from the tolerating party, a willingness to consider the possibility that one’s 
own preferences may not exhaust all that is valuable or right. Tolerance is typical to countries 
where, after the old wars of religion and other fruits of religious intolerance, the principle of 
secularism has been instituted and freedom of conscience of individuals has replaced the 
monopoly of a majoritarian belief (Cerezo 2005:192; Rawls 1993). This reading of history 
helps explain why the virtue of tolerance has so often been seen as underwriting political 
practice: tolerance is the attitude that informs and at the same time requires a regime that 
consecrates political rights such as freedom of thought, expression and association. As a citizen 
practice, it presupposes a legal right: “The nerve of the idea of tolerance is the recognition of 
the equal right to coexist which recognises opposite doctrines” (Bobbio 1991:152). 
There is a great distance between the idea of tolerance as grudging acceptance of 
differences that are lamentable, and the positive recognition of an equal right to form and 
espouse opposite doctrines. The difference is so great that it could be questioned whether still 
using the same term to describe the associated attitudes and practices is desirable. The answer 
is positive: in its semantic complexity, tolerance must continue to retain, despite everything, 
elements of discrepancy and censorship without which it would no longer merit the name. They 
capture the important truth that we do find some doctrines and attitudes objectionable which 
we nevertheless, as citizens, are obliged to recognise as legitimate. It might be objected that 
the constitutionalising of pluralism makes it unnecessary to appeal to tolerance. In other words, 
some believe that we should not call a virtue what is only the fulfilment of a citizen’s obligation 
to respect a right. Yet, the fact is that legal or institutional tolerance, although being a necessary 




also require tolerant attitudes to oil the wheels of common citizenship.  
The state cannot and should not legislate everything. Neither is the rule of law or 
legislation in modern societies without gaps and inconsistencies. Tolerance is needed 
practically to carry a society beyond the limits of legality and the mutual acknowledgement of 
constitutional rights (whether or not these are enforced in practice is a separate issue). Neither 
authorities, officials nor our fellow citizens can relieve us of the need to exercise the thoughtful 
caution, prudence, and tolerance that complicated situations may require in our daily life. The 
virtue of tolerance, like oxygen, is something that we notice as vital only when it is absent. 
Across time and space, human beings seem to exhibit a shared tendency to suppose their own 
beliefs and convictions to be true, to associate only with those who share them, and to be 
suspicious and often fearful of others’ ideas or ways of life. It is only by opening ourselves up 
to others that we can avoid self-righteousness, partisanship, and solipsism (see Paz 2001). As 
a virtue, tolerance must be relearned and reinvented on a regular basis, both in our interactions 
with our friends and neighbours and in our lives as citizens. 
It is possible, therefore, to distinguish between public and private tolerance, depending 
on the framework in which public or private relations are manifested. It may also be helpful to 
differentiate between vertical tolerance, which presupposes a hierarchical relationship between 
the tolerant and the tolerated and horizontal tolerance, which does not. And, of course, we may 
distinguish between negative or passive tolerance, by which we refrain from rejecting or 
repressing doctrines or actions only when we do not feel directly annoyed or affected by them; 
and positive tolerance (also called active tolerance), which implies a willingness to understand 
the reasons of the “other” and, if necessary, to modify our actions and convictions in light of 
theirs (Thiebaut, 1999). Each kind of tolerance has its own place in a democratic society. The 
one that matters for the purposes of this thesis, will be of a more public character, but is 
nourished by private tolerance and cannot thrive in its absence (or vice versa). Since I am to 
explore the tolerance of the state towards religious minority groups, in particular The New 
Jerusalem community, I will be focusing more on the vertical kind of tolerance; but I shall also 
explore the horizontal version of tolerance, for I am interested in understanding reciprocal 
relations between citizens (as the inhabitants of The New Jerusalem are Mexican citizens de 
jure if not de facto). Concerning the last distinction, I regard passive tolerance as the starting 
point wherein a minimum amount of tolerance is required. Yet, the more complex a situation 
becomes, the level of tolerance also increases. In the end, as Peter Balint (2017) points out, 
toleration is usually a matter of degrees.  





Our confidence in the value of tolerance is often not accompanied by sufficient 
theoretical certainty. The polysemy of the concept itself, which in ordinary use can vary from 
a mere prudential commitment to the most hypocritical form of indifference, makes its 
delimitation problematic. Even while referring to tolerance based on moral reasons, it is 
important to bear in mind that this same ambivalence in drawing the line between the duty to 
tolerate and that of not tolerating, or its paradoxical character (why is it good to tolerate the 
bad?) causes frequent discrepancies when we want to put it into practice, defend it as a 
condition for pluralism, or draw attention to its pitfalls and risks. However, there is sufficient 
agreement to establish its constitutive elements: we can only talk of tolerance when these three 
elements concur: 
 
1. Our own convictions are confronted and affronted by the actions of others,  
2. we have the power to do something about it, but  
3. we recognise there are valid reasons to tolerate instead of interfering, blocking or     
entirely suppressing such actions. 
  
We cannot speak of tolerance if we do not begin with the condemnation or disapproval 
that we experience as a result of the beliefs or actions that we ultimately tolerate. In principle, 
there should be a tendency to prevent the dissemination of the idea or practice that provokes a 
reproaching judgement; this is what distinguishes tolerance from indifference or scepticism. 
Tolerance demands that a subject feels concerned or affected by that which they tolerate; there 
is no such a thing as tolerance when you have nothing to lose in the case (Arteta, 1998). What 
characterises the tolerant is not a lack of convictions, but the unwillingness to impose those 
convictions as compulsory guidelines for all. The rejection of what dislikes us or shocks us will 
be greater the more intense our convictions are, but there will be tolerance as long as our 
convictions do not overpower our reasoned decision to refrain from imposing, or seeking to 
impose, our will on others. These reasons for rejection are part of what has been called our 
basic normative system (Garzón 2000:187).  
If we consider tolerance as a moral virtue, then it is not to be confused with the simple 
discomfort or moral indignation of the subject. The fact that someone feels offended in their 
intimate convictions but decides not to persecute the source of this offence does not 
automatically make a person tolerant. On its own, moral indignation is not enough to constitute 




result of prejudices or whimsicality. Racial bias, for instance, might push me to reject groups 
of people who, however much I dislike, I just accept: such conduct is certainly better than 
threats and violence, but it cannot be described as virtuously tolerant. There will be tolerance 
only if the objection—the intolerant inclination—is itself valuable or desirable. Whilst we 
should not tolerate certain things because it would be harmful to allow them, it is inappropriate 
to say that we “tolerate” when our reasons to object are entirely unfounded (Horton in Heyd 
1996:31-33). 
The tolerant person must also have a significant degree of power to interfere with the 
belief or conduct of others of whom they disapprove, a power which they choose not to 
exercise. Let us not only understand this power as a direct and observable ability to prohibit or 
allow, but also the capability to constrain the object of rejection. It is only that sufficient amount 
of competence or capacity to interfere that allows us to distinguish between tolerating and 
suffering: to be tolerant is at the same time to be able to choose not to be tolerant, for there is 
no tolerance when there is no choice except to bear others’ behaviour, when there is no 
alternative but to endure. Tolerance has to be in this sense voluntary, a matter of will. When 
the behaviour of others is protected by a right, it is constrained by the legal obligation to respect 
it but, going beyond the juridical perspective, it is undeniable that such capacity persists in the 
internal jurisdiction, so to speak, of each individual, and this may be what gives tolerance its 
moral value. I suppose we can say tolerance becomes a virtue when we exercise it for good 
reasons, whether we are obliged by law or not. On the other hand, the ability to (not) tolerate 
should not be presented as an arbitrary and discretionary power, because then the tolerance 
would be arbitrary and end as soon as the whim or the particular mood of the “tolerant” person 
shifts. If tolerance is not to reduce to an offensive sense of superiority (such as the white 
supremacist feels towards the black man), it has to be grounded on good reasons.   
As described above, the third condition of tolerance is that we find reasons to tolerate 
that trump the reasons to inhibit the object of toleration. That is to say, reasons that are 
normatively stronger than those that initially inclined us not to tolerate, some reasons that now 
justify at least restraining that inclination. Here is the answer to the paradox of judging it good 
to consent to the bad. The truth is that “the tolerant person is not lacking reasons, but in some 
way having more (…) He has reasons to condemn or reject something, but for some other 
reason he refrains from doing so” (Toscano 2000:180). 
Tolerance presupposes and at the same time resolves an internal conflict of the subject 
between two normative systems. In the face of the judgement based on our basic normative 




first assessment of reproach. If those immediate reasons were of the first order, these other 
justifiable reasons of tolerance are of a second order that supply logically superior rationales 
to justify our actions. Tolerance would then be a permission to say or do something, despite 
having reasons to prevent it. In this way, as Norberto Bobbio (1991) notes, the conflict between 
the respect for my conviction and the respect for the other is resolved; the conflict between 
what I must believe and what I should do is settled through tolerance. 
These last foundations justifying tolerance, which confer its peculiar value upon it, can 
be reduced to a few arguments. I shall not distinguish between the arguments arising from 
theoretical reasons versus practical applications. I shall also leave aside purely prudential 
reasons that advise tolerance only in terms of the immediate interest or strategic calculation of 
the adversary, in view of the situation and in search of a simple modus operandi. If that was its 
justification or its value, the principle of tolerance would lose its meaning as soon as one of the 
warring parties stood to benefit more from intolerance (Rawls 2002:255). It is not that they are 
negligible reasons in the event of a risk of civil conflict, but they are of a different order to 
what I would call “sustainable” reasons, whether they are epistemic, moral, or political (Ibid.).  
 
There is no tolerance without limits 
 
Establishing tolerance or practising it, both in private and public realms, presupposes 
acknowledging and accepting that tolerance has limits. Those limits, in a way, define the 
meaning of tolerance. Because essentially one only tolerates when one knows what, when and 
how much they should tolerate, that is, one knows where to draw the boundary of tolerance. 
This certainty implies another certainty: to know what not to tolerate. If it were always good to 
accept what one judges morally reprehensible, it would follow that the more evil I tolerate, the 
greater virtue it would be to tolerate it. This is the counterpart to the so-called paradox of the 
tolerant racist, who becomes more tolerant as he adds more races to the list of those he thinks 
contemptible. An unbounded tolerance, which would encompass the atrocious, would be an 
aberrant contradiction. That motto, shared by thousands: “Forbidden to forbid!” that was 
trumpeted in the streets of Paris in May 1968 embodied an attractive but dangerous absurdity. 
George Fletcher (1996) has written that there is a ceiling of toleration, what he calls “The 
Ceiling of Harm”, with calls for intervention and, on the other hand, the floor of toleration, 
“The Floor of Disregard”, where we have the extreme opposite: “it is not of my business, so 




and sustain the median between the Ceiling of Harm and the Floor of Disregard. Finding this 
equilibrium and applying it to the case of the New Jerusalem will be my commitment in the 




What is the intolerable? For practical purposes, anything that directly harms others, or 
makes civil coexistence too difficult or even impossible is intolerable. What this means is that 
the limits of the intolerable are set with reference to “the right” or “the just”, not “the good”: it 
is only when actions, values or doctrines threaten the basic structure of our shared life, when 
they disregard the rights and protections that we mutually acknowledge as citizens, that they 
become intolerable. According to the Rawlsian lexicon, unreasonable doctrines would be the 
conceptions of the good incompatible with the “political” conception of justice that citizens 
have to share in a democratic society. “Many doctrines are simply incompatible with the values 
of Democracy” (Rawls 2002:64). They would be unreasonable for denying the very principles 
of political justice, the basic assumption of equal and free citizens who are committed to public 
reason-giving when deliberating over the moral or political rules that regulate our common life. 
Unfortunately, there is no doubt about the practical power of such doctrines, since it is 
recognised that their diffusion can put at risk the essential justice of the basic institutions of 
society (Ibid, 249); so much so that they may need to be contained, like war or disease. 
Whether we speak about tolerating doctrines or about tolerating opinions that inspire 
norms or practices, it is generally accepted that the last limits to toleration are set by some kind 
of harm to others. This idea was stated canonically in the classic principle of protection by 
which John Stuart Mill restricted the freedom of the individual: “(…) that the only purpose by 
which power can, with full right, be exerted on a member of a civilised community against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill 1996:65). What constitutes harm is a complex question: 
Mill himself distinguished harm from mere offence, which does not damage important interests 
in which we have rights; he suggested that the risk of harm was sufficient to trigger the 
application of the principle; that the scope of harm was broad and applied to all sorts of social 
relationships, not only the relationship between states and citizens; that harm in the relevant 
sense could not be incurred voluntarily (it is not harm to have your shoulder dislocated in a 
wrestling match you agreed to take part in, but it is harm to have your shoulder dislocated by a 




always a pro tanto reason to regulate an action. Yet, there may well be other reasons that trump 
the impulse to restrict. Subsequent writers have modified Mill’s criterion to draw out the 
underlying commitment to equal respect and concern they take it to embody (e.g. Forst 2004; 
2012; Raz 1986) but the point remains: we still need to establish just how and when a norm of 
equal concern and respect is being violated. In other words, the implementation of Mill’s very 
simple principle was a complex matter of judgment according to an assessment of the actual or 
probable damage caused, in accordance with the circumstances, on a case-by-case basis. 
It is common enough to argue that the ultimate limit of tolerance is given by manifest 
injustice, as when one individual or group tries to make its own rejectable conception of the 
good the rule of right for all, or by an attack on fundamental human rights (compare Forst 2004; 
and UNESCO 1995). At first glance, these seem like unambiguous criteria; but it is important 
to bear in mind that the frontiers of the intolerable can be rather blurry and that they may be 
crossed without the slightest consciousness if all circumstances are not properly taken into 
consideration. In deciding whether we tolerate an action that we morally condemn, we will 
have to calibrate the seriousness of the damage or injustice by taking into account the nature 
and consequences of the harm; whether the damage is prospective or tangible; whether it will 
be short-term and transient or long-term and lasting. To escape the limbo of abstraction, we 
must attend to the foreseeable or measurable effects of consenting to actions we might 
otherwise prohibit or of prohibiting what we might otherwise allow. This was noted by Mill 
himself when he wrote: “even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which 
they are expressed make this expression a positive incitement to some harmful action” (Mill 
1996:125-126). It is a very different thing —as he explains— to circulate in a local newspaper 
the opinion that certain merchants starve the poor than to trumpet this opinion before a crowd 
excited at the doors of the house of one of those merchants (Ibid.:127 et passim). 
If there are reasons not to tolerate the intolerable, there are likewise reasons not to tolerate 
the performer of intolerance, that is the intolerant himself or herself. “If a group maintains that 
I or people like me simply have no place in our society, that we must either leave or be 
eliminated, how can I regard that as if it were just a point of view among others who have the 
same right to be heard and considered?” (Scanlon in Heyd 1996). Mutatis mutandis, to maintain 
such a point of view is to arrogate to oneself privileges or rights that one does not accord to 
others: to place oneself outside the relations of reciprocity that constitute a political community 






Pathologies of Tolerance 
 
Who are the real enemies of tolerance? Obviously, the fanatical intolerant, by which I 
mean those who adopt the posture I have just identified and demand that their own conceptions 
of good and bad, right and wrong, become the measures by which everyone and everything 
should be judged; but it is important to note that, unthinking, indiscriminate tolerance is no less 
a danger to tolerance and maybe more subversive, although less intrusive. Whereas fanatical 
intolerance seeks to limit the scope of what is permissible to coincide with private or personal 
preferences (albeit preferences which are often represented as the demands of a higher being 
or higher law), the indiscriminate tolerance I have in mind uses its own “bad” reasons to expand 
and extend the scope of the permissible to include actions which may not immediately threaten 
harm to everyone, but which may harm some and, in the longer run, may dissolve the bases on 
which we can prudently judge when harm is being done and muster the collective will to 
prevent that harm from being done. There can be no greater enemy to true tolerance than the 
inability to distinguish between what is tolerance and what is tolerance only in appearance; 
between what must be tolerated and what should not. 
According to Toscano (2000), the moral value of tolerance rests on two grounds: the 
validity of the reasons why a person is inclined to condemn what he tolerates, and the quality 
of those other reasons for which he finally tolerates (Toscano 2000:187). Tolerance is perverted 
from its proper sense when it comes from invalid reasons on the part of the tolerant for finding 
something or someone objectionable but also when there are faulty reasons for tolerating that 
person or thing. Tolerance will be affected either if it derives from an inadequate normative 
system or a flawed structure of justification.  
For theorists who valorise a moralised conception of tolerance of the objection-type (see 
e.g. Toscano 2000; McKinnon 2006; Horton 2020) one cannot really tolerate something that 
one finds unimportant or acceptable. It makes no sense to say we tolerate behaviour or opinions 
from others if we do not dislike them in the first place or fight an urge to condemn them. As I 
have explained above, we cannot talk of toleration if no challenge is posed to our beliefs 
(reasons of the first order). In theory, there would also be no tolerance if the reasons underlying 
our rejection of the thing to be tolerated come from simple prejudices without reasonable 
validity. Strictly speaking, there would be nothing to tolerate either, because the voluntary 
requirement of toleration would be violated; we would be unable to do or think anything other 
than what we do or think. And again, where we do not understand the basis of the contrary 




requirement is lacking. An unconscious tolerance of the meaning and scope of toleration is also 
false tolerance. 
Let us devote a few words to false tolerance. Toleration plays a major but ambivalent 
role in modern political discourse (see Forst 2004).  In our society, it enjoys a special status in 
contradistinction to its opposite, intolerance, which is found everywhere by those who are 
inclined to look for it and, wherever it is found, loudly deplored. Still, this distinction 
approaches paradox in two directions. Either we are required to tolerate everything in order to 
avoid the vice of being intolerant, in which case the distinction between the tolerable and the 
intolerable dissolves, or we draw limits to toleration, in which case we seem to be guilty of the 
vice of intolerance in arbitrarily drawing a boundary between what we will tolerate and an 
intolerable or intolerant other (see Scanlon 2003; Fish 1997). The first tendency in modern 
society was observed some decades ago by the philosopher Herbert Marcuse (1969), who wrote 
of “Pure Tolerance” or “Repressive Tolerance”; more recently Aurelio Arteta (1998) has 
spoken of “False Tolerance” making a similar point (see Arteta 1998; compare with the notion 
of Repressive Tolerance, Marcuse 1965).  
The second tendency manifests in worries about moral and epistemic relativism and, 
more crudely, the growing sense that almost everything is merely a matter of opinion:  that 
outside a few incontrovertible scientific truths (an idea which is itself now under attack from 
many quarters: see e.g. Otto 2016; Sismondo 2017)39 there is no possible truth and that, 
therefore, everything should be tolerable. The democratic political ideal, for example, is often 
reduced to its formal aspect (that of organising transparent elections and counting the votes 
rightly), which could be extended to include people and ideas who plan to use the democratic 
system to subvert it from within.  
In the absence of solid moral, epistemic or political reasons, tolerance is replaced by 
prudential calculations or tricks to maximise self-benefit with tolerance providing a kind of 
flag of convenience that covers what would otherwise be recognised as naked self-interest. 
Without the carapace of respectability that the invocation of the idea of tolerance provides, 
such kinds of “prudence” will be in fact no different from sheer cowardice or convenience. 
Behind the language of tolerance, it is possible to detect a contract of mutual convenience: “I 
tolerate what you do or say and you will tolerate everything I do in return”. When this happens, 
tolerance has been replaced by a greater or lesser degree of indifference or scepticism, both to 
 
39 Attacks which are often funded by powerful political and business interests: see e.g. Kalichman (2009); Oreskes 




the value of others’ beliefs and actions and to our own convictions. If true tolerance implies 
the capability of the tolerant to judge, here the subject of tolerance is willingly giving away 
such power. Therefore, they will be also giving away the power to interfere. This subject will 
be also missing a valid or defensible justification to do so. They may still call what they exhibit 
tolerance, though it will be anything but a virtue. Yet, the issue is not only that we may slide, 
or have slid, into a tolerance lacking reasons, but also the possibility of tolerance based on 
invalid reasons. It is not valid, for example, to argue that since there are so many reasons to 
tolerate, we should therefore tolerate everything. That would not only be simplistic but 
illogical: given that, almost as a matter of definition, we tolerate for the sake of something else, 
some higher reason or value, it makes little sense to tolerate for the sake of toleration itself, 
since this is, in effect, to pull the rug from under our own feet and to deprive tolerance of the 
grounds which bear its moral weight.  
More than three centuries ago, discussing toleration, John Locke wrote that: “every 
church is orthodox to itself and erroneous or heretical to others” (Locke 1968:81-83). His 
particular point was that no single church monopolised truth because what made every church 
the church that it was and not something else was that it judged the doctrines around which it 
was constituted to be the sole truth. His more general point was that none could determine what 
was true for its rivals and that its judgements could not stand as criteria by which the claims of 
its rivals ought to be evaluated: what mattered was what the members of each church had in 
common. In this respect all churches were alike. How they stood with reference to some 
transcendent conception of truth was beside the point, since what each required from the others 
was the freedom to act on its own judgment in constituting its worship as it thought best. To 
deny that freedom to others, he opined, was manifestly contradictory. For a group to constitute 
itself as a church was to commit to mutual toleration of other churches at the same time, because 
it means excluding the claims of other churches and confining the claims of one’s own church 
to its members, whose agreement that those claims were right and true and the only safe route 
to salvation was a necessary precondition of their being a church at all. There was a right, and 
indeed a duty, for each church to try to win new members for itself by argument and by the 
example of its peace and holiness, but it could not impose itself or its doctrines on others by 
force. Any church that retained the wish or willingness to do so was not really a church by 
Locke’s definition and was likewise intolerable. Toleration required intolerance (see Harris 
2013).   
The improbable fantasy of being only tolerant and never tolerated was no more an option 




about toleration between churches and Christians, not, or not principally, the toleration of 
churches by the civil ruler, who, he thought, had no business being tolerant or intolerant of 
churches qua churches at all (see Locke 1968:69, in light of Harris 2013). A pluralistic society, 
of which we find a rough analogue in Locke’s account of the plurality of churches, will be 
organised from a tolerance of tolerances. 
In this society, the ideal of a rational progressive agreement, which is still present in 
Locke’s account, is substituted by the ideal of tolerance towards all points of view or, what is 
pretty much the same, by the slogan of “respecting and allowing everything that is different 
just because it is different”—a position that goes some way beyond the one that Locke set out 
in relation to churches. This will result in exempting the “different” from critical discussion 
and accepting any opinion that is different without questioning its inherent negatives. With 
Locke, we are dealing with one single tradition of moral and religious practice in the protracted 
process of fracturing. What distinguishes modern pluralistic societies is the fact that different 
traditions of practice are often at odds with one another and so it becomes difficult to vindicate 
one’s own practice by appealing to the idea that the good should be wished for and justice be 
done, because everyone supports justice. Any objection on moral grounds is liable to be 
countered by matching grounds from a rival tradition as there are many conceptions of the 
good. One way of coming to terms with the implications of this fact, which has won adherents 
among philosophers and has seeped into the general culture, is to adopt a kind of relativistic 
stance, which strives to avoid making any pronouncements about good or bad, just or unjust. 
Concomitantly, neutrality takes the place of morality and the neutrality expected of the political 
state is extended to the individual citizen, who is likewise expected to exhibit neutrality when 
engaging with fellow citizens on matters of public concern or, more pointedly, to accept that 
one person’s meat is another person’s poison and one should simply live and let live (for a 
critical discussion of this line of argument, which attempts to derive toleration from scepticism, 
see McKinnon 2006:35-51). 
Arteta (1998) maintains that under the influence of indiscriminate tolerance, 
objectionable ideas are not confronted for it is not worth the effort: all ideas are equally valuable 
(and so equally without value). This soft tolerance also arrogates the right not to give reasons 
or explanations to anybody and to accuse of bigotry anyone asking for reasons, consecrating 
its right not to defend its own preferred opinions with reasons and invoking a duty on the part 
of others to refrain from inquiring about those reasons by way of reciprocation. At the limit, 
we are encouraged to begin from the assumption that every opinion advanced in the social or 




morally and politically equal subjects. It makes no sense to call for debate, if one position is no 
more or less reasonable than any other, and there is no basis on which to discriminate between 
positions beyond everyone’s own preferences.  Toleration is required, on this line of argument, 
because my position, and my opposition to your opinion, is based on subjective reasons that 
have no higher standing than the reasons you could give for holding your position and so cannot 
legitimise intolerant action against you. 
This argument may be logically invalid—if subjectivism is true then there is no reason 
to think that toleration is required more imperatively than intolerance or any other moral 
judgment—but the conclusion it fails to support is nurtured by (and expressed in) many of the 
platitudes that now proliferate in our public life, (notwithstanding the more recent irruption of 
the politics of insult and belligerence associated with former president Trump in the USA). 
How often do we still hear politicians proclaim, “I have the greatest respect for your opinion…” 
“I respect that view, but I do not share it…” “It would be wrong to judge …” “We will have to 
agree to disagree” and so on. Nowadays, tolerance comes with the express command not to 
judge in public—and if possible, not even in our private ruminations—the ostensible object of 
our toleration. This is a mysterious thing, for true tolerance does not take a step without judging. 
This other unsound tolerance, however, argues that its work consists precisely in refraining 
from judging: it neither approves nor condemns but simply allows (see Williams 1991, for a 
concise demolition of this position).  
 
The empire of opinion 
 
In short, this corrupted or vacuous form of tolerance consists in the willingness to tolerate 
almost everything. The situation, as depicted by Arteta, is something like the following: 
Laissez-faire principles now pervade our moral and social life. Any attempt to vindicate one’s 
position by appealing to the authority of morality immediately risks accusations of 
intransigence and prejudice. From the fanaticism of the faith of a few we have moved to the 
fanaticism of the relativism of the many; for fear of intolerant dogmatism, we have moved to 
the dogmatism of tolerance: anyone who discriminates (that is, passes judgment) is perceived 
as intolerant. Tolerance, which rose to prominence in the seventeenth century as a means of 
settling fractious and feverish religious disputes, has become for many nowadays a kind of 
pseudo-religion aiming less at salvation than universal pacification via the satiation of 




intellectual pacification is the complete sacrifice of all human moral impetus” (1996:96). This 
sacrifice can be observed in the wide range of phenomena emanating from the false tolerance 
against which Arteta sets his stall; just as the relativism and nihilism that nurtures it seep more 
and more into the wider public culture. 
The renunciation of practical truth, which occurs when only the right to express the 
opinion is accountable and not the opinion itself, diminishes our collective life.40. It does so 
not least because, in effect, it gives up on the idea of coming to understand, let alone trying to 
conciliate, opposed positions. At the limit, it affects a “right” to escape the scrutiny of reason 
and, in the end, to give up on reason altogether (Arteta, 1998). 
It is in the political arena where the deleterious effects of this pseudo-tolerance are most 
visible. Here the abandonment of reasoned argument as a way to achieve consensus contributes 
to the devaluation of public debate, which no longer evinces the same degree of commitment 
to progress through arguments or the desire to achieve rational consensus. The citizen body is 
not conceived as a public capable of offering, receiving or responding to reasons, but as a heap 
of singular interests that, since they are valued by those who take themselves to have those 
interests, are also valuable. The bearers of those interests take themselves to have the 
permission, and perhaps the duty, to express themselves about them. The democratic process 
of decision is replaced by the crude mechanics of the aggregation of preferences which all stand 
on the same footing.  
The irony is that this kind of tolerance, which begins with the idea that every opinion 
should be accorded some (maybe the same) weight, embodies a threat to pluralism itself. It 
becomes so from the moment it endorses the equivalence between the sociologically normal 
phenomenon and the normatively right phenomenon (Arteta, 1998). Moreover, it encourages 
intolerance. First, because as soon as the effort to justify our theses or proposals is abandoned, 
only the more or less arbitrary preferences remain: the readiness to speak becomes everything. 
Also, the avowed commitment to avoid judging only makes the judgments we inevitably do 
make more self-conscious. We second-guess ourselves and become fearful of appearing 
critical. Hesitant to limit our tolerance or to attract the accusation of intolerance even in 
response to intolerant views that would suppress other views, we give such views enough room 
to prevail. Tolerating intolerance produces further intolerance.  
 
40 This insight was important to the ancient Greeks, who understood dialectic, the pursuit of truth through the 
exchange of opinion for justified true belief, as one of the more important characteristics of a virtuous public life. 
A healthy and prosperous Polis should always be arguing, reasoning, discussing, confronting opinions until the 




The demoralising effects of this indiscriminate tolerance take a long time to become 
manifest.  They rot a society from its foundations, and the consequences become apparent only 
when it is, in a sense, too late; at those junctures at which its basic political institutions are 
openly challenged. It is then that many citizens experience the powerlessness of being morally 
unarmed against absolute tolerance. They are the same citizens who may become the best 
carriers of any future totalitarianism: As Hannah Arendt observed, “The ideal object of 
authoritarian domination is not the Nazi convinced or the convinced communist, but the people 
for whom there is no longer the distinction between the fact and the fiction (the reality of 
experience) and the distinction between the true and the false (i.e., the norms of thought). At 
the end of the day, if nothing is true, what can be opposed to falsehood?” (Arendt 1987:700). 
One reason why the language of toleration matters as much as the practice, and why that 
language retains its power, is that it retains this connection to true and false, to principle, to 
reasoned objection, without which the practice of toleration all too readily slides into a 
relativism of opinion that cedes political power to those who manipulate and diffuse opinion 
most ruthlessly and most effectively. 
Beyond this reflection, which is intended to underscore the potential and actual use and 
abuse of (what is considered to be) a tolerant attitude, the argument of the thesis now moves 
on to address the issue that is key to understanding the dilemma that modern states face when 
dealing with extreme minority groups: what, precisely, should be tolerated and to what extent? 
Should individual rights trump group rights, or should it be the other way around? It is with 
these complexities, very well encapsulated in the ongoing debate between liberalism and 






THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF THEIR MEMBERS 
 
 
Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If 
we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we 
are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of 
the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with 
them. 
 
Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, 1962 
 
“Nothing to immigrants as a group. 
Everything to them as individuals.” 
 
—Jean Paul Sartre 
 
This chapter discusses the place of toleration in wider liberal and multicultural theories 
of diversity and difference.  It focuses, in particular, on the relationship between individuals 
and groups and explores the competing terms in which that relationship is construed by authors 
such as Kukathas, Barry, Kymlicka, Walzer and Taylor by means of raising and answering the 
following questions: Are there any group rights? Can the rights of religious minorities (as 
communities) trump the rights of their members (as individuals)? Which claim, the individual’s 
or the group’s should prevail? These debates provide normative resources which will help us 
to better understand the problem of The New Jerusalem and the ways in which wider questions 
of the rights of religious minorities are discussed in the existing literature. This chapter also 
provides the platform for a subsequent analysis of the particular form this debate has taken in 
Mexico, often under the influence of the anglophone debate on multiculturalism and liberal 
individual rights. The Mexican dispute will be addressed in detail in the fourth chapter. 
To be a citizen of a modern democracy entails living with people whose behaviour and 
beliefs differ from ours. Sometimes, perhaps often, those differences induce our disapproval. 
To be tolerant, as I discussed in the previous chapter, requires individuals to refrain from acting 
upon this disapproval and to accept behaviours and mores that may be at odds with or at the 
limit antithetical to their own. One displays tolerance when one eschews the use of any kind of 
coercive means to suppress or restrict contrary beliefs or actions. We are called upon to display 
tolerance frequently, because modern societies are increasingly pluralistic in multiple aspects: 
ideological, religious, cultural, and moral. As Rawls puts it, such plurality ought to be regarded 
as “a permanent feature of the public culture of democracies” (Rawls 2002:60)41. But what are 
 




the limits, if any, of this plurality? 
As Rawls went on to emphasise, the plurality that has eventuated among us is not to be 
lamented, because it is the consequence of the free exercise of human reason under free 
institutions. Nevertheless, it has effects; and those effects need to be acknowledged and 
accommodated in liberal societies. This can be challenging, especially when our political or 
moral sensibilities are affronted. If we are to meet this challenge, we are required to incorporate 
diversity and difference into liberalism, an ideological tradition which, notwithstanding its 
stated commitment to pluralism, embodies a decided set of preferences when it comes to how 
society has to be organised.  
Liberalism42 is a congeries of attitudes, ideals, values, and principles which form a more 
or less coherent set: autonomy, freedom of association, freedom of speech, property rights, 
tolerance and a state strong enough to defend or enforce the rights and values with which this 
set of ideals are associated but limited to the defence or enforcement of those ideals. In this 
sense, freedom is the master value, because the fundamental liberal assumption is that it is 
placing limits on the free action of moral agents that requires justification, not such action itself. 
On the other hand, plurality, as can be inferred by its name, implies the existence of alternative 
principles with similar claims to priority, at least prima facie. So, how can we conciliate 
plurality with liberalism or, in other words, how can we make diversity work in a liberal 
society?  
Here the relationship between groups and individuals becomes especially pertinent, 
because society is composed of groups and groups in turn composed of individuals (something 
that remains true even if it is argued that group membership imbues the individual with identity, 
as opposed to giving expression to that identity). The rights of individuals and the manner in 
which and agencies through which these rights are enforced are crucial to this relationship, as 
I intend to show in this chapter and the ones to come. So also is toleration. Why is this so? 
One obvious answer is that when pluralism meets liberalism, toleration becomes almost 
inevitable, because the plurality of beliefs, values and different ways of life that jostle together 
side by side in diverse societies do not fall naturally into a harmonious pattern. Peaceful 
cohabitation, mutual compossibility, would not be possible without a practical and daily 
exercise of mutual toleration between groups and individuals (see Waldron 2003). A further 
 
42 By Liberalism, I am addressing here to the mainstream of this line of thought, which accepts of course a wide 
variety of degrees. In particular, I am alluding to the majority of western democratic nations who will be pleased 




question arises here: how much variety should be tolerated? The empirically observed plurality 
appears to make room for normative pluralism, which is nothing but the civil regulation of the 
differences we see and feel every day. Tolerance, pluralism and democracy are intimately 
related conceptions. As Adam Przeworski (1988) has pointed out, democracy is, among many 
other things, an institutionalisation of pluralism, and a necessary means to that end. Toleration 
is therefore, in at least one sense, essential to pluralism and, by extension, to democracy. But 
what does it mean when we say that toleration is essential to pluralism? How should that claim 
be construed?  
In his canonical book On Toleration, Michael Walzer (1997:84) identifies two forms of 
toleration that, by his account, developed into the two grand projects of modern democratic 
politics, “individual assimilation” and “group recognition”. In Walzer’s view, democratic 
inclusiveness is the first modernist project; it is the project of Locke and of Mill, a project with 
many modern continuators whose work shall be discussed below. It is a project which 
understands human destiny as being in the hands of individuals themselves, and moves in 
thought to a consideration of the kinds of groups they might choose to make or to leave, the 
laws they may decide to put themselves under, and the beliefs they might reasonably come to 
form or discard through the use of their own intellectual and moral faculties. It is a project that 
is rooted in the assumption that the individual is not properly subject to the norms, sovereignty 
or authority of any other person or group by nature, custom or divine dispensation, except 
through their own will and agreement. Groups are associations of individuals, made by 
individuals for their own specific purposes, and they are free to leave them when they find that 
those purposes are no longer served by group membership. In short, the individual trumps the 
group.  
The second modernist project, in contradistinction, seeks to provide the group as a whole 
with a voice, a place, and a politics of its own. The crucial slogan of this struggle is “self-
determination”, but that slogan, as Walzer emphasises, is ambiguous between the claims of 
groups and of individuals (Walzer 1997:91). The coexistence of strong groups and free 
individuals, with all its complexities and ambivalences, is an enduring and perhaps a defining 
feature of modernity. This is why the political struggle of modernity, for Walzer, is a struggle 
for boundaries, an ongoing quest to delimit the proper claims of the individual vis-a-vis the 
group and groups vis-a-vis each other and the state (Walzer 1997:93-112). 
The aim of this chapter is to explore this struggle through the debate between liberalism 
and multiculturalism, to better understand the rights of religious minorities and the rights of its 




geographic and legal boundaries of a modern liberal state. To do this, I begin by reviewing 
some of the most relevant literature on the theory of groups and the theory of group rights 
before setting some of these ideas against the context of The New Jerusalem. The New 
Jerusalem arguably is an exceptional case, but the exception can be useful in bringing out 
certain features of the normal that might otherwise be overlooked.43 Setting various theories of 
group rights and toleration against the reality of The New Jerusalem brings to light the 
complications arising from trying to make accommodations for religious minority groups that 
claim special treatment by the state, particularly when it comes to defining and enforcing limits: 
how far is it feasible and desirable to tolerate practices that directly infringe the principles of a 
liberal state? The mere existence of a community where the normal rule of law does not apply—
or is applied irregularly or at the will of its leaders—yet which is geographically located within 
the borders of a constitutionally liberal state, operating as a millenarian theocracy where 
decisions are taken discretionally by self-identifying holy authorities, allegedly in the name of 
the mother of God herself, but de facto encroaching on civil rights of its members and 
preventing them from interacting with the outside world and obstructing elementary education 
for children, presents a double dilemma.  
The first dilemma relates to the complex challenge that the survival of such a community 
poses for the Mexican state in terms of governance and jurisdiction: how far can a liberal state 
tolerate difference and diversity and adapt a legal/political system to accommodate beliefs and 
ways of life that threaten some the values and rights enshrined in that system? The second 
dilemma concerns potentially contentious relationship between a minority group and its own 
members: if a group enjoys exemptions from the normal operation of the rule of law that applies 
to the rest of the population at large—for whatever philosophical or practical reasons— what 
happens to those minorities that dissent inside such a group? Who will defend them if their 
individual rights or even their rights as a minority group within a minority group are imperilled 
by the larger group to which they belong? My aim in what follows is to identify the features 
that pose special problems to the theory of minority rights and the theory of religious identity 
exemptions.  
Rights are claimed, enforced, adjudicated and supplemented in multiple jurisdictions (see 
e.g. Barzilai 2005; Shachar 2001). These jurisdictions often overlap, meaning that questions 
about the scope of rights and who or what has ultimate jurisdiction over them cannot be 
avoided. So, for instance, what should the Mexican government do when there is an overlap of 
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jurisdictions? Which should prevail, the customs and norms attached to groups and group 
membership or the rule of law over all citizens in the state? The New Jerusalem throws up 
many questions and challenges of this order, which in the last generation have been treated in 
the scholarly literature under the rubric of multiculturalism versus liberalism. To address these 
questions effectively, it will be helpful to discuss how this debate has developed. I begin with 
the classic discussion between multiculturalists and liberals, and focus, more precisely, on a 
significant intervention into the debate between representatives of the two camps, made in 2003 
by the Malaysian-born Australian political theorist Chandran Kukathas, in defence of the first 
modernist project identified by Walzer (individual assimilation) and against a version of the 
second (group recognition) advanced by the Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka, since it very 
well encapsulates the ongoing dispute between the champions of individual rights and the 
defenders of group rights. 
 
Multiculturalism and Liberalism 
 
Multiculturalism is the name given to a broad-based politico-philosophical project that 
supposes that cultural membership is valuable and that cultures are many and diverse, 
religiously, ethnically, and nationally, within and across the states of the world. It holds this 
diversity and difference in high esteem, rather than regretting it, and takes a very particular 
understanding of political inclusivity to follow from it. Deriving originally from lines of 
thought that flowed out of communitarianism, the multiculturalists have developed the ideas 
they inherited about what constitutes community, what it means to be a member of a 
community, and what rights are associated with such membership in ways that move them 
beyond their communitarian predecessors. What they have retained is a greater or lesser degree 
of dissatisfaction with the “liberal” perspective with reference to which they define their own 
position. A closer look at the grounds of that dissatisfaction may help to illuminate some of the 
difficulties and implications involved when a modern state has to deal with minority groups, 
particularly when they explicitly or indirectly claim special rights or even demand the 
suspension of some aspects of the rule of law in the name of their identity as a community or 
for the sake of the beliefs they uphold. The question, in short, is, what is it about groups, if 
anything, that gives them claims to special consideration?  
One answer to this question is, nothing. There is nothing special about groups as such.  
They perform a function for individuals insofar as they provide the context for the expression 




particularities of groups in providing fair background conditions for every individual to explore 
their identity as they see fit.  According to this view, a modern nation is like “a melting pot” 
where different beliefs, traditions, ideologies, and cultures come together, mix, but transcend 
the differences and discrepancies between them in creating one big culture that includes them 
all (see Bell 2000). The ideal is appealing, prima facie, not only in virtue of its simplicity and 
its underlying message of harmonious coexistence but also in its implicit appeal to the values 
of equality and fairness. However, its critics wonder what preconditions are necessary to make 
such a society work, and whether and how far the resultant monoculture could be beneficial or 
hospitable to every individual. 
Multiculturalists argue that a precondition for such a society is the existence of a political 
majority with the power to compel minorities to incorporate into and become part of the 
mainstream culture. In reality, the “melting pot” implies the enforcement and coercive 
inclusion of political, religious and ethnic minorities into the preponderant majority, to 
standardise and homogenise culture in the image of one single type: the dominant type (Taylor, 
1992). However, for Multiculturalists, fusion is not an acceptable outcome, because individual 
cultures are to be appreciated and even encouraged for their own sake. Diversity is valuable 
because cultures in the plural are valuable, either because, in the stronger version, every culture 
has value in itself or because, in a weaker version, cultures are important ingredients of our 
identities as individuals.  Either way, they lay at least some claims on the terms of citizenship. 
In his classic book The Rights of Minority Cultures (1995b), Will Kymlicka claims that 
the toleration of group differences, taken by itself, fails to guarantee that group members will 
be treated as equal members of the wider society, essentially because this provision is too weak 
to avoid the risk of marginalisation, and cannot even guarantee the survival of the group itself. 
What is required is recognition and positive accommodation of minority practices. How to 
achieve that? By subscribing to what he calls “group-differentiated rights” (Ibid.). Only 
through positive affirmation and by acknowledging such special rights can minority groups be 
compensated for the historical inequalities and the atrocities committed against them in the 
name of, or to the advantage of, the dominant culture and protected against the perpetuation of 
the marginalisation suffered at its hands.  
Group-differentiated rights are claimed by the Canadian indigenous peoples and 
Australian aborigines, who are granted exemptions from typically-applicable laws in virtue of 
their religious beliefs, their educational needs and their practices of political participation. They 
may be extended, under the rubric of multiculturalism, to embrace the political claims of other 




social participation, African-Americans, members of the LGBT community, indigenous 
peoples, minority nations like the Quebecois, the Catalans or the Basque. All of them should 
be subjects of political affirmation to restore the power that has been unfairly removed from 
them simply for being outnumbered by oppressing majorities. However, immigrants mistreated 
and outcast for being “illegal” are perhaps the best example of the concerns of multiculturalists: 
Muslims stigmatised and discriminated in Western Europe or Latinos in the United States, 
arbitrarily dispossessed and deported, often separated from their families or prosecuted as 
outsiders within the political community in which they make their home (see Eisenberg and 
Spinner-Halev 2005; Kymlicka 1995, 1995b; Spinner-Halev 1994).  
Kymlicka accepts that for many people “the idea of group rights is both mysterious and 
disturbing. For how can groups have rights that are not ultimately reducible to the rights of 
their individual members?” (Kymlicka 1995b:13). It is mysterious because it is difficult to 
determine just what it is that has such rights: how is it possible to fix an enduring identity for 
any group over time, given that it is always gaining new members and losing old ones.  It is 
disturbing because it seems to give the group precedence over the individual and raises the 
worry of the illiberal treatment of individuals who dissent from the terms of membership. On 
most accounts, the relevant groups are natural or involuntary ones, into which people are born 
(Johnston in Kymlicka 1995b:183) and so the worry is amplified: people haven’t chosen to 
belong to these groups and now face being told they have no choice but to accept their rules 
and mores as binding on them. These groups are bound together by multi-dimensional 
relationships of mutual interdependence, recognition and even obligation. But, for Kymlicka 
the answer is succinct: groups have rights. To fail to admit that would be equivalent to 
accepting the claim that it is impossible to recognise difference and treat the different as equals 
without being unfair and inequitable (Villoro, 1998).  
The liberal view, captured in the worries to which Kymlicka gives voice, is that it is not 
communities but the individual that is of prime importance. Individual decisions can be made 
without any hindrance or interference by another agent or agency, other things being equal: 
they can be explained and justified simply in terms of the properties of individuals and 
individual goods. Multiculturalist views come closest to their communitarian ancestors when 
they reject the idea that the individual, logically or morally, trumps the community, and deny 
that society is composed by individualistic selves each concerned with pursuing their own 
conception of the “good life”. This “individualistic” attitude was long ago identified by 
Tocqueville as one of the defining and more deplorable aspects of modern societies: “Primacy 




his present get loosened and relaxed: it is only him (the individual ego) and his desires that 
matter; it is only him and his extremely small sphere that counts.” (Tocqueville in Paz 
1994:400). For individualist liberals, the value of social goods can be measured in quantums 
of individual welfare and as expressions of individual choice. For critics like Charles Taylor, 
this leaves out of account the many collective human goods that are “irreducibly social” and 
inherently valuable (Taylor, 1989). 
Taylor opposes to individualistic liberalism an ontological holist account of collective 
identities and cultures. His argument for a “politics or recognition” rests on the ground that 
identities are not fixed but rather shaped in and through association with others. “We define 
our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant 
others want to see in us” (Taylor 1994:33). This argument reflects Taylor’s belief that human 
life is “fundamentally dialogical” (Ibid.:32) in character, and his matching belief that it is in 
the nature of human beings to seek recognition from and by others. Indeed, our need for 
recognition “continues indefinitely” (Ibid.:33).  
Taylor began his academic life as a scholar of Hegel and turns to Hegel to explain the 
different kinds of recognition we seek: our most intimate, or personal identities are initially 
formed by “contact with significant others”, both our social identities are “formed in open 
dialogue” in the political arena, a dialogue which, in the modern world, has come to take two 
forms. The first emphasises “the equal dignity of all citizens” in the effort to avoid a return to 
hierarchical ordering of life which marked the pre-modern world. The watchwords here are 
equality and similarity: equal treatment means treating everyone the same (Ibid.:37-38). 
Similarity means that everyone is owed “recognition of the unique identity” of each individual 
or group (Ibid.:38). This politics has a universal, egalitarian basis–equal recognition for all—
but “it asks we give acknowledgement and status to something that is not universally shared” 
(Ibid.:39). This second form of politics is what Taylor calls the “politics of difference”. It 
requires, in its fullest form, that “one accord equal respect to actually evolved cultures”, 
whatever it is that those cultures happen to value or valorise. As a matter of principle, they 
ought to be accorded equal value. The alternative view, what Taylor calls the “politics of 
dignity” stands accused, by contrast, of “imposing a false homogeneity” (Ibid.:44) by seeking 
to do away with particular differences in the name of equal rights and equal freedoms. 
Taylor uses the example of his homeland, Canada, to explore the strengths and 
weaknesses of these two forms of politics.  He associates the first model with liberalism and 
finds that, if there are more or less persuasive versions of liberalism on offer, there is at least 




homogeneity may be difficult to rebut. The reason is that, notwithstanding liberalism’s claim 
to offer “a neutral ground on which people of all cultures can meet and coexist”, liberalism in 
fact “is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures”. Rather, it is “the political expression of 
one range of cultures” (Ibid.:62)—certain Western ones, assimilating non-Western cultures 
which do not challenge their fundamental values— but it is “incompatible with other ranges”— 
certain Muslim societies or aboriginal cultures, for instance. If liberals “can’t and shouldn’t 
claim complete cultural neutrality” (Ibid.), then what is the next step?  
In Taylor’s mind, what follows is what he calls the “presumption” of equal worth owed 
to every other culture, including those which liberalism finds difficult to accommodate. He is 
not by any means saying that all cultures are in fact of equal value. Any demand for recognition 
on that basis would be false and readily rejectable. But there is prima facie reason to take 
seriously the demands for recognition made by different cultures and, with this, one line of 
justification for a politics of multiculturalism. 
A second justification of multiculturalism is provided by Kymlicka, who seeks to 
combine the liberal values of autonomy and equality with the value of “cultural membership” 
(Kymlicka, 1995). He regards cultural membership as a primary good and describes cultures 
as contexts of “choice”, arguing, on the “weaker” line identified above, that cultural 
membership plays an important role in people’s identity (see also Festenstein 2005). There is 
a deep connection between a person’s self-respect, Kymlicka claims, and the respect accorded 
to the cultural group they belong to. 
Kymlicka also distinguishes between different types of groups and proposes a typology 
of different rights accordingly. He offers a full array of group-differentiated rights44 for 
indigenous peoples and national minorities for what his critics call the luck egalitarian reason 
that justice requires assisting cultural minorities to bear the burdens of the (un)chosen 
disadvantages under which they labour. According to luck egalitarians, individuals should be 
held responsible for inequalities resulting from their own choices, but not for inequalities 
deriving from inevitable circumstances (Dworkin, 1978). 
Kymlicka, then, believes that identities are key: they define groups as much as they define 
individuals. Therefore, groups may need to be defended and protected as well as individuals. 
“The idea of according special rights of self-government to minority communities need not to 
be illiberal, if this communal self-government respects the civil rights of its members” 
(Kymlicka in Heyd 1996:67). He suggests that this point has been obscured by a prior claim 
 




upon our attention. The claim is laid by history or, to be more exact, by the unreflective 
tendency to think about minority cultures on the model of religious communities, and to 
perceive religious communities in terms of a Western model of toleration that separates the 
state from the church. But there is, Kymlicka notes, a contrasting historical model that lasted 
for about 500 years, in which toleration unified the state and the church, and which worked 
surprisingly well: The Millet system of the Ottoman Empire. 
Kymlicka argues that the Millet system offers a viable alternative form of religious 
tolerance to Rawlsian liberalism. “Even if we endorse Rawls’s liberal conception of tolerance, 
the Millet system is a useful reminder that individual rights are not the only way to 
accommodate religious pluralism (…)” (Kymlicka in Heyd 1996:70).  Kymlicka observes that 
in his later writings, Rawls eschewed the autonomy argument associated with Kant and Mill, 
which he came to regard as “sectarian” and “insensitive” to the pluralistic reality of modern 
democratic societies, relying instead on a “political” conception of the person as a free and 
equal member of the political community. Kymlicka, however, does not think that his strategy 
really works “(…) for it simply leaves it unclear why a liberal state should assign priority to 
civil rights, without in fact being more sympathetic to the demands of non-liberal minorities. 
A more appropriate response, I believe, is to continue to defend comprehensive liberalism, but 
to recognize that there are limits to our ability to implement and impose liberal principles on 
groups that have not endorsed those principles” (Kymlicka in Heyd 1996:80).  
What this means, for Kymlicka, is that the state has no business forcing citizens to 
renounce their differences in identity as religious or ethnic minorities and embrace a common 
political identity. The truly tolerant state, instead of remaining neutral between different 
conceptions of the good, should intervene to guarantee and create equal opportunities for all. 
Inequality reduces opportunity, especially for the members of the disadvantaged groups, and 
damages self-esteem. An active multicultural tolerance takes due account of the long-term 
damage caused by sustained inequality to people’s self-respect and life chances. It proposes 
measures of affirmative action and even over-representative quotas in certain public institutions 
to compensate for the effects of historic injustice. Sometimes this extends to calls to protect 
minority groups from conduct or speech that, for such historic reasons, is particularly 
detrimental to members of such minorities (Águila 2003:372). 
Of course, the intensity of protective measures to compensate for those marginalised 
cultures or identities can vary over a wide range, and there are some differences of degree as 
well as differences of kind. Kymlicka, for instance, strives to find a balance between the 




some multiculturalists would countenance. A “harder” approach insists more strenuously on 
the non-interference of the state in a group’s organisation or in its communitarian life. If the 
group’s identity is treated on strict analogy with the identity of a person, the group can arrogate 
to itself rights that are above the individual themselves: they are collective rights of the group 
as a collective entity, with the caveat of exit. The individual is important insofar they are a 
member of the larger body: the group itself. They would thus claim toleration from the state, 
toleration understood as special treatment; more particularly they claim exemptions from 
general obligations that apply to citizens outside the group. They demand that certain areas of 
their collective life, such as their cultural, religious, or educational affairs, should be regarded 
and treated differently from those of the external majority, governed by the group’s own rules, 
without any interference from the national authorities. The result is a kind of sovereignty over 
cultural self, demanding that public power should allow whatever occurs inside the group short 
of physical coercion. What is recommended, in other words, is a principle of social enclosure, 
that makes cultural communities self-governing entities, lords within their own jurisdictions45.  
 
The Critique of Kymlicka and Multiculturalism 
 
When Multicultural Citizenship was published in 1995 it attracted much critical 
comment, pro and contra. Even the cover—depicting Quakers and pilgrims, harmoniously 
interacting with the Native American tribes and what seems to be a happy lion peacefully 
enjoying a sunny day with the sheep and the cattle—induced sardonic comments about the 
naïve nature of the contents of Kymlicka’s theory. In this instance, a book was literally judged 
by its cover. 
Critiques of multiculturalism have taken many forms.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to discuss them all. This being said, I would like to lay out in general terms some of the critiques 
deployed against multiculturalism that bear most saliently on the case of the New Jerusalem. 
One early critique, offered by Jeremy Waldron (1995), accused Kymlicka and his followers of 
being engaged in a “cosmopolitan” view of culture that ignored the changing nature of cultures. 
Cultures, he argued, do not need to be defended or protected because they evolve, adapt, and 
sometimes even disappear in time as a part of wider cultural phenomenon that has been evident 
 
45 For a breakdown of non-vertical accommodation policies in multicultural societies, compare Bachvarova 2014; 
for a detailed exploration of multicultural arrangements and the responsibilities of the State, see Banting in 





since the earliest civilisations developed in China. Another critique was offered by Fraser 
(1997) who worried that multiculturalism was a form of a “politics of recognition” that diverted 
attention away from a “politics of redistribution”, which —according to the critique—is what 
minority groups really require, for they need to be provided with economic inclusivity and 
opportunities by the state rather than to be granted a legal status that in practical terms would 
make little impact in the life of their members.  
Brian Barry (2001) noisily promoted a universalist idea of equality in contrast to the 
group-differentiated idea defended by multiculturalists. From a very different angle, a few 
postcolonial authors were sceptical of Kymlicka and his arguments because they regard the 
politics of recognition as a mechanism that actually reinforces, rather than transforms, the old 
colonial structures of domination. Latterly, the feminist critique (see Song 2007; Shachar 2001, 
2000; Okin 1999) has been particularly successful in pointing to the fact that extending 
privileges and protections to minority groups may have the unwanted side effect of supporting 
oppression of the most vulnerable members of those groups, in particular women, who tend to 
be excluded from the significant decisions of such communities. A dispiritingly wide variety 
of examples could be adduced to empirically support feminist concerns on this score. 
However, the critiques that is most relevant to my argument came from the pen of a 
liberal, Chandran Kukathas, who maintained, contra Kymlicka, that there were no group rights, 
only individual rights, and that by granting special legal protection to minority groups, the state 
overstepped its proper role at the price of undermining individual rights: in particular, what he 
considers to be a singularly valuable right, the right of association.  
In his work The Liberal Archipelago (2003), Kukathas gave sustained attention to the 
way claims of cultural minorities should be addressed in the modern world. He wonders 
whether a liberal society should tolerate illiberal communities or accommodate illiberal 
immigrants. He asks his own version of Rawls’s famous question: What is the principled basis 
of a free society, marked by cultural diversity and different and perhaps competing group 
loyalties? (Kukathas, 2003). The answer, he suggests, depends on how authority is allocated, 
and so he goes on to pose a subsequent question: what is the place of authority in a free society? 
According to him, the fundamental principle that defines a free society is the principle of 
freedom of association. Then he states what he takes to be the corollary of the principle of 
freedom of association: the principle of freedom of dissociation (it is not wholly clear if he is 
referring here to the right of exit, or to something more extensive); and he takes this to imply, 
further, the principle of mutual toleration of associations. In other words, he presumes a right 




the part of others to permit everyone to exercise this right.  
Again, it is not entirely clear whether he is talking only about mutual toleration between 
associations within the state or if he is treating the state itself as one such association among 
several others: speaking of society rather than the state suggests the second construction, 
whereas his formal position seems to be the first (as we shall discuss later). But either way, 
what is presumed is that it is the duty on the part of the state to permit forms of association of 
which it strongly disapproves. As he writes, “A society is free to the extent that is prepared to 
tolerate in its midst associations which differ or dissent from its standards or practices”. Or 
again, “A liberal society is marked by respect for the independence of other authorities, and a 
reluctance to intervene in their affairs” (Kukathas 2003:4). 
Kukathas’s thesis could be summarised as follows: “The principle of a free society 
describes not a hierarchy of superior and subordinate authorities but an archipelago of 
competing and overlapping jurisdictions” (Ibid.:4-5). So summarised, his position stands in 
contrast with those of Rawls, who deals with the problem of a free society by providing 
principles of justice that could eventually be accepted by everyone, Kymlicka, who claims 
group-differentiated rights for certain communities, and Iris Marion Young (1989), who 
assures that less advantaged minorities would benefit more from economic inclusion and 
political empowerment, rather than from legally special recognition. 
Kukathas identifies the core of his position as follows: “In a free society only the freedom 
to associate is fundamental and the need to tolerate the different forms that associations might 
take.” Kukathas believes in an idea, a liberal formula, if you like, that can be reduced to the 
following elements: a free society equals freedom of association plus mutual toleration. 
Nothing else is needed for a free society, according to him. Dismissing Rawls, Kukathas says 
that the primary question of politics is not about justice (and has never been), but about power: 
who should wield it and what may be done with it (Ibid.: 120). 
How does this question play out in relation to toleration? Kukathas writes: “(When) 
confronted with the question of whether or not the practices of some cultural communities are 
acceptable, we establish the limits of tolerance by referring to our basic moral principles and 
then determining whether or not particular practices are consistent with them. We can 
subsequently decide if we should intervene in traditional societies or minority groups by 
providing state subsidies, disincentives or penalties for particular practices” So, when to 
intervene? Rarely if ever. In his words, “liberal societies should tolerate illiberal groups in their 
midst for toleration lies at the heart of a good society in a world of diversity” (Ibid.). According 




Kymlicka, among others —is that they all underestimate the importance of toleration or fail to 
apply its logic consistently. He also thinks that a further problem with some liberal approaches 
is that they overestimate the value of self-determination, by which they really mean the capacity 
or perhaps even the duty of individuals to adopt liberal mores and to pursue ends they have 
chosen for themselves in self-conscious contradistinction to traditional or inherited plans of 
life.  
Deborah Fitzmaurice (1993)46 argues, “We should interfere with traditional societies 
only in order to prevent powerful members directly coercing or harming co-members in order 
to sustain traditional ways of life” (Ibid.:21). Kukathas replies that, on this view of things, 
minority practice is to be tolerated only as long as it abides by the fundamental moral principles 
of the wider liberal society; coercive minority communities will be restructured (so far as it is 
practicable) to be brought into accord with majority practice (Ibid.:125). The problem is that 
this approach propagates insufficient toleration to minority communities. What ultimately 
emerges—he says—is a trumping concern with the perpetuation or reproduction of a liberal 
social order, but at the risk of intolerance and moral dogmatism. Then he offers what he calls 
“an alternative view” which makes toleration the very foundation of liberalism. Toleration is 
most important—he argues—not because it promotes reason but because “it upholds reason 
since it forswears the use of force in favour of persuasion” (Ibid.) and in doing so rejects the 
implicit assumption of superiority and concomitant right of the liberal state to impose its 
preferences on others that he associates with rival positions that are, to his mind, incompatible 
with the liberal formula.  
Kukathas’s stated view is not that groups have or should have rights against the state, but 
that liberal states, being liberal, ought to permit them to pursue their beliefs and enact their 
norms as they deem fit within limits that are so broad as to constitute no effective limitation at 
all on their customary practices and to render the explicit or statutory ascription of group rights 
to them nugatory or superfluous.    
Kukathas, then, defends a tolerationist view of society. Yet, other voices challenge what 
they regard as his excessive permissiveness. Barry, for example, was a long-standing critic of 
this position: Kukathas’s view, in his view, does give groups rights and too much power over 
their members, if not by commission then certainly by omission, with the result that groups 
may harm their members with impunity. The role of the state, for Kukathas, is to police and 
enforce the duty of mutual toleration among groups but not to intervene directly in their internal 
 




workings to protect their members from a group exercising its power over them (in sometimes 
extreme ways), be that by reproducing inherited norms through education or indoctrination or 
requiring forced marriage or female genital mutilation.  It looks as if, Barry observes, “Public 
tolerance is a formula for creating a lot of private hells” (Barry 2001:143).  
This observation can be applied in respect of the situation in The New Jerusalem. In this 
community, the holy authorities maintain that children should not receive formal education 
because it is evil. Grudgingly, they allowed parents to decide about the future of their children. 
Some of them (the Naborists) send their children only to the religious school, ruled by the 
edicts of the Virgin and the holy bishops. Others, the Dissidents, chose to take the risk of 
sending their children away from the community to receive a formal state education, the 
consequences of which choice were discussed in chapter 1. The question that then arises here 
is: Should parents be allowed by the state to stop children from going to school?  Barry 
answers: “If the state should turn a blind eye on private coercion, this will bring about coercive 
results (…) if it grants immunity to parents to do things to their own children that would be 
illegal if they did them to any other children, the state is handing power over parents in a 
particularly brutal and uncontrolled way” (Barry 2001:43). 
Kukathas would immediately riposte that there is little to gain in allowing the historically 
abusive state to get involved in the suppression of parents’ rights. On the contrary, there is a 
manifest loss of liberty. He then would explain, perhaps, that it is difficult for anyone living 
within any community to do entirely as they please to another because there always are 
constraints imposed by society, by the law, and by an array of different authorities besides the 
state and the leaders of the community. But it is emphatically not the role of the liberal state to 
tell parents how to raise their children, any more than it should extend special protections to 
certain groups. The liberal formula rightly permits all groups to do as they will, as long they 
allow others to do likewise. 
According to Kukathas, the proponents of the “Politics of Difference”, such as Young, 
are therefore wrong and mistaken to imagine that groups need to be empowered against the 
inundations of liberal individualism. Young says: “The politics of difference promotes a notion 
of group solidarity against the individualism of liberal humanism”. She goes on: “Liberal 
individualism treats each person as an individual, ignoring differences of race, sex, religion 
and ethnicity, maintaining that ‘each person’ should be evaluated only according to her or his 
individual efforts and achievements” (Young 1990:75). But Kukathas strikes back: Liberalism 
does not argue for assimilation as she assumes, so her critique is, in the end, unsound: it treats 




feature of all human interactions under all types of political regime. He goes on to assert that 
Young’s theory, in treating groups on the model of natural kinds, rests on less plausible 
ontological foundations that those supporting liberalism (which treat them as associations of 
individuals combining and recombining at will) (Kukathas 2003:155). 
Critics—liberals or otherwise—of multicultural claims for group rights regard toleration 
as a kind of “fall back option”. It is my hypothesis that the particular conception of toleration 
deployed towards The New Jerusalem also stems from such understandings and provides 
legitimating cover to both local and federal authorities. They have come to invoke this vague 
notion of toleration to justify their political ineffectiveness and their refusal to intervene in the 
city, where the self calling holy authorities claim special rights for themselves whilst 
attempting to establish a parallel form of government within the walls of their enclosure despite 
belonging to a liberal state. Yet, as Michael Walzer (2006:50) has asked,  
 
Shall we liberals and democrats recognize the rights of totalizing communities like 
fundamentalist or ultraorthodox religious groups (The “Haredim” in Israel, 
Pentecostal sects in the USA)47 or like traditionalist ethnic groups (The aboriginal 
tribes of Canada and New Zealand) to reproduce themselves —that is to do 
whatever they think necessary to do to pass on their way of life to their children, 
who are also citizens of a democratic state? And, should the state in any way 
support the exercise of this right? 
 
Walzer finds such a right to be problematic for three reasons: first, because these groups 
do not typically recognise the individual rights attributed equally to all their members; second, 
because these groups tend not to equip their children with the economic skills they need to 
succeeded in life; and third, because these groups are unlikely to teach their children the values 
of democratic politics (Ib.:87-89). 
Walzer, like other liberals as different as Rawls, Moshe Halbertal, Peter Balint and 
Bernard Williams, believes that the Millian argument of autonomy is problematic. We cannot 
expect all groups to regard this value as fundamental or even as desirable, as liberals do. “In 
working out state policy, we do not have to refer to individual autonomy but only to the mutual 
dependency of democratic citizens (…) liberals have always insisted that autonomous 
individuals need to be protected against the power of state officials, they are less solicitous of 
autonomous groups that do not value individualism” (Ibid.:87). For him, these are the central 
propositions of a social democratic theory of civil society: 
 
 




I. Civil society in the real world is not a collection of voluntary 
associations; its overall character is not determined by individual 
comings and goings; 
II. Civil society cannot work as liberals want it to, without the help of the 
state; 
III. The state must act to regulate (I would add: it must be strong enough to 
regulate)48 the conflicts that arise within civil society, but also to remedy 
inequalities and; 
IV. When the state intervenes in civil society, it cannot aim to reproduce its 
liberalism in all associations; it acts sometimes for political freedom, 
sometimes for associational pluralism, and only sometimes for both 
together.49 
 
The issue that I have been discussing in the preceding paragraphs might suggest that I do 
not think it is viable to argue for special rights for minorities within a liberal state. That is not 
what I am trying to argue here. Indeed, I believe it is possible to have non-liberal communities 
with a certain degree of autonomy within a liberal state. What I contend is that the coexistence 
of such communities is possible only as long as they do not marginalise nor mistreat their own 
members. In the context of The New Jerusalem, I would say that the situation is complex 
enough to require special attention not only to the conceptual content of the terms we use to 
describe and evaluate that situation, but also to the practical implications of theoretical 
positions that are advanced with relative ease in academic monographs but experienced very 
differently when theory meets practice. More pointedly, I would say that there is a staging post 
between high theory and low politics, where philosophical concepts, ideas, theories, become 
objects of public contestation and an attempt is made at the level of public or popular opinion 
to elucidate the ideals, hopes, and aspirations that are being invoked to legitimise different 
forms of political action and inaction.  
In recent years the contemporary discussion between liberals and communitarians has 
jumped from the pages of academic journals into the Mexican political arena and the popular 
press, especially (but not exclusively) on the subject of the group rights of indigenous peoples. 
This ongoing debate in Mexico mirrors, to some extent, the anglophone dispute sketched above  
and is well encapsulated by the liberal professors José Antonio Aguilar Rivera and Jesús Silva-
Herzog Márquez on the one side, and the communitarian philosopher Luis Villoro, on the other. 
In the next chapter I explore this debate in greater depth, because the challenge posed by The 
 
48 What is between brackets is mine. 
49 Walzer differs from multiculturalists like Kymlicka in focusing on states and the different ways in which they 
can accommodate internal diversity rather than on groups per se, their different types, and the rights they can 
legitimately claim irrespective of the kind of state in which they are found. See Walzer (1983) and, for discussion 




New Jerusalem at once illuminates and help to fertilize the debate over the liberality of the 





































THE DEBATE ON GROUP RIGHTS IN MEXICO 
 
No one could claim to be civil society’s speaker, for society 
is naturally plural, and various and diverse. 
 
 — Octavio Paz (An Open Letter to Sub-Commander 
Marcos) 
 
“The problem with Nostalgia  




This chapter analyses the direction the debate over group rights and individual rights has 
taken in Mexico, where it has come to focus ever more sharply on the group rights of 
indigenous peoples. Is it right or not to grant minority groups special rights?  The dispute is 
well-encapsulated in the intense debate between Mexican liberals such as Aguilar Rivera and 
Silva Herzog, and the philosopher Luis Villoro on the side of the multiculturalists. The chapter 
is complemented by hasting through some of the more outstanding and recent authors that have 
continued that debate to unveil the state of affairs the discussion holds in Mexico. How it relates 
(or not) to the problem posed by The New Jerusalem community and how it belongs to the 
critique I make to contemporary models of toleration will become more evident in the fifth 
chapter. 
On 1 January 1994, the Zapatista rebellion broke out in the high mountain rainforests of 
southern Mexico. What has been called by the press “the indigenous revolution” was meant to 
put an end to centuries of economic and political oppression, under the leadership of Sub-
Commander Marcos, the nom-de-guerre used by Rafael Sebastián Guillén, a middle-class 
lecturer of graphic arts (Obregón, 1997). The rebellion, in time, became more of a moral 
challenge to the neoliberal values that successive technocratic Mexican governments had 
espoused, rather than a violent, weaponised movement. In the years that followed the rebellion, 
an intellectual and political debate on the issue of indigenous rights took place in Mexico. It 
was, perhaps, the last great Latin American ideological debate of the 20th century. The 
participants were the new school of liberals, mostly educated in American universities, and 
some older, august philosophers who sympathised both with the indigenous movement and 
with the claims of multiculturalism. The paroxysm of that dispute took place in 2001, when the 
congress discussed a constitutional reform to accommodate some of the demands of the 




Three years previously, in July 1998, the well-known Mexican-Spaniard philosopher 
Luis Villoro, a sympathiser for the Zapatista cause, published two essays in the left-wing 
newspaper La Jornada on the indigenous question. The texts were the subject of a controversy 
in the magazine Este País between Villoro and a liberal junior professor, José Antonio Aguilar 
Rivera. Three years later, whilst the debate in the Federal Congress on the indigenous law was 
still ongoing, a second controversy broke out between Villoro and Jesús Silva-Herzog 
Márquez, another liberal academic and scion of a venerable liberal family. The quarrel moved 
beyond personal disagreement into the public consciousness because it was played out on the 
pages of the newspaper Reforma.  
Since the debates with which I am concerned are so neatly encapsulated in this public 
dispute, it provides the point of entry through which I shall review and criticise some of the 
arguments deployed in the Mexican iteration of the liberal versus multicultural contest. The 
dispute provides background context to the discussion of special rights in the national milieu 
and enables me to explore the relationship between the Mexican debate on indigenous rights 
and the broader discussion on toleration. Among the questions which the dispute brought into 
focus before the public were: is it wise, fair and effective to accommodate group-differentiated 
rights within a liberal state to obtain a more egalitarian, peaceful and just society? What are the 
associated costs and benefits? According to the contemporary national debate, what is the role 
that group rights play versus individual rights in Mexico? 
 
The Future of Indigenous Peoples According to Luis Villoro 
 
Villoro (1998b) contended that recent decades had witnessed a new presence, a revival 
of indigenous peoples’ discourses in the wider public consciousness. Mexican society was 
thinking about the future, and this future, he argued, was bound up with the fate of all the 
communities that composed that society, or, to put it in politico-legal terms, the nation state. It 
is important to put matters in these terms, Villoro suggests, because the history of Mexico as 
an independent nation can be regarded best in the light of a contrast between two rival 
conceptions of the nation state.  
The first conception, he says, is the one that has triumphed. Following the ideas of Jus 
naturalism, this first conception holds that the new nation that emerged out of the Mexican 
Revolution of 1910-20 was born of a social contract between equal individuals. The assembly 
of representatives constituted the new nation, but it was—and it is—only a projected nation, a 




groups (Villoro, 1988b). Confronted by the heterogeneity of the real nation, a group of creoles 
and mestizos50, most of them lawyers, imposed their own idea of the nation, which they 
represented as a contract among all. But the indigenous peoples were never consulted and had 
never actually entered into this “Social Contract”. They were forced to accept its terms because, 
poor and disempowered, they lacked the means to resist and had no alternative but to submit.  
Its proponents sought to legitimise the new Mexican nation by presenting it as a unity 
between the state (a system of political power) and the nation (a unity of culture and peoples). 
The newly-formed Mexican state corresponded, in this picture, to a homogenous nation: there 
was a single legal order, a single language, a common education, a common national culture: 
in sum, a single collective project. Only diversities that do not break this unit were admitted 
and, Villoro argues, this vision has gripped the imagination and driven the practice of Mexican 
governments ever since. This is the state as Bluntschli depicted it at the end of the 19th century: 
a state in which unity of language is thought to be in the interest of the nation, is taught in 
school to the children of “still uninformed” peoples, whose customs may be allowed to continue 
only so long as they do not “offend against the rights of the State”, who are owed no special 
recognition or protection from the state, which must include the whole population in its laws 
and “transform or abolish” the rights claimed by particular peoples (Bluntschli 2000:85-86). 
The subjects of this nation-state are to be seen as equal citizens, regardless of the cultural and 
social characteristics that differentiate them from one another. “There are no longer Indians, 
nor Spaniards nor castes, they are all American citizens: so proclaimed the first Mexican 
deputies” (Villoro, 1998b).  
This idea of a homogeneous nation-state made up of equal citizens continues to exert a 
powerful influence on the political imagination of modern Mexico. It idealises a liberal state in 
which all identities besides that of citizens are deemed to be irrelevant. Those who actually 
belong to heterogeneous communities—Villoro implied—are not part of the liberal state at all. 
After the Mexican Revolution, he repeated, this notion came to dominate elite thinking, with 
increasingly negative effects for the indigenous peoples.  These effects were explained at length 
by the “founding father” of Indigenismo, Manuel M. Gamio (see Gamio 1942, 1916; León-
Portilla 1962). 
 
50 In colonial times, a new social mosaic emerged in Mexico, known as the Colonial Caste System: At the top of 
the social status there were the Spaniards, the most privileged social group, followed by the Creoles, who were 
the sons of Spaniards but born in Mexico; below them there were the Mestizos (the sons of a Spaniard and a 
Mexican native) and, at the basis of this imaginary social pyramid, the indigenous peoples, with no influence at 
all in any important decision concerning the public realm. For a detailed explanation and a thorough analysis of 




Writing in the turbulent years of revolution and its aftermath, Gamio described a divided 
Mexico. According to him, the elite that founded Mexico as a modern republic wished to 
enforce unity in the creation of a single homeland. This one homeland for all has to be “forged” 
(Forging a Nation is the title of his most important work) 51, a metaphor that carries a great 
deal of weight: inherited identities need to be melted down and mixed together to create a new 
alloy strong enough to sustain the new nation in existence. Indigenismo52 was a social and 
political movement that tried to redeem the indigenous populations by elevating their ways of 
life. However, indigenists interpreted that “redemption” as the aboriginal people’s integration 
into the dominant national culture (a culture that regarded creole and mestizo as equals), with 
the consequence that the various differences between them, differences that made them who 
they were, were gradually abandoned (Gamio 1916:22-30). Gamio wrote: “The challenge of 
the revolutionaries of Mexico is to take up the hammer and tie on the apron of the forger” 
(Gamio 1916:24), to perform “the task of forging ‘the steel of the Latin race’ with the crude 
‘indigenous bronze’” (Kieron 2014:3). 53 
This conception of a homogeneous nation-state was never uncontested. It was 
challenged, Villoro says, by the rival idea of a nation (and by extension of the nation-state) that 
always had its exponents. Villoro speaks of a vision that is to be felt and incarnated, rather than 
thought: a populist, holistic vision, typical to communities linked to the land, especially among 
those inhabiting marginalised villages in the countryside. While the Creole lawyers projected 
assemblies to constitute the nation, very much on the model of the American framers and the 
French revolutionary deputies, the people that followed the Liberty Fathers, Hidalgo and 
Morelos54, for instance, fought for concrete objectives: the reduction of the oppression of the 
state, the right to the usufruct of the land, the freedom of the communities to which they 
belonged. They gave very little thought to the establishment of a republic and they were not 
concerned with the congresses where lawyers were debating the conditions of a homogeneous 
nation-state. They defended their communities because those communities nourished and 
defined the lives of the people who lived there. The principal concern of the promulgators and 
 
51 Also translated as Forging a Fatherland or Forging a Homeland. “Forjando Patria” (Spanish original title) was 
first published in 1916. 
52 In Manuel Gamio y el Indigenismo Oficial en México Brading and Uriquidi (1989) explored how Gamio 
successfully vindicated the art, the architecture and even social and political practices that the Aztecs and other 
ancient natives of Mexico had before the European conquer.  
53 H. Kieron (2014) points out the similarities and differences between two of the main Mexican post-revolutionary 
thinkers. For a detailed interpretation and confrontation of their writings see The Indigenismo of Manuel Gamio 
and José Vasconcelos in Revolutionary Mexico 1916-1948, and Branding and Urquidi (1989). 




partisans of this popular vision was the land and, accordingly, their demands were for local 
autonomy, not directly for a particular model of the state or national government. Nevertheless, 
such a model was present implicitly in “the local demands”, as have been called by Arnaldo 
Córdova (1973), that characterised the movement.  
This model saw the state as composed of parts of different peoples, each with their own 
spirit, language, character and customs, which ought not to be suppressed or abolished by the 
state. In place of centralised power, it envisaged the harmonious interplay of different 
community structures: for the indigenous and Mestizo peoples in the south and for the military 
agrarian colonies in the north. The fundamental values which the institutions of the state were 
intended to institutionalise were not individual freedom or formal equality before the law, but 
justice and fraternal collaboration. This was a different idea of the state to match a different 
idea of the nation: imagined rather than legal-rationally constructed but poles apart from the 
homogeneously unified state of the liberal tradition55.  
The concept of the nation-state, Villoro concludes, is currently in crisis, the strains 
between these two rival conceptions no longer capable of being contained by threat or coercion. 
It is only now that we glimpse the possibility of uniting the two ideas of nation that have 
shadowed our history. Villoro is ambitious: “The revival of indigenous peoples and their 
demands invites us to think of a new nation project” (Villoro, 1998b). 
The recognition of the multiplicity of peoples and cultures that constitute the country, if 
genuine, implies a new design of the national state: a shift from the homogenous state to a 
plural state. A plural state would recognise, along with the right to equality, the right to be 
different because equality—a matter of justice—does not consist in uniformity but rather in 
equity, that is, in respect and equal treatment for all differences. The plural state is not the result 
of an agreement between individuals that are considered, from the standpoint of the legal fiction 
in view, to be interchangeable, but between situated people, with their own identities, belonging 
to different cultures. In a plural state, no attempt is made, explicitly or implicitly, to standardise 
minorities: individuals and groups that support different values and have different ideas of the 
nation cooperate with each other, accepting their diversities. According to Villoro, the plural 
state does not identify with, or seek to produce, a single culture. “Forging the homeland” does 
not mean integrating all the peoples in the same way of life and in the same conception of the 
world. Forging the homeland means building a space for dialogue and collaboration between 
 
55 These two conceptions of the state complement, but are not logically implied by, the two great modern political 





peoples with different cultural identities. Only then, the "social contract" that constitutes the 
nation ceases to be the result of the imposition of only one part of the society to become an 
ongoing negotiated agreement between all parts involved. The plural state does not eliminate 
unity, but grounds it in the cooperation and solidarity between collectives that uphold their 
differences. To adopt a phrase of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), collected 
by the National Indigenous Congress, we could summarise his view thusly: The Nation is “a 
world where many worlds fit” 56 (I Congreso Nacional Indígena, 1996).  
In the plural state, Villoro (1998c) insists, “autonomy” is a fundamental value. By 
autonomy is meant the faculty of a subject—whether an individual or a collective—to choose 
and pursue freely, without external hindrance, its own goals in life. The recognition of the 
autonomy of a social group implies a right to develop its own identity and to explore its 
differences. It does not necessarily involve separation from others. Rather, it invites the 
cooperation of each autonomous subject with other subjects to constitute a superior whole, 
always in equal respect for the freedom of each one. When the indigenous communities demand 
autonomy, they propose that the collaboration among all the peoples that constitute the nation 
be carried out with respect to the freedom of each to follow their own values in accordance 
with their culture. Yet, autonomy is not only a claim of the indigenous peoples but the sign of 
democratic participation of all the groups that constitute the nation’s society, for in a plural 
state, all have the right to sustain their differences. (Villoro, 1988c). 
This vision was endorsed by the EZLN when it proclaimed that its claim of autonomy 
for the indigenous communities “can equally apply to the peoples, to the unions, to the social 
groups, to the peasant groups, to the governments of the states, which are nominally free and 
sovereign within the Federation” (I Congreso Nacional Indígena, 1996). In other words, the 
struggle for autonomy is part of the struggle for freedom of decision in the matters and issues 
that concern all social groups. Villoro’s demand is that everyone should have the same right to 
self-govern within a framework of mutual cooperation. The fight of the indigenous peoples for 
recognition can be seen as a part of that broader struggle: the fight for political autonomy. The 
struggle is, so to speak, chain-connected all down the line: the autonomy claimed by the 
indigenous peoples is linked to local areas where they actually live: communities, 
municipalities. The communities want to govern themselves in matters that concern them. The 
movement of the autonomous municipalities is linked to the popular and localised idea of 
Nation that supporters of the indigenous movement embrace. It is also an expression of the 
 




traditional democracy of many indigenous communities that provides a template for a 
reconceived. modern democratic Mexico.  
Villoro argues that despite the external influences that pervert it, despite the caciques and 
the chiefdoms that often distort it, “most indigenous communities keep an ideal of direct 
participation of their members in common decisions”. Such decisions are usually taken in 
assemblies, moderated by a “council of elders” (in effect a Senate) where the appointed 
officials respond directly to the community (Villoro, 1998c). They must follow the 
community’s guidelines and their mandate can be revoked at any time by the community. The 
way indigenous communities rule themselves, according to Villoro, is an estimable form of 
direct democracy that lights a path towards a more participative and fairer society.  
The new nation he sees in prospect, which will supersede the homogenous Mexican state, 
thus involves the establishment of a participatory democracy that corrects for the limitations of 
representative democracy. It is not a matter of abolishing the existing institutions of Mexican 
democracy, such as parties and electoral procedures, but about supplementing them with forms 
of direct democracy that may be analogous to those embodied, albeit sometimes imperfectly, 
in the decision procedures of indigenous peoples. The idea, he continues, is to establish ways 
of direct participation of citizens in those decisions that directly concern them, so that every 
citizen experiences the possibility of exercising control over their own lives and over their 
rulers. Here as well, Villoro (1998c) urges, the traditional rule of indigenous governments can 
serve as a motto: “those in power must command by obeying”. A third strand in the 
transformation of our national project, he goes on to say, “is also linked to the growing presence 
of indigenous peoples”, but this strand concerns not institutional but rather moral change.  
What is needed, Villoro argues, is moral renewal. “The selfishness of particular interests, 
the lack of human solidarity, the generalized violence and the oblivion of a common good are 
tendencies that corrupt everything” (Ibid.). The main problem, he asserts, is that our society is 
based on individualism: each individual and each group is encouraged to pursue its own 
interest, governed by a cost-benefit calculation: each seeks to obtain the maximum benefits for 
themselves at the lowest possible cost. The indigenous communities, after five centuries, have 
lost many of their old institutions and collective norms, but retain an appreciation for certain 
communitarian virtues which are alien to the possessive individualism of modern western 
societies. The indigenous ideal of community contrasts with the isolation of the modern citizen 
who is almost entirely absorbed in his or her own interests alone. The indigenous alternative 
may contribute to a restoration of virtues that were lost as individualism gained ground. Inside 




to the whole to which each of us belong, without always seeking personal reward or benefit. 
The values prized are those we have almost forgotten: the gift of oneself, fraternity, solidarity, 
selflessness. It is clear that such virtues are neither ubiquitous nor fully developed in every 
indigenous community, “but they are present in the civilizing pattern of indigenous cultures”. 
(Villoro, Ibid.).  
Villoro was not alone in pushing this line of thought. Lenkersdorf (1996) examined the 
ideas of community that prevailed in the Tojolabal ethnic group in southeast Mexico. Some of 
the poorest peoples of Mexico, he urged, “those who still have an ancient wisdom of life can 
contribute in our country to its moral renewal.” (Lenkersdorf 1996:87). Villoro made the same 
point: “it is not, of course, about returning to pre-modern forms of life but, once again, about 
achieving a synthesis for a new form of collective ethics”. (Villoro, 1998c). He proposed a 
conjunction between the modern conception of individual rights, based on the dignity of the 
person, and the ancient values of the community, based on the full realisation of each individual 
through his or her dedication to the whole community to whom her or she owes her formation 
and identity. Once again, he says, a maxim of the EZLN captures in a few words the moral 
renewal our nation requires: “For all, everything; for us, nothing.57”  
Three lines of action summarise the rallying cry to which Villoro gave voice: first, a 
transition from the homogenous current state to a plural state, respectful of all differences; 
second, a transition from the centralised government to a participative democracy, based on the 
autonomies of all social groups. Third, a shift from an individualist association to a true 
community. His suggestions provoked a furious reaction from the younger generations of 
Mexican liberals. 
 
The Re-Founding of Mexico According to Aguilar Rivera 
 
The liberal response came first of all in the form of an article signed by Aguilar Rivera, 
part of a new generation of liberals.58 The response was not overwhelmingly positive.  
Aguilar began with the observation that the ideological bases on which the country had 
rested for decades had been eroded. What once were certainties, were now everywhere in 
question. With the coming of the 21st century, the social imaginary that had once dominated 
 
57 As cited in Villoro (1998c). 
58 This generation of young liberals is also known in Mexico as “The Chicago Boys”, for many economists and 
social scientists who acquired great influence in the country since the eighties obtained their PhDs in the 




the minds of Mexicans was all but extinguished: that of the uniform Mestizo nation. Today, 
there was widespread agreement that the political system of modern Mexico must be plural. 
But what exactly did it mean to be plural? The re-founding of the country was an ongoing 
process, capable of resolution in countless ways. Villoro, Rivera wrote, pointed out with 
singular acuity the axes of a dispute that involves, simultaneously, a reinterpretation of the past, 
a political proposal for the present and the construction of a new imaginary for the future. His 
ideas articulate coherently an important line of thought in fin-de-siècle Mexico. For Rivera, 
they also demonstrate that Mexico is in the throes of a deep ideological crisis. Villoro had 
identified three pending transformations: of the homogenous nation-state into a plural state; of 
representative democracy into participatory democracy; of an individualistic moral culture into 
a more solidary and communitarian ethos. Rivera acknowledged that these proposals 
represented the feeling and thinking of an important intellectual stratum in Mexico and 
proceeded to analyse and discuss them at length. 
Aguilar considers that the first argumentative line of Villoro is revisionist. Villoro’s 
assertion that the indigenous peoples have not been consulted, that they have not entered into 
the “social contract” (Villoro, 1998b) that nominally binds the nation together is dangerous. It 
implies that there are not legitimate bonds of obedience tying indigenous minorities to the 
norms and government of the country to which they belong. 
Aguilar Rivera pauses to notice the ideological character of the argument. “[Villoro’s] is 
not a line of reasoning that is either progressive or enlightened” (Aguilar 1998:16). It echoes 
the conservative reaction against the school of natural rights in the 17th and 18th centuries, the 
supporters of the absolute monarchy and the divine right who argued against the theories of 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau that the supposed agreement between men to leave the state of 
nature was pure invention: it never existed” (Aguilar 1998:17)59. According to these 
reactionaries (from Filmer to Charles Leslie to Hume, who attacked the Lockean version, to 
De Maistre at the extreme who eviscerated Rousseau) with whom Villoro was silently aligning 
himself, the social contract was nothing an absurdity that could not justify nor be the foundation 
of any argument: it was ahistorical and unreal. Aguilar identifies an identical argument being 
deployed by Villoro to delegitimise the authority of the Mexican state. The natural law theorists 
and their successors held that legitimate authority could only derive from a voluntary contract 
between equal individuals. Villoro, by using the old trick of denying the existence of this 
 
59 All the arguments here summarised and presented come from an article by Antonio Aguilar Rivera published 
in the Journal Este País in October 1998 under the title, “La Refundación de México” (“The Re-Founding of 




agreement, is playing the same role as the monarchists who wished to fight back against liberal 
arguments demanding more freedom and equality in the name of traditional hierarchies.  
Aguilar sides with those who, like Kant, read the social contract as an idea of reason, not 
a historical event (see Williams 2007 for a comparison between Rousseau and Kant on this 
point). The idea of the social contract served for them as a critical standard for judging existing 
political arrangements. It was by using the idea of the social contract that they dared question 
the despotic power of kings, to challenge their acting “by the grace of God”. So, Aguilar states: 
“It is true, the indigenous peoples were not asked if they wanted to be part of the social contract, 
but who was asked for it?” (Ibid.). Villoro was committing the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, 
basing his argument on an irrelevant consideration. 
This point leads on to a second. According to the theories of the founding fathers of 
Mexico (those who Villoro refers to as “the Creole and Mestizo lawyers”), the nation was 
founded on popular sovereignty, that is to say, on the consent of all its members. This idea 
attributed rights to the members of the political community as a whole and used them to limit 
the power of the state. Theoretically, this applied to all equally: Indians and Europeans, 
although the original settlers had not signed any paper which explicitly guaranteed those rights 
and limits. Does Villoro want to question these postulates? On what legitimate foundations, 
other than popular sovereignty and respect for the natural rights of individuals, could the nation 
and political authority have been founded? Aguilar wonders if Villoro and the other 
communitarians want to find legitimacy in the customs and practices of the peoples and groups 
that made up the pre-Hispanic world, including slavery and inequality between peoples. As 
Aguilar observes: “The theories ‘imposed’ by the Europeans provided—and still continue to 
provide—an arsenal of ideological resources to claim rights and denounce injustices”. For 
instance, he argues, in 1849 the indigenous authorities of Juchitán, Oaxaca, demanded before 
the national government their right to take advantage of the salt reservoirs of Tehuantepec, 
appealing precisely to those rights.60 On numerous occasions the indigenous communities have 
invoked the civil pact and their rightful access to sovereignty to insist that their rights be 
respected. It is historically inaccurate, as well as dangerous, to argue that the natives reject the 
ideological vocabulary of the “Creole” nation entirely. This vocabulary, and the theory on 
which it was founded, supplied them with political weapons to defend themselves against their 
oppressors. In other words, the theories and ideals of the Enlightenment had—and still have—
an emancipatory component that did not go unexploited in Mexico or elsewhere.  
 




Aguilar goes on to argue that in Villoro’s interpretation of Mexican history, and in his 
idealisation of the indigenous community in particular, there is a high degree of romanticism. 
Aguilar suggests that Villoro typifies a certain kind of intellectual, found across the political 
spectrum, whose animus to neo-liberalism leads them to praise with exaggeration whatever is 
different and unique and to deplore the universal as an attack on the particular; they vituperate 
metaphysics and cosmopolitan theories that transcend the immediate discourse of 
circumstances. Aguilar quotes Russell Jacoby, “both the left and the right relive dubious 
notions of localism and nativism” (Jacoby 1995:180)61. Those who celebrate difference and 
discredit universal values are incapable of thinking beyond the limited possibilities that history 
offers. In the best case, they appreciate only the unique or the non-western and, at worst, they 
idealise highly questionable practices. Villoro’s narrative is Manichean: solidarity only exists 
in rural communities, while Mestizo and urban Mexico is uniformly selfish. For 
communitarians like Villoro, the only real communities are found among the indigenous 
peoples; the fraternal bonds are the exclusive patrimony of that deep, nostalgic, forgotten 
Mexico. Villoro yearns for a lost simplicity that is probably illusory. He idealises a bucolic 
past, that of the pre-Hispanic indigenous world, and longs for its restoration. 
Villoro, Aguliar continues, takes the strong multiculturalist line that community is 
intrinsically good. He hopes that once people have overcome their individual (sc. selfish) 
interest, they will behave admirably and civilly. However, the solidarity exhibited by a 
community can either be good or bad, depending on the substantive character of the ties that 
bind the members of a group together. Aguilar states that cruelty is not only the daughter of 
selfishness: it often manifests as an effect of exactly the kind of group solidarity Villoro is 
commending. For example, he reflects that we may find solidarity among the members of racist 
sects, groups dedicated to ethnic cleansing and especially between fundamentalist fanatics. It 
suits Villoro’s purposes to represent individualism as necessarily antisocial, but the truth is that 
individualism can involve an authentic concern for others, not so much as members of a group, 
but as persons. Contrariwise, as Aguilar states, “sometimes the greatest threat to social 
cohesion does not come from individualism but from collective passions, ideological conflicts 
and inherited rivalries” (Aguilar 1998:21). 
In his scepticism about the universal values, and his effort to imbue historical 
particularity with a special significance, Villoro—Aguilar complains—has, along with other 
intellectuals of the left, wittingly or not, joined a great current of conservative thought that 
 




harks back to the traditionalism of Burke, German romanticism and their epigones. All of them 
repudiate the uniform and abstract thought systems they associate with the Enlightenment and 
advocate particularism in history. The “authentic democracy” that Villoro proposes, although 
it is rarely said explicitly, is to re-found the nation in such a way that the state becomes the 
product of a pact between peoples or groups and not between individuals. This is not a minor 
proposal, since it involves a retrogression to the medieval vision of the nation as the product of 
an association between kingdoms, such as Castile, Aragon, and so on, that the modern state 
came into existence to replace; and did so to the advantage of justice and progress. 
The modern notion of democracy made possible by the creation of the modern state 
presupposes a series of theoretical concepts linked to the evolution of western political thought. 
The idea of “rights” itself is a product of the legal culture of liberalism, claims Aguilar. Rights 
imply not only immunities or liberties, but the idea that those immunities and liberties are not 
merely concessions from power.  They constitute someone’s property and are imprescriptible. 
This idea of “subjective right”, that is, the idea that rights are inherent in every subject by 
reason of their very humanity, Aguilar explains, played a powerful role in medieval European 
societies and it was the basis for the reworking of natural law during the 17th century.  
For natural-law theorists, from Pufendorf to Rousseau, the origins of human society could 
and should be explained without immediate reference to God. The fundamental law would no 
longer be the natural law of scholasticism, but rather the natural rights that individuals enjoyed 
in a pre-political state. Hence, at the origin of society there is a “contract” by which individuals 
consent to leave the state of nature and constitute the civil state. This idea has been the 
backbone of democratic theory for at least 300 years.62 The notion of subjective right defines, 
on the one hand, certain legal powers while on the other it offers a “master image” of a 
philosophy of human nature, of individuals and their societies, where rights operate as legally 
enforceable powers and as an underlying justification for political rules.63 
Henceforth, the modern discourse of rights involves, on the one hand, a set of legal claims 
by means of which certain immunities and liberties are registered as rights, with provisions for 
their possible alienation and for their assurance and, on the other, a philosophy of the person 
and the society that attaches special importance to the individual. The legitimacy of the 
government depends on individual consent because it is only via consent that the authority 
 
62 For the same reason, it has attracted critics, who suggest that western culture has been selfish and atomistic 
from the first and that its individualism is an acid that dissolves other, more traditional forms of life (compare 
Taylor 1996; Paz 1990; Tocqueville 1840). 




individuals enjoy over their own persons by nature, in virtue of their subjective rights, can be 
passed or lent to the government. According to liberals, the origin of democratic political 
authority is, therefore, individual and not collective. Here we can already observe sources of 
tension between the process of the full establishment of democracy in Mexico and the 
reconstitution of the historical relationship between the state and the indigenous peoples. One 
aspect of this tension has to do with the definition of the indigenous community as a legal 
subject. This is plain enough: in the liberal democratic tradition, it is individuals and not 
collectives that have rights. To invoke the rights of a collective is a façon de parler that 
obscures the fact that only individuals essentially have rights. There is, and necessarily, a gap 
between the origin of subjective rights in the individual human personality and their possible 
extension to collective subjects. Is it desirable, Aguilar asks, to give up a vision that puts the 
human person at the centre of our concerns?  
Villoro, he continues, tries to have his cake and eat it too. He casually extrapolates moral 
characteristics of the individual to human collectives. For example, he states, as we have seen, 
that “in the plural state a fundamental concept is that of ‘autonomy’. Autonomy is the faculty 
of a subject—individual or collective—to choose and perform freely, without impositions, its 
own plan of life” (Villoro, 1998b). Villoro deduces, invalidly, that autonomy is not only a claim 
of the indigenous peoples but a sign of the democratic participation of all the groups that 
constitute a free society. Even more problematical is the conclusion that Villoro arrives at by 
the end of his reasoning: “for in a plural state, everyone has the right to sustain their differences 
[...] the struggle for autonomy is part of the struggle for freedom of decision in the issues that 
concern them, the issues of all social groups. Everyone has the same right to self-govern”. But 
Villoro’s conclusion is false. It cannot be inferred or deduced legitimately from his conception 
of autonomy. Aguilar sets out to explain why this is so. 
“Autonomy, it is true— Aguilar writes—is one of the most important characteristics of 
individuals. By conferring on the groups (people’s associations) a moral attribute that only 
belongs to men and women, a series of sophisms takes place. The collectives do not have social 
purposes different from those of their members; they do not have a dignity independent of that 
of the individuals that compose them” (Aguilar Op. cit.:23). This is not an idle theoretical 
disquisition. By considering the person as a “categorical imperative” (according to Kant) we 
can set limits to the power of the group over it. Human groups can be self-governed, but not in 
any way they happen to find appealing. Groups that self-determine “autonomously” must 
respect certain fundamental individual rights. The ontological priority of the individual over 




demands and the rights of the person. The “dignity” of the group cannot supply a pretext for 
denying or threatening the dignity of individuals. People are neither means nor ways to achieve 
any collective purpose, but ends in themselves.  
Aguilar and other liberals, like Silva-Herzog (2001), argues that the theoretical 
construction of Villoro confuses and relativises the categorical imperative and opens the door 
to possible abuses. Not all forms of self-determination are equally valid. A permanently binding 
agreement, however autonomously it has been conceived, is never legitimate: we cannot sell 
ourselves into slavery, so to speak. In the same way, groups that as part of their “values” and 
“their culture” oppress others or deny individual rights (for example, women’s rights) are not 
morally permissible.  
According to Villoro, as I have explained above, “most indigenous communities keep an 
ideal of the community, they must follow its guidelines and their mandate can be revoked at 
any time. It is a form of ‘direct democracy’” (Villoro, 1998b). Aguilar reminds Villoro that, 
according to Aristotle, the most democratic form of selection of magistrates in Athens was 
sortition; the random lottery. Yet in many indigenous communities, when federal elections are 
held, the use of sortition to select the polling stations and the poll officials causes conflicts. 
Some communities are opposed to this mechanism, democratic by nature, because the people 
selected to be officials were not appointed by the council of elders or by the assembly. 
According to Villoro, the direct democracy practised by indigenous peoples indicates a possible 
way forward, reforming “the homogenous state” and improving the quality of its democracy. 
Aguilar was sceptical, and he suggested that Villoro’s commitment to “democracy” was not all 
it seemed.  
Villoro had written elsewhere that representative democracy did not advance the power 
of the people; it was, on the contrary, an evil, if perhaps a necessary one. For him, representative 
democracy is always on the verge of falling into a distortion: the rule of the people is replaced 
by rule by a small group that makes decisions “in its name”: political bureaucracy, technocrats 
and legislators. Although direct democracy is not entirely realisable, Villoro admits, there is 
likewise “a limit to which representative democracy can approach to be authentic and not 
supplant the power of the people” (Villoro, 1998b). The question, for Aguilar, was: what are 
the limits in question? On this question, he suggested, Villoro’s position displayed obvious 
affinities with many conservative political traditions. But, more worryingly, the reformulation 
of democracy proposed by Villoro also verged on positions outlined in the thought of the Nazi 




In recent decades, some sections of the left have claimed Schmitt as a critic of 
representative democracy (e.g. Mouffe 1993). In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy 
1923-1926, Schmitt (1923) argued that the emergence of mass parties, the rise of organised 
interest groups, and the presence of manipulative plutocrats had rendered the liberal conception 
of representation inoperative64. All the important political decisions were taken by powerful 
interest groups, behind the backs of the people, “the organization of democracy, as it has been 
established today in the bourgeois liberal states, is precisely aimed at ignoring the people 
assembled as such” (Schmitt, 1985).65 Villoro affirms that real democracy consists in the 
exercise of power from below. He argues that decisions should be taken by the people most 
directly affected by them. People belong to multiple associations, “To the extent that these 
associations work with autonomy—Villoro reasons—we will approach a real democracy”. 
These conclusions are not the same as Schmitt’s, but in the antipathy to representative 
democracy to which they give expression, Aguilar senses Schmitt’s dark influence.  
Villoro’s positive claim, that the associations that give meaning to and govern people’s 
lives are to be identified with the traditional communities to which they belong, is decisive in 
lending plausibility to his further claim that the recognition of the autonomy of indigenous 
peoples is a step towards democracy. Aguilar objects that the positive claims rely for their 
plausibility on the polemical simplifications of the negative view of representative democracy 
that colours them. But modern democracy involves many elements besides majority 
government, which cannot be replaced and would not be rendered superfluous by the 
decentralisation of decision-making to autonomous self-governing peoples. Liberal democracy 
also includes the right of citizens to criticise government policies and the possibility that 
defeated minorities may protest freely. A democracy is not worthy of the name if it does not 
satisfy these requirements. In the same way, the idealisation of direct or plebiscitary democracy 
obscures the rationality and normative desirability of representative democracy: “Only indirect 
democracy ensures deliberation, necessary for rational decision-making. The ideal of 
representative government is that parliament is a forum for reasoned and free debate among 
deputies aimed to achieve a better understanding of what they want collectively. A vigorous 
parliamentary debate encourages public learning and can eventually lead to measured and 
rational consensus on public policy”.66 It is deliberation that allows deputies and their 
 
64 Schmitt (1923) in light of Aguilar (1998). 
65 Quoted in Aguilar (1998:23). 
66 (Aguilar, Ibid). These were points that defenders of parliamentary democracy made against Schmitt in the 1920s 




representatives—through the press—to review their beliefs and adjust them for the sake of the 
general interest. In addition, it provides insurance for citizens against hasty and imprudent 
decisions. Representative democracy allows citizens not only to feel emotions but to meditate 
reasons. When Villoro says that “It is not a question of abolishing the existing institutions of 
democracy, parties and electoral procedures, but of complementing them”,67 Aguilar is 
suspicious. Isn’t that what every enemy of parliamentary institutions starts out saying? 
The slogan of the EZLN, which according to Villoro epitomises the very soul of 
communitarianism, for Aguilar is enticing precisely because it is empty: “For all everything, 
for us nothing.” We can fill in the content as we choose. In an ideal world, as in the world of 
our imagination, we can win everything without losing anything. In the real world, however, 
we really must lose some things to win others. The synthesis proposed by Villoro is rhetorically 
attractive, but what does it mean in practice? Liberals like Aguilar worry that nothing is said 
about the political institutions that will structure and enforce the multiple decisions of the 
“plural state” Villoro is advancing. All political arrangements involve the use of coercive force. 
What arrangements characterise this plural state? At a minimum, Aguilar (1998:24) writes,  
Villoro should be much more specific about those conditions under which, in his 
ideal order, sanctions would be applied. What, exactly, would imply a commitment 
to the maintenance of collective solidarities? What would be the authority of 
majorities over dissident minorities? Should Protestant Indians leave their 
communities, now expelled by the secular arm of the state? What happens if those 
who “command by obeying” persecute those who think differently? And if the 
answer to these questions is negative then, what is the difference between the order 
that is proposed and the current one? The inconsistency is not only apparent. 
Nowhere is it written that the Mexican nation is mestizo, or Creole or Indian. The 
Constitution says, yes, that it has ‘a multicultural composition originally sustained 
in its indigenous peoples.’ The issue is already quite baroque and confusing the way 
it is. 
 
Aguilar suggests that the simplest and safest way of resolving the confusion would be to 
affirm that Mexico is a culturally plural country. The “homogenous state” against which 
Villoro is railing has no real existence. Villoro’s proposal suffers from several of the recurrent 
pathologies exhibited by the cultural critics of liberalism: “it enthrones an idealised and 
ahistorical model of the indigenous community, it uses a biased and generic category of “the 






ambivalent and unforthcoming about what the alternative option actually is, about the form of 
the plural state” (Aguilar, Ibid.).  
Aguilar agrees with Villoro that the re-foundation of Mexico is a symbolic, ideological 
and institutional task. While it is tempting to likewise agree with him that reforms should target 
different races, creeds and languages, the truth is, Aguilar concludes, that any institutional 
reforms should aim to guarantee to all people those rights that until now have only been 
declarative. The poverty of the indigenous peoples and their political marginalisation do indeed 
affront the principles of equality and justice, as Villoro correctly deplores. Yet, the objective 
should be to guarantee equal opportunities for everyone, so that individuals do not suffer 
persistent social disadvantages by being born in a certain group, are guaranteed effective access 
to justice, which is what gives substance to legal equality; and enjoy the freedom to associate 
as they choose, to conduct their community affairs, define their cultural identities and undertake 
the tasks that they deem valuable, all of these as long as they respect the rights of others.  
 
The Communitarian Response 
 
Villoro’s response was not slow in coming (Villoro, 1998d). The ideological debate that 
ensued still rages on,68 not only in Mexico but also in the rest of Latin America,69where the 
tension between multiculturalism and liberalism is explored as much on the pages of 
newspapers and in parliaments as in academic books and journals.  
Villoro’s first move was concessive. He agreed that “The Social Contract” was a 
theoretical construction and not a historical event. Therefore, it would not make sense to reject 
it because some sector of the society (the indigenous peoples, in this case) had not actively 
been consulted. Yet even if it is a legitimising fiction, a metaphor, it is not an idea that can be 
applied plausibly to every political association, only to associations that bears some 
resemblance to the fiction by embodying at some level an idea of equality between the 
“contracting parties”. The question is, whether this resemblance is present or not (Villoro 
1998d:16):  
 
68 When asserting social and collective rights in Mexico, it is worth mentioning authors like Gilly (1997), 
Montemayor (1997), Stavenhagen (2012) and catholic priest Mauricio Beuchot (2005), vindicating collective 
rights for the indigenous communities. For a rational refutation of multicultural and communitarian thesis see 
Popular Movements in Autocracies: Religion, Repression and Indigenous Collective Action in Mexico (Trejo, 
2012). 
69 The Latin American debate on social rights versus individual rights takes place in contemporary authors like 





When I write that “the indigenous peoples were not consulted” I only use the same 
metaphorical language. I mean that the state constitution responded to the project of a 
westernized creole-mestizo group, which excluded the indigenous peoples, who actually 
never had representatives in the new nation. I move on to answer another question: the 
new nation could not have been founded “on other foundations than [...] popular 
sovereignty and respect for the natural rights of individuals”. —Yes; but “popular 
sovereignty” was understood as the faculty of a sum of undifferentiated and 
interchangeable individuals, not similar at all to the creoles who legislated and imposed 
the bases of the new nation, abstracted from all real diversity. The new nation could 
have been founded on a contract between individuals located in different communities 
and cultures; a genuine federalism could have been established that recognized the 
belonging of individuals to a plurality of peoples and the right of all of them to 
participate in the constitution of the state.  
 
but it was not; and the fiction has been substituted for a reality that is very different. 
Aguilar had argued that Villoro’s article claimed that “the only real communities are the 
indigenous”. Villoro replied: “I have never held such a thing. The ‘community’ is a form of 
association that constitutes an ideal, not fully realised, but that can serve as a guide to our 
political action. Certain pre-modern communities—among which the Mexican indigenous ones 
could be named—are still guided by that ideal, even if they do not fully realise it. But in our 
time we would have to find a new form of community that could go beyond the individualism 
of modern society, to recover forgotten virtues, but, at the same time, preserve the conquest of 
modernity: respect for individual human rights” (Villoro 1998d:16-17).  
Again in his response, Aguilar had maintained the liberal thesis that the proper subjects 
of rights and “autonomy” were individuals. Villoro conceded that “the rights of collectives and 
groups would not have a basis like that of individual rights”, but he regards the two as mutually 
compatible. The doctrine of “human rights” refers to the rights of every person, in any time 
and culture, but its formulation in positive law, in terms of exclusively individual rights, 
corresponds to one culture, western culture, and it also belongs to a particular time in history, 
the time of its development: the 18th century. Therefore, Villoro argues, one can think of a 
more universal formulation, based on analogous concepts drawn from other cultures, which 
recognise that the rights of any person are linked to their belonging to a community. He adds 
that individuals can only exercise their autonomy through a choice of plan of life from the 
range of values and purposes offered by the culture to which they belong, and this is a collective 
product. The autonomy of the subjects of culture (peoples) is therefore a condition for the 




of the peoples are not, therefore, opposed to individual rights: they are conditions that make 
individual rights possible. (Villoro 1998d:17-19). 
Concerning democracy, Villoro affirms that there is no hidden design to replace 
representative democracy with a direct democracy. The intention, rather, is to address the 
shortcomings of democracy as currently constituted through its own procedures and by 
enriching it from other sources. In the criticism of the current forms of representative 
democracy, at least two different lines are pursued. Villoro (1998d.:22-23) writes:  
 
Aguilar reminds us of Schmitt's criticisms, but they are not the most important ones. 
There is another criticism to representative democracy that goes back to Rousseau and 
that, in our days, authors who are not "conservatives" at all continue: In Europe, 
Norberto Bobbio ("expanded democracy"); in the United States, C. Lumnis ("radical 
democracy") or D. Held ("participatory democracy"). The two critical lines have points 
in common but greater differences. The first leads to a rejection of democracy in general 
and a demand for authoritarian governments; it is "regressive". The second, on the 
contrary, claims control of the government by the people and repudiates the 
impersonation of democracy by the domination of a technical bureaucratic stratum: it is 
"progressive".  
 
Villoro explains that his reticence over institutional forms is explained by the fact he was 
not rejecting existing institutions and procedures, but merely pressing for their reform to allow 
the properly effective participation of the people, as the classical theory of democracy 
proposed. These reformed institutions would be inspired by the example of direct democracy, 
but they would not be the same as the direct democracy found in ancient Greece or in pre-
modern indigenous communities.  
Reform is needed, Villoro now argues, because for centuries, there have been huge 
disparities between different segments of the population. The only way to achieve the kinds of 
equality (of status, of opportunity, of right) that would make the idea of the social contract 
relevant is to admit those disparities without hypocrisy and to open favour the more 
disadvantaged at the expense of the privileged. A just policy, in a situation of injustice, cannot 
treat the unequal equally (as he takes liberals like Aguilar to be suggesting). If one really wants 
equality, one has to first recognise inequality and correct for it, even when this involves making 
restitution for historic injustice. Villoro repeats his claim that “equality” is not the same as 
“homogeneity” or “identical treatment”. The true equality between autonomous subjects 





I believe that our discrepancies come from two different conceptions of what the state 
should be. Aguilar adheres rigorously to the classical liberal conception, whilst I believe 
the liberal conception (human rights, popular sovereignty, for example) should recover 
and even embrace a sense of community now lost. It is a major issue that requires further 
and meticulous discussion. Such discussion, now, in our country, is urgent. That is why 
I welcome the contribution of José Antonio Aguilar to this necessary intellectual 
dialogue. 
 
Marching towards a New Nation 
 
Twenty years have passed since “The Caravan of the Colour of the Earth”—the Zapatista 
journey through 12 states that deeply moved Mexico: between 24 February and 28 March 2001, 
24 rebels and 1,111 Zapatists travelled more than 3,000 kilometres of roads and mountains. On 
11 March 2001, thousands of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples marching from Chiapas 
following the caravan arrived in Mexico City. In their journey they visited schools, squares, 
parks, universities, squares. They took to the streets to communicate their message that the 
indigenous peoples were there and were demanding attention and a fairer treatment from the 
government and the rest of the country. They placed a radical dilemma at the centre of the 
political debate: to build a country for everyone or a nation for a few (Hernández, 2021). Villoro 
took this as his cue to re-enter the fray, publishing an article in the daily newspaper La Jornada 
(Villoro, 2001a) that summarised the indigenous peoples’ demands and expressed sympathy 
with the movement. Liberals did not like it much, and the debate his original article ignited was 
enflamed. The article is brief and succinct, but also powerful and eloquent, and since it has not 
to my knowledge been translated into English before, and since I have drawn on some of its 
language in presenting Villoro’s positions, it may be worth giving it in full: 
 
The Zapatista project goes far beyond the communities of Chiapas. It covers all 
indigenous peoples, but it is not limited to them. It is a project that concerns us all, for 
it is the vision of a new nation. In three general principles, enunciated by the Zapatistas 
themselves, that vision is condensed: 1. Plural state. Since its independence in 1821, 
Mexico was constituted as a nation-state following a conception traced from the 
European countries, mostly by an influential Creole and Mestizo group of lawyers. It 
was a homogenous state, which admitted a single culture, a single legal order, a single 
political power. The homogenous nation-state is an artifice. It does not correspond to 
the social and cultural reality of the country, which is extraordinarily diversified and 
complex. Protected by a de jure layer of equality before the law, the homogenous state 
rejects, in fact, all those who have another culture, follow distinct ways of life and 
embrace different ends and values than those of the dominant group. The Zapatista 




life choices that conform to the nation: recognition of differences. In addition to the 
right to equal legal treatment, they fight for the right to be different. The right to be 
different means that no one can be excluded either by the people or by the rules he or 
she chooses to follow or by his or her personal preferences. The equal treatment of the 
‘different’ is a sign of justice. A slogan of the Zapatistas expresses, with force, this 
principle: we want, they say, "a world where many worlds fit". 2. Radical democracy. 
The recognition of the plurality of life forms implies ensuring that collective decisions 
emanate from the participation of all different groups and individuals. In 
representative liberal democracies, the people participate, once every three years, by 
depositing a ballot in a ballot box. Then the citizen becomes absent. Others take their 
place. State bureaucracies and delegates of political parties are in charge of governing 
the citizens. They supplant the real people. But the root of democracy is the permanent 
power of the people. And the real people are not the people as represented but concrete 
men and women in the places where they live and work. Radical democracy does not 
deny representation or reject parties, but subjects them to the control of society. The 
Zapatistas’ project is the dissemination of power to the areas where people live: 
communities, municipalities, regions. Permanent control of the representatives by the 
constituency, accountability, power to dismiss the leaders, participation of the peoples 
and social groups affected in the projects that concern them. Autonomy is the power 
to decide by obeying the rules that one has established for oneself. The Zapatistas are 
asking, for the time being, for autonomy for indigenous peoples. But autonomy 
includes, in the San Andrés Agreements, communities and municipalities. The same 
principle of autonomy is applicable in all associations of civil society: trades unions, 
unions, universities, non-governmental organizations. Autonomy is the exercise of 
real freedom that refuses to obey other people’s dictates. 3. Community. It is indeed 
sad and easy to see that in our liberal society reigns selfish individualism wherein 
every individual seeks their own interest since the notion of a common good was long 
ago rendered obsolete. The supreme norm of liberal societies is universal 
competitiveness and in universal competitiveness the one that succeeds is always the 
one that has greater advantages. The liberal society has a necessary consequence:  the 
exclusion of those who have fewer resources, namely the more disadvantaged. Faced 
with an exclusive society, there is only one alternative left: the community. In the 
community, individual interests are not eliminated, only those that exclude the interest 
of others. In the community, the interest of each person makes the common good his 
own. The service to the whole deprives itself of service to itself. The community has 
been the ideal, often unfulfilled, of indigenous peoples; it is this principle that they 
constantly keep coming back to. That is why they have so much to teach to the 
members of our selfish society. 
The other side of the recognition of differences is the collaboration of the 
different ones in the achievement of a common goal. That is the function of a plural 
state: to promote the solidarity of all in the search for an equitable order for all. At the 
national level, the new project is to move beyond the competitiveness, towards the 
construction of a society based on solidarity. In the international arena, it replaces the 
domination of the faceless capital of neoliberalism by the cooperation of all nations in 
a new world order of justice. That is why the new nation project introduces an ethical 
dimension into politics. It expresses itself in a motive that drives its action: "For all, 
everything; nothing for us". The march towards the construction of a new nation has 




before establishing the foundations of a new nation: a nation respectful of differences, 
a nation that ignores exclusion, founded on the power of the real people, where rivalry 
and competition between those who obey only their own self-interest gives way to 
solidarity in building an authentic community70. 
 
Once again, Villoro’s words provoked a response. 
 
The Caravan and “The New Nation” 
 
The most significant response came from Jesús Silva-Herzog (2001a), a liberal professor 
of ITAM71, one of the most influential think-tanks of Mexico, in an article published on 5 
March 2001 in the daily newspaper Reforma. I am aware that quoting the whole article may 
seem excessive, but as the criticisms it embodies are so important to understanding the debate 
between liberal and communitarians about the delicate issue of granting special rights to groups 
and accommodating their demands of autonomy, I believe it is necessary to include the bulk of 
it, again in translation, partly to show how political argument is conducted at this intermediate 
level, in the popular press rather as opposed to academic monographs and articles, and partly 
to illustrate the important point that, in this setting, the fine distinctions that characterise works 
of that kind are absent. In these arguments, the difference between liberalism and 
communitarianism is as much or more a matter of style than it is of content of argument, or 
philosophical prepossession: 
 
The route of the Zapatistas from the jungles of Chiapas to the political centre of the 
country has been accompanied by the sounds of flattery and pretension. On the one 
hand, Zapatismo fanatics eulogise the leader of the cause, citing with veneration the 
literary attributes of the well-dressed Sub-Commander and drooling at the very 
mention of his name. Every day the same event, the same speech, the same act is 
chronicled with a litany of praises as if it were a tournament of eulogies. Who will find 
the just qualifier for the infinite jubilation of the civil society in advance of the arrival 
of the Sub-Commander? How to do justice to the eyes of Marcos, the depth of his 
gaze, the delicate smoke of his pipe, the infinite modesty of his gestures? What 
chronicler will be able to capture the rebellious enthusiasm and hope that he espouses? 
How to portray those glances in which the dreams meet the memory? Will there be a 
pen that is capable of describing such rebellious dignity? The truth is that it is 
necessary to establish a prize in recognition of the most inspired adulator of the Sub-
 
70 The translation into English is mine. 
71 ITAM (Autonomous Polytechnic Institute of Mexico) is one of the most famous private universities in Mexico. 
It is known for its costly tuition fees and because of its neoliberal tendency. Many of the lecturers and researchers 
are economists trained in Chicago, Harvard and other well reputed universities in the USA. Political elites of 




Commander. On the other hand, a parade of hypocrisy accompanies the Zapatista 
procession. The federal government, the most diverse political actors (with the 
exception, certainly, of some PAN72 troglodytes), and business groups pretend to hide 
their differences and disguise themselves in Zapatista costumes. We want the same as 
the Zapatistas, they say. We all seek, like marchers, peace in Chiapas and the 
development of indigenous peoples. Vicente Fox73has contributed to this empty 
sloganeering that accompanies the Zapatistas, with his speech and initiatives. Under 
the hollow idea that we all want peace, there has been the intention not to question a 
single word of the rebels. I celebrate that the Zapatistas are not being fought; I regret 
that none dares to argue with them. There is no point in continuing to accompany the 
march with this parade of drool and masks. It will be necessary to debate the meaning 
of the march, but above all, the meaning of the Zapatista discourse. For Luis Villoro, 
the march is the ceremonious birth of a new nation. I hereby pick up the arguments of 
the philosopher. 
In his article "The march towards a new nation", Luis Villoro finds three 
principles in the Zapatista vision that could give birth to a new Mexico. The first one 
is the establishment of a plural state. That a desirable Mexico should be pluralistic is 
something that no-one denies. Mexico must be hospitable to different groups, ideas, 
parties, governments, values, life projects. That is the sense of pluralism: it is a world 
in which many worlds fit. But it is not liberal pluralism that Villoro has in mind, nor 
is it what the Zapatistas defend. He suggests that the Mexican state is an imposition, 
an alien invention that denies the social reality of our culture. Villoro says: "the 
homogenous nation-state is an artifice. It does not correspond to the social and cultural 
reality of the country, extraordinarily diversified and complex". The argument is 
interesting: the liberal model of the State is questioned because it is considered a lie, 
an artificial mechanism, and an importation that does not correspond to the reality of 
our nature. The supposed social nature then acquires prescriptive meaning. The 
machine is perverse, but the tree is noble. The romantic conservatism of the proposal 
could not be more evident: if tradition orders, politics must submit. According to 
Villoro, the Zapatistas defend a commendable idea of radical democracy. The 
democracy of the liberals is episodic, superficial… and also false. Villoro writes: in 
representative liberal democracies, the people participate, once every three years, by 
depositing a ballot in a box. Then the citizen becomes absent. Others take their place. 
State bureaucracies and delegates of political parties are in charge of governing the 
citizens. They supplant the real people. Democracy is not the government of the people 
because the people hardly choose, they do not decide. Villoro and the Zapatistas take 
up the old discourse on the formalities and pitfalls of bourgeois democracy. 
Constitutional democracy is a regime that does not establish the reign of the people. 
Therefore, we must look for another democracy that goes beyond the institutions and 
faithfully follows the supreme popular dictates. There is no doubt that criticism of 
democratic representation has supporters here and there: in fact, others speak in the 
name of the people. What is indefensible is the proposal given as an alternative: to 
pretend that “The People” will directly decide everything in a sort of radical 
 
72PAN (The National Action Party), at the time the second political force of Mexico, is a party of the right, well 
known for its lack of sympathy towards social demands such as the autonomies claimed by indigenous peoples 
and their defenders. 




democracy, the form of democracy that the Marquistas74defend. The only possible 
(achievable) democracy is one which renounces the illusion of embodying the will of 
The People. That is why Claude Lefort said, that in democracy power becomes an 
empty place; it comes from the people but does not belong to anyone.75The radical 
democracy that Villoro posits does not transcend liberalism. He denies it because he 
claims to sacralise what he calls "Real People" and that is, by the way, the most unreal 
thing that may exist. Of the Royal People, of the Authentic People, of the True People 
let us remember, the fascists once spoke. Finally, the Zapatistas claim to be bringing 
the community back in. "In our liberal society", says Villoro, "selfish individualism 
reigns. Everyone follows their own interest, losing the notion of a common goal". 
Villoro starts from an error: to believe that individualism is identical to selfishness. 
But the worrying thing is the medicine that he proposes to cure this disease. He writes: 
"in front of a necessarily excluding society, there is only one alternative: the 
community. In the community, individual interests are not eliminated, only those that 
necessarily exclude the interest of others." But is that true? The great engineer of 
modern freedom, Benjamin Constant, still has warnings for us. It does not matter if it 
is the federal government or the community. If these political bodies have the power, 
then they can threat freedom. Is it true that the community is incapable of excluding 
minorities? Who speaks for individualistic doom? Thus, the neo-Zapatista discourse 
forgets indigenous people as it is obsessed with defending indigenous communities. 
PRI’s corporatism in their bid to save the unions forgot the workers. That is why 
Zapatismo is not the birth of a new nation and, if it is, it is the birth of an undesirable 
nation. Luis Villoro understands that the Zapatistas have exhibited the misery of 
liberalism. I am convinced that they have revealed liberalism’s relevance and value.76 
 
Unsurprisingly, Villoro was stung into action. His reply, published in the pages of the 
same newspaper (Villoro, 2001b), inaugurated an epistolary dialogue of a kind more common 
in the eighteenth-century than in today’s world. Again, it seems better to give the exchanges in 
full, rather than engaging in extended paraphrasing, but in view of considerations of space I 
include them in full in Appendix 2 to the thesis, while drawing on some of materials contained 
therein to inform the argument of the remainder of the chapter. The dialogue was joined by 
other writers and public intellectuals and came to focus more and more on the rights of 
indigenous and minority peoples, shaping the intellectual context in relation to which the crisis 
at the New Jerusalem was understood and represented by the political authorities. Popular ideas 
of multiculturalism, combined with a degree of embarrassment about the perceived historic 
failings of the liberal state, came together to create an environment in which decisive 
 
74 By “marquistas” Silva-Herzog refers to the supporters and enthusiastic admirers and defenders of Sub 
commander Marcos, de facto commander in chief of EZLN (National Zapatist Liberation Army). 
75 Surely Siva-Herzog refers here to a classical article written by Claude Lefort (1983) “The Question of 
Democracy”. 




intervention was, perhaps, more difficult to contemplate than it seems from an external point 
of view.  
 
The Debate on Indigenous Rights down to Today 
 
These ideas were shaped by many writers of different political persuasions and from 
different disciplines. The philosopher Mauricio Beuchot, a Dominican catholic priest with 
close ties with the native communities, was one influential contributor to the debate. His 
analysis of multiculturalism centred on cultural identities and the ways they have historically 
and sociologically developed in Mexico. In his (2009) Hermenéutica analógica y educación 
multicultural (Analogical Hermeneutic and Multicultural Education) he maintains a position 
that finds fairness in granting group rights to groups of people that have been systematically 
denied rights and justice. On the other side, David Recondo (2001), in his article Usos y 
costumbres, procesos electorales y autonomía indígena en Oaxaca (Uses and Practices, 
Electoral processes and Indigenous Autonomy in Oaxaca) and in his book (2007) La Política 
del Gatopardo: Multiculturalismo y Democracia en Oaxaca. (The Politics of the Leopard: 
Multiculturalism and Democracy in Oaxaca) he describes the negative consequences of 
granting special group rights in the state of Oaxaca—the region of Mexico with most 
indigenous people: poverty, economic backwardness, with more than half of its communities 
and municipalities self-ruled, and numberless victims of political blackmail and manipulation, 
often exercised by caciques77 and indigenous leaders. Legal reforms had taken place, autonomy 
had been granted, but the good results promised by advocates of multiculturalism and 
communitarianism were yet to be seen. Liberals like Recondo continued to regard with 
suspicion the idea that conferring special treatment on communities or groups rather than 
individuals brought tangible gains, whilst the intellectual heirs of Gamio and Villoro insisted 
that affirmative action and recognition of indigenous communities were the only ways to 
guarantee a fair and pluralistic society and to repair the historical damage done to those 
communities by centuries of injustice.  
Constitutional reform and the customs and practices of indigenous peoples entered the 
public mind and forced their way onto the political agenda through this popular debate. In the 
last two decades they have been translated into a set of laws that allows many communities to 
 





enjoy different degrees of autonomy, particularly in the southeast states of Oaxaca and Chiapas. 
However, in the gap between theory and practice lie some dangers for the freedom of the 
indigenous peoples. Undoubtedly, one of the most controversial aspects of these laws (the so-
called San Andrés Agreements) is how expansive the rule of customs and practices of 
indigenous people should be. It is said, for example, that indigenous peoples will have “the 
right to apply their regulatory systems in the regulation and resolution of internal conflicts 
respecting individual guarantees, human rights and in particular the dignity and integrity of 
women”.78 According to the initiative that was proposed to the Congress by former president 
Vicente Fox and that now constitutes the Indigenous Act approved by the Mexican Congress 
on 14 August 2001, they also have the right “to choose their authorities and establish internal 
forms of government according to their rules in the areas of their autonomy, guaranteeing the 
participation of women in conditions of equity”. Later in the Act, the first point is re-stated 
thus: “In the municipalities, communities, auxiliary bodies of the town hall and related bodies 
that assume their belonging to an indigenous people, its inhabitants shall be guaranteed the 
right to define according to the traditional political practices of each of them, the procedures 
for the election of its authorities or representatives and for its own forms of internal government 
in a framework that ensures the unity of the national state”. Proponents of the law claim that 
this recognition of the indigenous norms or traditions logically derives from the right of 
indigenous peoples to autonomy. Critics worried that giving statutory force to such traditional 
norms and/or uses and practices would have the perverse consequence of limiting indigenous 
autonomy and bringing about a significant reduction in the number and efficacy of the rights 
formally owned by the members of such communities.  
My argument is that the critics’ worries were well-founded. Villoro suggested that the 
indigenous people had a conception of democracy and justice based on consensus and the 
defence of the community that was radically at odds with “western democracy” and could be 
used as a resource to correct for the defects of the latter. Yet his position was based on a series 
of essentialist assumptions that lacked historical foundation. Villoro implicitly identified the 
indigenous and the “original” people, the first nations, the Mesoamerican, the Mayan and the 
Mexican, among other grand civilisations, as opposed to the “aliens” from Europe, as if the 
situation had remained little changed since the 16th century. In fact, the situation bears very 
 
78 The San Andrés Agreements 1995 (also known as The COCOPA Law) are the foundation of the Indigenous Act 
that was legally approved by the Mexican Congress in 2001 giving guarantees of autonomy and respect to the 
Mexican indigenous communities, including the possibility of self-ruling and electing their authorities according 
to their own uses and practices. The quoting presented throughout these comments belongs to the 2001 Indigenous 




little resemblance to the tragic moment of the Mesoamerican conquest. Indigenous and non-
indigenous peoples are part of a single society: both groups are the contingent results of a 
common history nearly half a millennium in the making. Original cultures, whatever is intended 
by that term, have been intermingled, developed and enriched with external contributions, 
giving rise not to a homogeneous culture, but to an extreme diversity of forms of cultural 
miscegenation that extends unevenly throughout the national territory and across all the points 
of the social scale.  
That same common history allows us to understand the emergence, in some regions, of 
opposing identities—indigenous versus ladino79in Chiapas—which did not exist at the time of 
the conquest. Indeed, we must not forget that the present-day indigenous people are the result 
of the uniformity policies and segregationist practices put into practice by the Spanish Crown 
and its officials, as the Mexican anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil Batalla has extensively 
documented (Bonfil, 1987)80. On the other hand, although ladinos and indigenous people base 
their identity on the assumption that their cultures had a different origin and that one is opposed 
to the other, the fact is that both groups have cultural practices that derive as much from 
Mesoamerican societies as they do it from the European world. Thus, a large part of the 
traditional practices of the natives of Chiapas that now some want to preserve in their original 
purity have Spanish origins. That is true of the brotherhoods, for instance, so common in 
communities; and the traditional town hall council with its mayors and aldermen. In turn, many 
Mestizo practices also include elements of Mesoamerican origin. But perhaps the most 
worrying part of the current indigenous discourse is the almost exclusive valuation of “the 
proper”, “the authentic” and “the original” and the concomitant deprecation of the “colonial”, 
the “Western”, the “modern”.  
This, perhaps, was what raised Aguilar’s suspicions about what Villoro was proposing.  
It implies that electoral democracy, being a Western imposition, has no place anywhere in the 
country. Indeed, there can be no elections by universal suffrage and secret vote, as political 
parties came later to the Mexican lands. Should these, then, be rejected as alien intrusions? The 
“usocostumbrista”81 perspective contains another contradiction that goes beyond semantics: the 
changing nature of traditions. As Viqueira (2001:32) pointed out in his contribution to the 
 
79Ladino is another name for mestizo, mostly used in Chiapas and the southeast of Mexico. It has a negative 
connotation for it is almost a synonym of traitor or deserter.  
80 I am referring here to Bonfil’s most influential work (1987), México Profundo: Una civilización negada. 
(Deep Mexico: A denied civilization). 
81Usocostumbrista is an adjective that has no translation into English. It means that is related to the “customs and 




original debate, “a tradition is what each generation transmits, what one generation delivers to 
the next one”. That is indeed its etymological meaning, but every generation is diverse, plural, 
contradictory and such is its heritage. In addition, nobody passes on to their children exactly 
the same values that they have received from their parents. The tradition delivered is always 
selective and only some aspects of received knowledge are handed on to posterity. Hence, each 
generation enriches the tradition, due to the changing circumstances that pose unprecedented 
challenges and due to the very ability of the culture to evolve. Thus, tradition, if it is alive, is 
always in a process of transformation, constantly renewing itself.  
The paradox is that the institutionalisation of uses and practices requires “indigenous 
peoples [to] write down their traditions, so that they can be recognised legally” and so to fix 
their meaning.82 The question then becomes, whose is the authentic voice of tradition? In every 
community there is disagreement about what tradition teaches and rival factions tend to present 
themselves as the sole defenders of “authentic traditions”. This question is glossed over in the 
proposal to give legal force to the so-called "common law” or “customary law". Who will be 
recognised as the legitimate interpreters of indigenous traditions: the caciques83, the 
anthropologists or the National Indigenous Institute (INI)? Where two or more groups confront 
each other, each claiming to represent the “authentic” tradition, who will be the judge? The 
very logic the “usocostumbrista” disqualifies any external agent or institution from playing this 
role where consensus is absent. It is from Jus Naturalism and its Nemo iudex in causa sua that 
we learned of the “Evils, which necessarily follow from Mens being Judges in their own Cases” 
(Locke 1988:276 [II.ii.13]).  
To speak of men being judges in their own cases is to draw attention to a further problem. 
In the negotiations of San Andrés Agreements,84 feminist critics objected that some of the 
customs in use among the indigenous peoples were against the human rights of women. For 
instance, in some communities, parents arranged the marriage of their daughters after receiving 
a “payment” from the suitor’s family. It was also very common that women had no right to 
inherit their ancestral lands. What is more, women found themselves marginalised from a large 
 
82 See La Política del Gatopardo: Multiculturalismo y Democracia en Oaxaca. (The Politics of The Leopard: 
Multiculturalism and Democracy in Oaxaca). (Recondo, 2007), where he describes the process through which the 
“Uses and Practices System” was legally implemented in Oaxaca.  
83 Local bosses. 
84 The San Andrés Agreements are accords reached and signed between the Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
(EZLN) and the Mexican government in 1996 in Chiapas. These agreements granted recognition, rights and 
autonomy to the indigenous population of Mexico. The compromise, however, was only De Jure. These 
Agreements, also known as The COCOPA Law, are the basis of the Indigenous Act, approved and ratified by the 




part of the political life of the community. In religious activities likewise women usually played 
a secondary role. A more chilling example still is given by Viqueira (2001:34): “in some 
indigenous populations from Los Altos, Chiapas the man who rapes a woman must, if he is 
single, marry his victim to repair his fault”85. Thanks to the intervention of feminists, both 
liberals and non-liberals realised that it was necessary to set limits to the uses and practices 
scheme, and that such limits should be given by respect to individual and human rights.  
 
A few lessons from the Mexican debate on Indigenous Rights 
 
What lessons can be drawn for The New Jerusalem from the case of indigenous rights 
and what relevant parallels—if any— can be made? 
The lessons are largely negative. The first lesson is that the current discussion on group 
rights in Mexico leaves aside the fate of religious groups. The second lesson has to do with the 
meagre results of multicultural public policies and the small benefits that have been conferred 
upon ethnic minority groups. A third lesson is related to the scope of the liberal agenda, which 
seems to ignore inequalities and historical legacies that allow for ongoing social injustice and 
marginalisation. They also fail to acknowledge that liberal practices have been insufficient to 
reduce poverty, inequality and injustice in the indigenous communities. 
Regarding the second lesson, Recondo (2007) in his book La Política del Gatopardo: 
Multiculturalismo y Democracia en Oaxaca. (The Politics of the Leopard: Multiculturalism 
and Democracy in Oaxaca) elaborates on the negative consequences of granting special group 
rights to ethnic minorities. Using the example of Oaxaca, the province of Mexico with the 
largest number of indigenous people (Estatista, 2020), he argues that giving self-ruling rights 
to indigenous communities has led to economic backwardness, mainly because indigenous 
leaders have come to use such rights for their own benefit, using it to exercise manipulation 
and political blackmail and doing very little for their people. Extrapolating from this empirical 
experience, we could say that in many cases the “uses and practices” model described above 
has made it easy for federal officers, local politicians and caciques to contact community 
leaders to bargain directly with them. These one-to-one negotiations have allowed for the 
unfair status quo to remain in place and for corruption and injustice to prevail within 
communities. As chapter 1 demonstrated, this is the way in which generations of politicians 
have dealt with The New Jerusalem.  They have treated it, de facto, as an indigenous 
 




community divided into two classes, rulers and ruled, preferring to bargain with the former 
than to address the injustices done to the latter.  Between elections, and absent political crises 
so manifest that they could not be ignored, the Mexican state has granted quasi-self-governing 
status to The New Jerusalem.  The results have not been encouraging in practice. Besides, 
turning to the first lesson, The New Jerusalem is not an indigenous community: its members, 
even though many of them come from indigenous communities, are bound together by choice, 
not by chance. They are associates united in and by an ultimate concern common to all of them, 
not by the fact they are the living descendents of past victims of injustice.  No doubt that 
injustice is persisting, which makes Recondo's argument only more pointed; but that injustice 
is different from the injustices faced by the dissident minority in The New Jerusalem and the 
two ought not to be conflated.  
The third lesson, to broaden the point made just above, is confirmed by the 2020 National 
Census (INEGI, op cit): the states with greatest indigenous populations are still the poorest 
states of the federation (Oaxaca, Chiapas, Guerrero and Yucatán). After more than 200 years 
of liberalism, deep economic and social inequalities remain; and indigenous peoples and native 
communities are still holding the worst share. The liberal state has not succeeded in addressing 
the historical injustice that roots the indigenous in poverty. The failure to acknowledge 
collective identities as such seems, indeed, to be the Achilles heel of liberal policies: for it is 
the case that for the members of indigenous communities, their fate is inextricably linked to 
the fate of the group to which they belong to—as is the case, for different reasons discussed in 
chapter 1, with the citizens of The New Jerusalem. In the one case, we might say, the 
community is bound together by a shared past and vision of that past; in the other, by a 
contemplated future and vision of the future. Of course, the past is not really past: it lives on in 
structures of power and domination that roll on down the years and roll over the same people 
again and again. The existence and implications of these historic structural injustices has 
become a focus of interest recently for political theorists who wish to address and redress 
wrongs which liberal states helped to create, help to perpetuate, and prefer not to think about 
(see Nuti, 2019); but they apply in the case of The New Jerusalem indirectly rather than 
directly, insofar as differentials of power and a track record of marginalisation and 
manipulation (whether of the community by the state or of the community by its leaders) make 
trust difficult, in the absence of which both toleration and compromise are considerably more 
difficult to achieve. In principle and in practice, the state has treated The New Jerusalem on 
analogy with indigenous communities, "known quantities", as it were, with tried and tested 




communities in practice is beside the point, normatively speaking); but it is a different kind of 
beast, and ought to have been understood as such. 
This category mistake helps to explain the floundering response, intellectually as well as 
practically, of the Mexican authorities to the succession of crises in the New Jerusalem. The 
Mexican debate on minority rights yielded little by way of immediately deployable theoretical 
tools to address the conflicts when they exploded: it didn’t really help to make sense of what 
was going on; indeed, it invited the authorities to treat it as a different kind of problem than it 
was and to soft-pedal when more robust action was required. The major religious eviction that 
took place in The New Jerusalem in 1982 when 4,000 people were displaced by force in one 
single night went unaddressed. Similarly, the inaction of the legal authorities was striking in 
the aftermath of the pogrom that consumed the community in 1998, when Agapito Gómez, 
“The Blessed”, was sent to prison on accusations of rape and abuse of underage women. At the 
time, he and his armed guards were found responsible for the murder and the forceful eviction 
of 150 families and 31 priests (Marrero, 2014); an individual was prosecuted but the 
community was let alone. It seems important to include religious groups, with an emphasis on 
insular groups, in the wider discussion over group rights and individual rights and to treat them 
in their own terms, rather than by analogy with indigenous groups. We need theoretical clarity 
and precision about the character of such communities if we are to address the issues raised by 
their internal and external relations more effectively. 
But this brings me back to the starting point of the thesis.  What if groups do not respect 
the rights of their members, particularly the most vulnerable ones? Are contemporary theories 
of toleration (whether liberal or multicultural) adequate for providing states with effective 
theoretical tools to deal with the challenge posed by, let us say, an insular religiously extreme 
minority group, such as The New Jerusalem? The next chapter analyses what occurs when 













THEORY VS. PRACTICE: TOLERATION AND THE NEW JERUSALEM 
 
 
If politics are a dimension of history, they are also a call for political and moral criticism.  
This is criticism: the acid that dissolves images. In this case —and perhaps in all—  
criticism is but one of the modes imagination works,  
one of its manifestations. Imagination is critical in our age. Criticism may not be the dream,  
but it teaches us to dream and so to distinguish between the spectres of nightmares and the true visions.  
Criticism is the learning of the imagination in its second round, the imagination cured of fantasy,  
and determined to face the reality of the world.  
Criticism tells us that we must learn to dissolve the idols:  
learn to dissolve them within us.  
We have to learn to be air;  
to be a dream 
 in freedom. 
 
Octavio Paz. Postdata, 1969 
 
 
In this chapter, I set some of the most influential theories I have so far discussed (both 
liberal and multicultural) that advocate either toleration for, or the empowerment of, minority 
groups against concrete reality. I assess their value when applied to real-life questions and 
explore how successfully they cope with contentious issues such as children’s rights, the right 
of exit and the oppression of vulnerable members in the light of The New Jerusalem case and 
other important judicial examples, like the well-known Yoder case (1972), and the not so well-
known cases of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978), and the United States v. Wheeler 
(1978), where individuals sought the state’s protection against their own communities. How 
far can jurisprudence can succeed where political theory fails in offering clear answers in such 
cases? In the discussion that follows I endeavour to answer these questions while bringing to 
light some of the shortcomings and theoretical loopholes of current liberal and multicultural 
models. In particular, I examine the difficulties raised for the adequacy of the right to exit by 
the millenarian belief system of the members of The New Jerusalem discussed in chapter 1. In 
that chapter I was principally concerned with the bearing of that system of belief on the actions 
of the members of that community.  Here I explore its normative implications, and the ways in 
which it helps to illuminate some of the unstated assumptions embodied in liberal and 
multicultural thinking alike.  
One more general purpose of the chapter is to reinforce a theme that runs throughout the 
thesis, that the relationship between theory and practice is more complex than liberals, 
especially, are apt to suppose.  Another is to show that developmental, or dialectical 




incrementally towards a better all-round picture of the theoretical and practical possibilities 
before us rather than an all-or-nothing approach that thinks only in terms of dichotomous 
alternatives. One benefit of proceeding step-by-step in this way is that it helps us to see that 
there are different kinds of argument in play, not just different arguments; and these different 
kinds of argument at once reflect and assume different attitudes or approaches to the 
relationship between theory and practice and to the problem of minority rights: what kind of 
problem it is, and so how it can be best solved.  
As Ann Phillips (2005) notes, much recent liberal political theory, perhaps under Rawls’s 
influence, approaches the problem from the judicial standpoint, identifying and invoking “a 
number of principles relating to the rights of the individual and group” and arranging them “in 
the appropriate hierarchy in order to generate a solution” (Phillips 2005:115).  The deliberative 
approach, by contrast, suggests that “principles of justice are formed in particular historical 
contexts, and cannot therefore be appealed to as the deus ex machina to settle inter-cultural 
disputes”.  It assumes that what is needed instead is “resolution through dialogue rather than 
adjudication from on high” (Phillips 2005:115-16). Phillips argues that these two approaches 
tend to generate dichotomous alternatives because they presuppose them in assuming that there 
are “fundamentally opposed understandings of justice that need to be weighed up or 
democratically resolved” (Phillips 2005:116). It is more profitable, she suggests, to think about 
such problems from the perspective of the political activist. From this perspective, the puzzle 
of what is normatively “right” cannot be detached from judgements about the effects of one’s 
actions (Phillips 2005:118). Beyond the theoretical debates and the exhibition of good 
intentions, the results in practice are what really count for the activist; and the best results are 
obtained when the particular is paid as much attention as the universal and we understand what 
is really at stake, here and now, for the participants in a dispute: the political and contextual 
concerns that lie behind their slogans; where there is room for manoeuvre and when there is 
not.  
Getting clear about the details, understanding from the inside, so to speak, so Phillips 
suggests, oftentimes indicates that an apparent conflict between the rights of a minority and the 
rights of a sub-group within it is illusory: there is not a clash of values but rather difficulties 
“somewhere else in the chain” that need to be confronted sensitively and even-handedly.  I 




argument that follows,86 they are helpful insofar as they clarify the important point that much 
of the critique that I offer in this chapter is comparative in more than one dimension: as I move 
from consideration of Kukathas and Balint to Kymlicka to Shachar, I am not only comparing 
the merits of different arguments; I am moving along a spectrum which reflects differing 
conceptions of the nature and limits of political theory.  It would be unduly programmatic to 
say that it reflects a shift from the judicial to the deliberative to the activist; but my chapter 
follows Phillips’s cue in suggesting that the tendency to think in the first way especially is at 
once dominant and unhelpful, exerting a gravitational pull that is especially strong at moments 
of crisis: when things start to get messy, or awkward, it is often easier to fall back into the 
assertion of principle than to dig down into the practical complications. For what it is worth, I 
take the view that there is a time and place for each approach, and that each one can illuminate 
aspects of the problem that others cannot; by the same token, no one approach by itself 
discloses exactly when it is time to contemplate alternatives.  That is another reason for 
adopting the comparative approach adopted here, and for considering in sequence authors who 
differ in their approaches as well as their arguments. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, I address a position that is 
close to libertarian, Chandran Kukathas’s. Next, I assess the model of a contemporary liberal, 
Peter Balint, to see what these models have to say and what prescriptions would they provide 
to deal effectively with the situation prevailing in The New Jerusalem. I argue that neither 
model is adequate to the situation. Third, I critically assess the theory of one of the champions 
of multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka, and find difficulties with his theory too. Finally, I explore 
what seems to be a promising alternative, provided by Ayelet Shachar’s model of 
Transformative Accommodation (TA). I conclude that, though more adequate than its rivals, 
Schahar’s model faces problems that a case like The New Jerusalem throws sharply into focus 
and that, for all that it addresses defects with the other models analysed, an alternative approach 
to hers is nevertheless required. I begin with Kukathas.  
 
Kukathas’s Quasi-Libertarian Model  
 
Kukathas’s theory (which I outlined in chapter 3) is developed with style and defended 
trenchantly. It flows out of a commitment to freedom of association as a commanding value 
 
86 It will be seen that the approach I recommend/adopt in ch.6 is similar, but not identical to, the “political 





which is reflected in Kukathas’s reluctance to confer on the state the right or power to intervene 
at will in the internal lives of communities and groups under its wider jurisdiction. His theory 
of free association implies a high degree of tolerance that makes room for a multicultural social 
order without conceding any of the multiculturalist’s claims of justice. It presupposes a state (a 
monopoly legal system) that enforces rights for all persons but not for cultures, to which it is, 
or ought to be, indifferent, because it is concerned only to defend rights, and cultures per se 
have none (see Kukathas 1998). However, when looked at through the lens of the challenge 
posed by The New Jerusalem, some problems emerge: first, his reluctance to countenance state 
intervention leaves members of that community exposed to the depredations of its self-
appointed leaders; second, his understanding of a free society is a “your culture or your rights” 
type of approach that does not meet the demand of groups whose concern is not only to be free 
to pursue their own way of life as they choose but to ensure the survival of their culture; third, 
the tension between group differences and individual autonomy is deeper than he admits; and, 
fourth, he provides no feasible solution to the actual difficulties minorities within minorities 
actually face. I consider these problems in turn to see why they would constitute a failure when 
addressing an extreme case, like the one incarnated in The New Jerusalem. 
The first problematic aspect of Kukathas’s theory, his “indifferent” state, has the potential 
side-effect of leaving oppressed minorities within minority groups vulnerable to abuses. 
Although Kukathas takes seriously segregation and violence, and his state would intervene to 
prevent a massacre (or, more ambiguously, acts of sedition that threatens the peace of the wider 
community), the position he adopts is analogous to the one that obtains, here and now, in 
international society: there are many different groups (states in this case) engaged in all kinds 
of activities we find anything from distasteful or utterly reprehensible (the treatment of black 
youths by police forces in the USA, the treatment of women in Afghanistan, of immigrant 
workers in the Gulf States, the genocide of the Uighurs in China) yet these are tolerated. No 
attempt is made to interfere with the internal lives of these communities (states), even in cases 
where fundamental rights are being threatened. So also, Kukathas implies, within the liberal 
state. The state has no moral right to attempt to rectify unfairnesses within groups or even 
between groups. The end of the state is “settlement among groups”. It is what makes groups’ 
coexistence possible (1996:97). It cannot hope to be more: “If there is an ultimate authority 
that determines what ways are morally acceptable, liberalism is lost” (2003:139), he asserts.  
Kukathas wants “toleration without domination” (Walzer 1997b:110), and this requires the 




Kukathas writes of the state not as a Leviathan comprised of many thousands of 
individuals87 but as constituted by a changing number of communities. While the state is 
composed of communities, it should not be thought of one more community among the rest, 
but as the arrangement that makes this collectivity of communities possible: “(The State) is 
much more of an association of associations (…), not an association of alike associations but 
of diverse associations. It is not for the state to determine what forms—or form—the 
associations which comprise it will take. The state is a political settlement that encompasses 
these diverse associations, but it is not their creator or their shaper. It does not make judgments 
about whether those ways are good or bad, liberal or illiberal” (Kukathas 2003:160-61). This 
conception allows for self-governing groups to operate under the aegis of the state, which 
stands above and apart from them and regulates their interactions in the name of peace and 
order. Its role is limited to assuring that those groups peacefully coexist. 
This is not to say that Kukathas downplays abuse or oppression within groups. He takes 
both issues seriously, but he does not give the state any moral authority to act upon them, nor 
does he believe the state can or should be trusted to amend them. He is suspicious of the state, 
arguing that there is no guarantee that it will be any less oppressive than the traditional 
communities whose practices are in question. History provides plentiful dispiriting evidence of 
the state’s willingness to assume the role of oppressor. If there are practices that happen to be 
harmful or unfair, other means should be employed against them, not the coercive force of the 
state. Persuasion, he argues, is not only more effective than force but it is also much less 
invasive and damaging to the communities in question (1997a:88-89) and, in any event, liberal 
capitalist culture will prevail in the longer run as those communities, being mutable, will be 
changed by their exposure to the forces it unleashes. In the meantime, as long as they live 
peacefully with other communities, it is for each one to regulate the lives of its members as it 
chooses.  
No doubt it is true that states have used the coercive power at their disposal for ill as well 
as good. This seems a weak reason to impose upon it the self-denying ordinance Kukathas 
recommends. The consequences of state indifference are not difficult to predict. As Barry 
correctly noticed: “if the state should turn a blind eye to private coercion, this will bring about 
coercive results” (2001:43). The New Jerusalem is a striking example of what can happen when 
 
87 The frontispiece of Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), famously depicted this idea, with the state represented as a 
person, more exactly a giant king, holding sword and sceptre, his body (and so his strength) composed of countless 




the state relinquishes its right to intervene when minorities within a group are being oppressed. 
The remedy he proposes for such results, as we shall see, is inadequate. 
The nature of that inadequacy answers to the nature of his theory. In that theory, toleration 
is paramount and prevails over alternative principles because no “common standpoint of 
morality” is posited (Kukathas 1997a:69).  Most discussions of the clash between liberal mores 
and traditional cultures, Kukathas observes, begin by asking how far cultural practices that 
offend liberal moral sensibilities ought to be tolerated, which is question-begging.  It assumes 
that the liberal moral standpoint is the common standpoint of morality. This in turn licenses the 
invocation of the state as an instrument for enforcing morality and the pursuit of common 
citizenship as a normative ideal. We should consider instead what sort of regime we would 
need to have if no particular culture was privileged. The conclusion he reaches, which finds 
expression in the last paragraph of The Liberal Archipelago, is that it would be a regime of 
tolerance.   
A tolerant society, then, consists of a diverse array of communities that do not necessarily 
share similar values and in which no one set of cultural norms can play trumps. To some extent, 
these communities are autonomous and self-contained with minimal interactions between them 
(like islands in an archipelago). Kukathas is open about the implications of this position. A 
given community might practice female genital mutilation; another might prohibit blood or 
medulla transfusions or deny modern medical care; children may be uneducated, or subjected 
to what others would find cruel practices, or denied proper medical care. Marriage may be 
coerced and gender relations grossly unequal (1997a:88-97). But the state cannot set itself up 
as a judge for all, claiming to be morally superior to others and commanding what practices 
should be observed and what others should not: it is for each group to manage its own patterns 
of life according to its own norms.  
Groups are not homogeneous, unified structures that act and react like a single person. 
Typically, though not exclusively, they are hierarchically ordered and directed by authorities 
with an interest in maintaining their own authority, not averse to associating their own 
continuing preeminence with the survival of the group itself. Kukathas is not much concerned 
about the survival of groups in particular: over the years, he intimates, many will disappear 
(depending on the support they receive from their members) and be replaced by others; it is no 
business of the state to protect or rescue any community from the threat of disappearance. Its 
business is to defend the rights of individuals. The problem with this conception is that it leaves 
many individuals facing an unappetising dilemma: my culture (my group) or my rights? which 




In theory it implausibly imagines that groups exist in a state of permanently shifting 
simultaneity, all equal, popping in and out of existence as the choices of their members to 
pursue their plans of life in this way or that render them instrumentally useful or useless to 
those plans. As Walzer observes, in reality all these things take time, and one likely product of 
change over time is the development of exactly the kind of common moral standpoint Kukathas 
wishes to deny. When a new group comes on the scene, the question that arises is not, how do 
we all now, as equals, agree to new terms of mutual cooperation and tolerance, but, should we 
tolerate them? (Walzer 1997b:108).   
In practice it understates the degree to which our plans of life are framed through group 
membership and sometimes limited in ways we cannot readily apprehend by the norms to 
which we are subject and, more pointedly, by the authorities who impose them. It may be, as 
some argue, that cultural identities exercise a strong pull on individuals who tend to be reluctant 
to rationally discuss their views with the rest of the society, though the implicit identification 
of rationality with rights and cultural identity with irrationality and closed-mindedness is 
questionable (cf. Archard 2007), but to the extent that the argument is valid, it is something 
which treating cultures as islands each under their own self-jurisdiction does little to address. 
 
The Right to Exit 
 
Kukathas’s way of dealing with these problems is to insist on one limit to tolerance, 
which is the counterpart to the centrality in his scheme of thought of the freedom of association.  
This is the “right to exit”.  If a community is oppressive, people can choose to leave it.  But 
obviously, in most cases, children are not in a position to exercise this right unassisted.  Neither 
is it clear that women could exercise it easily in communities where they lack substantial 
property rights and where their access to society outside the extended family is tightly 
controlled (see Farer 2014:13). And then there is The New Jerusalem. 
There, children are prevented from attending public school and canalized into a religious 
school where they are exclusively taught approved religious doctrine. We have seen that 
Kukathas rejects interfering with the group’s authorities’ decisions about how to educate their 
members. Most liberals hold that this education, however it is delivered, should be minimally 
decent and sufficient to allow its recipients to make their own way in their future lives 
(Eisenberg 2005; Spinner-Halev 2000; Gutmann 1995, 1980). Kukathas’s posture of 
indifference excludes him from being among them. As Brian Barry notes, “If [the state in 




they did that to any other children, the state is handing over power to parents in a particularly 
brutal and uncontrolled way” (Barry 2001:43). And not only to parents. Education at The New 
Jerusalem has been sized by the self-called majority group “The Loyals”, and attempts by “The 
Dissidents” to send their children to a public elementary school outside the city walls have been 
met by a combination of practical obstacles, physical threats, and social stigma. Kukathas’s 
position may be that illiberal communities cannot rightly punish apostasy (see Farer 2014:13), 
but it is not obvious why or how, in this case, there is not a legitimate route to the same 
destination on his principles.  
This brings us back to an issue highlighted in chapter 1, namely the way in which the 
structure of beliefs that distinguishes the members of the New Jerusalem creates an insuperable 
barrier to their ever availing themselves of the “right to exit”.  This right is not something that 
only Kukathas gives special prominence. Rawls, for instance, suggests that all manner of 
particular associations “may be freely organized as their members wish, and they may have 
their own internal life” subject to “the restriction that their members have a real choice of 
whether to continue their affiliation” (Rawls 1999b:212).  Multiculturalists like Kymlicka, too, 
advocate for the sufficiency of the “right of exit”, arguing that such a right would allow 
dissidents that no longer want to belong to a certain community to revise their choices and to, 
eventually, leave the group and choose another way of life.88 Even liberals, such as Balint 
(2018), who want to avoid the idea that toleration is based on some thick conception of 
autonomy, still want to say that it matters that a person’s life is decided by their own choices 
and so some kind of “right of exit”, however minimal, is implicit, even if it is not announced 
explicitly, in the notion that there is value, perhaps a special value, associated with the 
individual’s control over his or her own actions and life-plans. And yet, for members of 
millenarian groups like The New Jerusalem, this whole debate simply begs the question. 
Let us consider how, if at all, “the right of exit” would work for the citizens of The New 
Jerusalem. Exit rights make sense for as long as they are feasible. There must be something 
else or somewhere else to meaningfully exit to. Such rights become useless if the exit is not an 
accountable possibility. The members of the New Jerusalem community live in expectation of 
the end of times and the devastation of all that currently exists outside the walls of their city. 
They exhibit an “unconditional apocalypticism” (Wessinger 2011:723) insofar as they are 
convinced that the world cannot be saved from destruction by human effort and the imminent 
cataclysm cannot be averted. Only the holy city can be saved and their ultimate concern, for 
 




their own salvation, cannot be separated from the fate of their city.  To speak in this setting of 
control over one’s own life plans is, for the relevant purposes, irrational not rational, because 
their ultimate concern is located within a worldview consisting of a cosmology and views of 
human nature that combine to render freedom of choice an illusion and separation from the 
community a practical nullity. They cannot separate themselves from it without belying 
everything that they believe and everything they are and hope to be. Exiting the community 
would equal abjuring the possibility of salvation and so abandoning their ultimate concern. 
Millenarian groups, of course, are not the only sort of group in which the fate of 
individuals is believed by members to be tied to the fate of the whole. Other religious groups, 
ethnic groups, and cultural groups can be viewed in these terms, families too. As a result, it 
may be necessary to distinguish between what might be termed a “prudential” and a 
“principled” argument against the viability of the “right of exit”. The prudential argument is 
that the costs of exiting the community are too high to bear to make the “right to exit” sufficient 
to protect internal dissidents. Costs here are construed in secular terms. The dependence of all 
the members of the community on their leaders and the community is enormous, such that it 
makes it socially and economically very difficult to leave (and the more vulnerable members 
of the community, especially women and children, tend to be exposed to greater costs of 
multiple kinds at once that make doing so especially wrenching). Growing up in such a 
community produces all kinds of profound effects, shaping one’s values and sense-of-self so 
powerfully that abandoning it seems so unlike the process a consumer exchanging one health 
club for another that any similarities seem irrelevant when set beside the differences. Liberal 
critics of Kukathas, like Green (1998), make this point: there are conditions necessary for the 
right of exit to be effective and these conditions imply a much wider range of rights, including 
freedom of dissociation, right of mobility, freedom of expression, and fair share of common 
resources (Green 1998:177-79). These rights, Green argues, are rooted in the value of 
autonomy, that underwrites the right of exit too, and framed by a notion of harm that is 
individuated: the question is, will this choice protect me against harm or bring me harm? It 
assumes that it is possible for individuals to weigh all these harms on the same scale and 
determine by that means whether it is better to stay or to exit. 
Green states frankly that this right, and the wider rights needed to make it effective, 
“works to make certain kinds of group life harder to sustain”: “an unreflective attachment in 
which interests of the self and group are not distinguished becomes nearly impossible” in this 
setting (Green 1998:185). Leaving aside the unargued assertion that such attachment in 




Jerusalem is nowadays impossible: autonomy trumps, is felt everywhere, and the question is 
always one to be asked and answered in terms of an assessment of the weight of the relevant 
costs and benefits of choosing to leave or remain. The alternative is to reject autonomy and 
privilege “cultural survival for its own sake”, and Green is “not persuaded that there is, in fact, 
much value” in that. 
But that is not quite the alternative as it presents itself to the members of the New 
Jerusalem. They are not weighing the benefits of choice against the costs of cultural 
homogenization, because the situation is one in which cost-benefit analysis is redundant. 
Whether it costs nothing or brings worldly riches (however transiently) is beside the point: 
leaving is inconceivable because any choice besides staying implies self-annihilation. It is 
tempting to convert the argument into an extreme version of the prudential argument, in which 
the costs of exit are unusually high; but the point is that they are infinitely high, which means 
that it is impossible to make any intelligible calculation on the other side. So while there are, 
no doubt, significant worldly harms that result from their staying, it makes no sense to argue 
that the right of exit could protect them from these or compensate them for their losses, because 
by leaving they believe that will lose everything forever.  Their ultimate concern requires them 
to remain within the walls of the city and so, in principle as well as practice, a right of exit is 
useless.  
In contrast to Kukathas, Peter Balint says little about the right of exit. Does his theory of 
toleration offer any better protection than Kukathas’s to minorities facing the situation of many 
children and parents in The New Jerusalem? My argument is that it does not. 
 
Balint’s “Active Indifference” Model 
 
Balint’s theoretical model of a tolerant society, like Kukathas’s, seems inadequate to the 
real challenges posed by insular religious groups that do not respect the rights of their members. 
I find four main problems with his theory. First, his conception of toleration lacks the objection 
component that provides toleration with its moral force. As a result, he falls into the trap of one 
of the classic paradoxes of tolerance: that we can end up tolerating either intolerable things or 
tolerating for the wrong reasons. In neglecting the moral element of the notion, second, his 
version of toleration slides, or collapses, into indifference (he explicitly advocates for what he 
calls “Active Indifference”), and this produces a harmful effect when added to his 
understanding of what should be the state’s role in a multicultural society. Rather like 




poorly positioned to address abuses that take place inside the groups that it tolerates and 
deprives itself of one strong reason for intervening to address them by, fourth, repudiating the 
argument of autonomy used by classical liberals like Mill to justify toleration. Balint has good 
reasons for rejecting that argument, reasons which reflect his sensitivity to the implications of 
pluralism, but I believe that the practical implications of that rejection need to be addressed 
with the same degree of sensitivity. 
None of this should be read as suggesting that Balint’s model of toleration lacks merit.  
On the contrary, Balint is making a powerful contribution to our understanding of toleration as 
a political practice, as opposed to a moral attitude or personal virtue, and a noteworthy 
counterblast to the multiculturalist’s call to go beyond toleration. Instead, argues Balint, it is 
necessary to rescue the liberal ideal of toleration and put it to work to meet the contemporary 
challenge of diversity. 
His theory successfully engages with the traditional accounts of toleration and makes two 
core normative assertions. The first grounds toleration practices in freedom, negatively 
understood as non-interference. The liberal assumption is that it is interference, not non-
interference, that has to be legitimated. Consequently, it is intolerance that must be justified 
and not toleration and it is reasons for being intolerant that must be offered, not reasons to be 
tolerant. The second normative claim, which embodies the tolerant default he presupposes, is 
expressed in his apology for state neutrality. Balint argues that the state should uphold an 
“active indifference” as opposed to displaying either forbearance—which means negatively 
evaluating an object of toleration but putting up with it—or respect for difference; which means 
positively evaluating what would otherwise be objects of toleration and recognising them as 
worthy of respect.  
On his liberal model, the state should remain neutral among the array of differences that 
generate diversity. This indifference sets the scene for his ‘hands-off’ approach, according to 
which, the state cannot intervene with tolerated ways of life. His reluctance to give the state 
more room for intervention derives from his ideal of neutrality. He believes a neutral, actively 
indifferent state will produce more freedom for all: “If one cares, as we should, about people 
living their lives as they see fit, then, as I will argue, it is toleration and neutrality that should 
be recognized and respected, and interventionist policies and laws that try to target and help 
particular citizens to achieve this good should be strongly resisted” (2017:16). 
His notion of toleration is not purely normative but also descriptive. His abolition of the 
moral objection component, and his adoption of a “broad understanding of toleration” implies 




the concept to include respect for difference. I certainly agree with Balint that toleration 
understood as a political practice should be respected as a key liberal value, yet I am not so 
sure that toleration should include indifference and even respect for difference. I maintain that 
indifference is not the proper matter for toleration, and that respect for difference will make 
toleration redundant, as I aim to show in the following paragraphs.  
Balint is able to treat toleration in these capacious terms because he dispenses with the 
objection component that, as we saw in chapter 2, is crucial to the concept in its traditional 
form. I think his descriptive and non-moralised understanding of toleration requires additional 
context. Let us start with the structure of the concept as he construes it.  
Balint describes the “orthodox” view of toleration as it follows: “toleration must always 
have three basic components: an objection, the power to negatively act on the objection, and 
intentionally not acting in this way. It is, therefore, a type of forbearance. Many views are even 
stricter, requiring the reasons for the objection and the withholding of negative interfering to 
be of the morally right kind” (2017:5). Further on, against this moralised ‘orthodoxy’ he 
juxtaposes his own account: “there is a much broader understanding that does not require 
objection, but simply power and intentional non-hindrance” (Ibid.). On this account, toleration 
is not the result of overcoming one’s objections through self-restraint, because it is not 
necessarily the result of an exercise of forbearance on anyone’s part. It might just as well be by 
not having objections in the first place that one decides not to interfere with another’s way of 
life. In such cases we do not practice any kind of virtuous self-restriction. It is merely that we 
do not feel impelled to interfere at all. Balint refers to this account as a “broader form of 
toleration” or “permissive toleration”. It requires only the power to interfere and the intentional 
decision not to do so. In this way, he entirely withdraws the objection component present in 
the “forbearance” form of toleration, in which negative valuation is what gives toleration its 
peculiar sense and reference.  
Balint does not suggest that forbearance is not toleration. His argument is that it is only 
one form that toleration can take: there is toleration whenever one intentionally decides not to 
interfere with another’s actions for some reason (moral, pragmatic, or of some other kind), 
whether or not negative valuing is also present. As he puts it, “one form does certainly not 
cancel the other out. In both a descriptive and normative sense, both understandings are 
required” (Ibid.:6). 
An obvious worry with this line of argument is that dropping the objection component 
evacuates toleration of its peculiar sense and reference and extends its meaning so far that it 




“permissive” sense, will be synonymous with a free society, especially if we follow  
Balint and other Berlinian liberals in understanding freedom in its negative formulation as 
equivalent to “the absence of interference” (see Balint 2018, 2017; Carter 2003, 1999; and 
Berlin 1958). Then it looks as if toleration is a superfluous term: we could ditch it from our 
moral vocabulary. The loss of conceptual precision this entails, however, matters not only in 
terms of our capacity to distinguish between importantly different states of affairs but in terms 
of its practical consequences: of course it is true that people can and do object to or take offence 
at almost everything, but it seems important to be able to distinguish between practices which 
are freely allowed in a given society and practices which are tolerated, not least because it tells 
the members of that community something important about the kind of community it is and 
what kinds of conduct matter to it: that offensive speech is tolerated, as opposed to being freely 
allowed, tells those on the receiving end of it that the community is not indifferent to the offence 
felt and, by extension, to those who feel it. Horton, for one, presses this point against Balint: 
“we should only talk about toleration where there is an initial objection; once the objection has 
been firmly jettisoned then talk of toleration loses its grip” (2020:193).89 
One reason why Balint is largely untroubled by this worry is that he denies that his neutral 
state is indifferent in the sense the previous example implies. It is not indifferent in the sense 
that it doesn’t care what the range of different ways of life it superintends happens to be, or 
how the living of divergent ways of life works itself out in practice. It is, rather, actively 
indifferent, meaning that it responds to diversity by ensuring that, as far as possible, it deals 
with divergent ways of life by being neutral between them. As he puts it, “an 
institution/law/policy is never neutral in the abstract, but between a range of things (in this case 
people’s justice-respecting ways of life). If the range changes, so should the 
institution/law/policy if it is to remain neutral. It is not enough to say the institution/law/policy 
was or even is neutrally justified; if the same justification can be met in a different way that is 
more neutral in intent towards the existing range of ways of life, then there is a strong case for 
change” (Balint 2020:226-27). So, as a community becomes more diverse ethnically and 
religiously, it ought to change to reflect that increased diversity, as, for example, by no longer 
requiring its police force to wear only one form of headwear which its Sikh officers cannot 
countenance. Here neutrality means removing an area of privilege (enjoyed by officers of other 
religions or not religious), rather than “adding new categories (e.g. exemptions, recognition, 
 




and minority rights)” (Balint 2020:227).  This, he argues, is the “best way of realising the 
freedom for those with divergent ways of life to live their lives as they see fit” (Ibid.).   
This, then, is Balint’s response to the multiculturalists’ claim that the “indifferent state” 
in practice favours the majority group and upholds the status quo (on the “indifferent state” see 
Barry 2001; Kukathas 1998, 2003). Balint deals with the multicultural challenge by 
reconceiving the concept of neutrality: if a policy discriminates against a minority group (or 
some members of that group), it is not justified because it is not neutral; it should remain in 
place only if a sound, neutral justification can be given for it. If such justification cannot be 
provided, the policy should be removed for everyone, not only for the minorities affected, or 
replaced by a revised policy which can be justified on grounds that such policy is neutral 
between all the different ways of life affected by it.  
Balint’s neutral state is self-reflective and “difference-sensitive” (2017:52), and the 
neutrality it exhibits is, at least as he presents it, radical in its implications (2020:226) because 
the need to be responsive to changes to the range ways of life between which it is neutral 
requires it to remove violations of neutrality whenever they become apparent (as with the case 
of police headwear discussed above). What it emphatically should not do, Balint argues, is 
respond to such changes by adding new forms of recognition for difference. One reason for 
that is straightforwardly practical. “Given the size of modern states, and the almost infinite 
amount of often changing diversity, it seems that trying to be “hands-on” will be more difficult 
than being “hands-off”, especially if one is concerned with protecting individual freedom (…) 
it will be easier and more viable to remain neutral by withdrawing support rather than 
constantly trying to juggle support for various minorities” (2017:72). But as this passage makes 
clear, there is also present an assumption that interference as a rule is worse rather than better, 
and that the less a state interferes, the less impact it will have upon the ways of life it 
superintends and so the less it will have to worry about whether that impact is distributed 
equally. A minimalist participation of the state tends to be less harmful for all; and so its effects. 
For Balint, hands-off entails better off. 
Accordingly, Balint is disposed to resist granting any form of special rights to groups; he 
says “no” to giving fishing and hunting rights to aboriginal peoples over their territories; he 
says “no” to state support for minority languages and dialects; he says “no” to authorising 
different treatment for indigenous groups according to their uses and practices. It is not, in his 
view, normatively desirable to grant special rights to groups or cultures, especially if one is 
interested in protecting the most vulnerable members of society. As he argues elsewhere, 




consequences. Put simply, the political recognition of particular groups can lead to the political 
construction of these groups: it provides incentives for people to present themselves as 
authentic members of groups, often fails to see diversity within groups and can lead to certain 
people, often women, being further disadvantaged by group recognition”.  The social salience 
of group membership cannot be ignored—it is a fact of modern political life in diverse 
societies—but it does not follow that we should accord groups special normative salience. We 
will tend to find, Balint thinks, that those matters of moral concern or interests that its advocates 
identify with group membership can be disaggregated and addressed separately and distinctly 
as individual interests. Once those interests have been identified, it becomes possible to assess 
whether or not they are being satisfied and if they are being satisfied unevenly, to remove 
existing impediments to their satisfaction (Balint 2018:375-84). If a rule is unfair or unequal, 
we should not have that rule in the first place for anyone. To Balint, there is no room for 
exceptions. If an exception is to be made, it should be extended to everyone. In this way, he 
attempts to forge a middle path between Kukathas’s model of local communitarianism and the 
classical liberal idea that the state ought to foster an overarching national identity: genuine 
equality of opportunity and fair access to resources can foster the feelings of belonging the 
advocates of group rights claim for culture without compromising the normative principles of 
the liberal state.  
Balint’s view, in sum, is that it is wrong for the state to discriminate between different 
ways of life, different cultures, and to award any of them special privileges or rights. In this 
respect it resembles Kukathas’s view, but it demands more of the state, which keeps its hands 
off culture but is active in ensuring that opportunities and resources are equally accessible 
regardless of one’s culture. Balint is unapologetic in taking it for granted that this is what states 
ought to be like. As he concedes, he simply “assume[s] a state that ha[s] this sort of basic 
nondiscriminatory framework” and his argument is that “beyond such an (interfering) 
framework, less interference would generally be preferable”. The problem, from the 
perspective of the inhabitants of The New Jerusalem, and, I would argue, of many citizens of 
liberal states besides, is that this assumption is questionable. It may be true in theory, but it is 
not descriptively true that such a state obtains. Balint appears to be assuming that it is true in 
both senses. Neither does it seem true, in light of this case, that less interference in the internal 
workings of cultural groups is better: Balint’s qualifier here “generally”, like his simplifying 






Kymlicka’s Multicultural Model  
 
Balint, we have seen, is reluctant to ground toleration on the importance of autonomy, 
which he takes to rest on controversial metaphysical claims that are not universally shared. 
Mill’s claim, for instance, that “Over himself, over his own mind and body, the individual is 
sovereign” (Mill 1989:13) would not be accepted by or acceptable to someone who believes 
that sovereignty over human beings resides with God. Balint thinks it is preferable, in 
conditions of diversity, to eschew appeals to this aspect of Mill’s thinking while continuing to 
adopt the broadly Millian line that “what ultimately matters is that people can live their (non-
harming) lives as they see fit, and that any state-imposed impediments to this need justification” 
(Balint 2020:228).  It is this last clause that underwrites his vision of the “hands-off” state. 
Kymlicka takes a different view. 
Kymlicka argues for the value of cultural membership as instrumental to the underlying 
good of individual autonomy. It is only a rich and secure cultural structure that provides the 
context for individual choice and flourishing (Kymlicka 1989a:164). It makes the world 
meaningful for those born into it. An individual, he writes, needs to be part of a societal culture 
in order to acquire the tools necessary for autonomous choice, such as self-respect, a selection 
of valuable options and different ways of life, a sense of history, personal capacity, agency and 
identity. The specific values, beliefs and rituals of a given culture may change over time, but it 
is important that it continues to exist as “a viable community of individuals with a shared 
heritage”, providing the means by which its members learn and develop the ability to make 
autonomous choices (Kymlicka 1989a:168). 
This ability is diminished, if not lost, where cultures are unable to control the 
socialization of the young and are compelled by the liberal state to jettison elements (such as, 
e.g. hierarchy, patriarchal social structures, shared religious rituals) of a strong culture that by 
its nature tightly integrates all of its components. The result is increasing alienation, intellectual 
confusion, and loss of self-respect in persons who lack the constituent conditions of 
autonomous agency. What this means, negatively, is that a state that is indifferent to the erosion 
of traditional cultures or which actively attempts to detach people from their cultural identity 
in order to strengthen their ties to the state, either as a bearer of dominant or superior culture 
or as nondiscriminatory framework of universally valid norms, should not really be called 





What it means positively is that “[r]espect for the autonomy of the members of minority 
cultures requires respect for their cultural structure, and that in turn may require special 
linguistic, educational, and even political rights for minority cultures” (Kymlicka 1989b:903). 
In order to give to the members of minority cultures the same opportunity to access the good 
of autonomy, it may be necessary to limit or entrench upon the rights of members of the 
majority culture. Hence Kymlicka, unlike Balint, supports aboriginal demands to restrict the 
property rights of whites in aboriginal land as well as the imposition of restrictions on migrant 
workers (Kymlicka 1995:43). Kymlicka, then, argues for special cultural rights as part of a 
liberal theory of equality, but his support for cultural recognition ceases at the point that a given 
culture or practice opposes his master value of autonomy (see Crowder 2013:21). As a result, 
his commitment to difference and diversity is narrower than his reputation as a leading prophet 
of multiculturalism might suggest; and in his recent works, he has made clear that access to 
special treatment is importantly conditional.   
I find at least three problems with Kymlicka’s argument. The first is that Kymlicka 
arbitrarily limits the scope of groups entitled to be granted special rights to only one kind of 
minority, what he calls “societal groups”, excluding a number of other important minorities. 
Second, he ties access to recognition exclusively to minorities that respect and promote the 
value of autonomy and that do not restrict the freedom of their members. If only autonomy-
promoters are to be tolerated, it means that only liberal-like communities can be part of the 
liberal state. Kymlicka softens the hard edge of this position by suggesting that autonomy 
promotion is present to some degree in most cultural contexts (Kymlicka 1995:94), but it still 
threatens to outlaw minority groups that reject individual autonomy or subordinate it to other 
values. A third, and related issue, is that there is a tension between Kymlicka’s commitment to 
autonomy and his commitment to protecting the rights of minority cultures to control the 
socialisation of their young people, which finds expression in his ambivalence about giving 
parents the right to educate their children according to their particular beliefs. These parents 
might argue that their religion bonds its members in shared values so constitutive of their 
identities that no harm is done if they are not exposed to alternative religious viewpoints, but 
that significant harm is done if they are prevented from receiving that education in the faith 
that gives meaning to their existence and provides the context Kymlicka himself says is needed 
to make choices meaningful for them. Kymlicka rejects the “communitarian politics at the 
subnational level”, arguing that individual autonomy must include the opportunity to question 




(Kymlicka 1995:82). My worry is that this position leads to consequences that happen to work 
against liberalism, as I will show in the following paragraphs. 
Kymlicka’s argument for state action to guarantee the survival of minority groups and 
cultures was subjected to an intense critique, particularly from other liberal and feminist 
theorists (Kukathas 2003, 1995; Barry 2001; Shachar 2000; Okin 1999; Waldron 1995, to 
mention some of the more well-known critiques). Perhaps as a result of this critique, Kymlicka 
was moved to clarify that the group-differentiated rights for which he was advocating only 
applied to “societal cultures”. These were defined as national minorities that are generally 
large; whose members speak a distinct language; possess a significant territorial concentration, 
and are willing to preserve their own culture in order not to be assimilated. Such cultures, he 
says, offer their members ways of life that embrace “social, educational, religious, recreational 
and economic life encompassing both public and private spheres” (1995:76). 
The problem with only recognising “societal groups” is that it will neglect several 
important minorities, leaving them vulnerable to both external interference and forced or 
insidious assimilation. Most ethnic groups and other important vulnerable minorities, like 
smaller religious groups, the LGBTQ community, and the communities of immigrants are 
excluded from its scope—“national minorities typically have the sort of societal culture that 
should be protected, while immigrants typically do not” (Kymlicka 1995:94)— and on grounds 
that do not seem entirely persuasive: the idea that national minorities did not choose to place 
themselves in the position in which they find themselves, whereas immigrants did, scarcely 
does justice to the complexity of a case like that of African Americans in the United States (see 
Kymlicka 1997:77-79). Likewise the fact that national minorities have pressed for recognition 
in ways that— as yet— immigrant groups have not, does not explain why, normatively 
speaking, the cases are different. Nor is it perfectly clear, in any case, that all indigenous 
peoples meet these requirements. He refers to some when illustrating which cultures do and 
which do not qualify: “American Indian tribes and Puerto Ricans, like the Aboriginal peoples 
and Québécois in Canada, are not just subgroups within a common culture, but genuinely 
distinct societal cultures” (1995:80), Kymlicka writes; but many of such groups and tribes 
appear to lack the capacity to provide their members with a way of life that includes “social, 
educational, religious, recreational and economic aspects” adequate to their needs or the 
resources they need to provide their members with the bases of autonomy, still less the means 
of living a good life. 
In Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989a), Kymlicka identified two conditions 




people must be able to take their own decisions and make choices according to their beliefs 
and the values that they uphold. We have seen that Kymlicka holds that cultures provide the 
context for the development of this capacity. But the second condition places side constraints 
on the kinds of culture Kymlicka seeks to protect: those which provide the conditions 
“necessary to acquire an awareness of different views about the good life, and an ability to 
examine these views intelligently” (Kymlicka 1995:81). This is why his theory of minority 
rights presupposes a broader liberal theory of justice and equality: because it assumes a 
“traditional liberal concern for education, and freedom of expression and association. These 
liberties—he goes on—enable us to judge what is valuable, and to learn about other ways of 
life” (ibid.; cf. 1989a:264) Thus, Kymlicka subjects minority and religious rights to the 
overriding right of individuals to act autonomously in pursuit of their good and insists on their 
right to question beliefs and “to examine them in light of whatever information, examples, and 
arguments our culture can provide” (Kymlicka 1995:81). “Our culture” in the final analysis 
plays trumps. In his view, there must be “freedom within a minority group” (Ibid.:152) and the 
individual right to dissent from the group. Minority groups ought not to be persecuted by the 
state; but illiberal minorities ought not to restrict the liberty of their own members (Kymlicka 
1995:158). In this way, “individual freedom of choice and a secure cultural context from which 
individuals can make their choices” (Kymlicka 1989a:169) can be rendered compatible, but 
this is done by excluding cultural contexts which are inhospitable to Kymlicka’s own, 
particular conception of autonomy. 
 Some cultures, he writes (1996c:95),  
 
far from enabling autonomy, simply assign particular roles and duties to people, and 
prevent people from questioning or revising them. Other cultures allow this autonomy to 
some, while denying it to others, such as women, lower castes, or visible minorities. 
Clearly, these sorts of cultures do not promote liberal values. This shows that liberals 
cannot endorse cultural membership uncritically. 
 
What it also shows is that Kymlicka is operating with a somewhat narrow conception of 
autonomy as “rational revisability”: “(C)hoice enables us to assess and learn what is good in 
life. It presupposes that we have an essential interest in identifying and revising those of our 
current beliefs about value which are mistaken. When I use the term autonomy, therefore, it is 
in this sense of ‘rational revisability’” (Kymlicka 1995:212); but (pace his claim at p. 94, 




everyone uses the term.90 Many men and women who have chosen to live a religious life of 
obedience, often with the strong support of their religious communities, may reasonably reject 
this conception of what an autonomous life consists in, while believing no less reasonably that 
they have chosen not only to practice and follow their religion but have also confirmed the 
choices they have made many times over in preference to available alternatives. As Jeff 
Spinner-Halev points out, religious people who have chosen to live a life of obedience are most 
of the time free to review their beliefs: they choose to cleave to their values and principles over 
those of the mainstream society (Spinner-Halev 2000: Ch. 3). It surely is not necessary to be a 
liberal to exercise choice and to live the life one has chosen for oneself.91 
The implications of Kymlicka’s conception of autonomy come into sharp focus when he 
discusses education as part of his discussion of how liberal states should treat illiberal groups. 
Kymlicka criticises Rawls for offering “no solution” to the problem of “insulated minorities” 
such as the Amish, the Hutterites or the Mennonites (1995:41-42) who reject the ideal of 
autonomy and demand groups rights that give them special privileges, including the right to 
educate their children into their own preferred ways of life. Education in their view, so 
Kymlicka suggests, is a matter of re-orientating the individual’s self-regard and nurturing the 
desire to live by the will of the community, not of preparing children to take up the rights and 
duties of citizenship (Kymlicka 1996c:102), and so Rawls’s claim that his conception of 
political liberalism is compatible with their withdrawing from the wider society is false, 
because by implicitly rejecting the rights and duties of citizenship for their children, such 
minorities are rejecting political justice and its associated conceptions. In fact, political 
liberalism requires enforcing liberal education to protect liberal political rights in minority 
communities “that have a strong social consensus in favour of group rights, and a strong 
historical claim to them as well” (Kymlicka 1996c:96). 
The problem is that Kymlicka’s alternative leaves us no better off than Rawls’s. He 
wants, he says, to defend liberalism based on autonomy on the one hand but exhibit caution 
 
90 Kymlicka (1996c) obscures this point to some extent by distinguishing his own conception from still narrower 
ones associated respectively with Kant (autonomy as an expression of our rational nature) and a particular reading 
of Mill (autonomy as non-conformist individuality), arguing that his conception of autonomy is “simply” the 
ability to assess what is good in life, and why. It is not obvious how assigning particular roles and duties to people 
could ever prevent people from even questioning them.  
91 I do not deny that people may be influenced by what Gould calls “improper socialization” (Gould, 1990:50) so 
that they cannot rationally comprehend the different courses of action open to them or those courses of action may 
be themselves unduly limited in practice: in certain traditional cultures that do not formally prohibit women from 
pursuing an education, many women may still choose not to do so, either because there are informal costs (e.g. 
the diminution of marriage prospects), or because the opportunities for acquiring education are too scarce or too 




about “imposing the full set of liberal political institutions on non-liberal minorities” (Ibid.), 
but the issue is really, as he acknowledges, about exemptions from the scope of those 
institutions which already are imposed de jure. When he concedes certain exemptions—
“education exemptions for the Amish, theocratic government for the Pueblo Indians”—he 
states explicitly that this is “a compromise of, not an instantiation of, liberal principles, because 
it violates a fundamental liberal principle of freedom of conscience [which is difficult to 
distinguish from his conception of autonomy]”, the implication being that this is a morally 
undesirable concession to reality that ought, over time, to become superfluous as “liberal 
reformers inside the group… promote their liberal ideas through reason or example, and 
liberals outside… lend their support to any efforts the community makes to liberalize” 
(Kymlicka 1996c:96). 
I will return to the issue of compromise in the next chapter. For the present, I merely 
observe that the processes on which Kymlicka relies for his solution seem to require precisely 
what his concession puts into question. In recent times, when claims for exemptions from 
mandatory education have come before the courts and the courts have upheld the obligation on 
the part of public schools to deliver a curriculum predicated on liberal principles,92the result 
has been that parents have removed their children from public schools and continued their 
education through religious schools and home-schooling, thereby reducing the opportunity for 
liberal reformers to promote their ideas through reason and example. When a teacher shows 
equal respect to male and female children, exhibits tolerance of difference and respect for 
alternative beliefs, they teach liberal values by their deeds as much as by the curriculum. 
Allowing minority groups to withdraw their children from public education on religious 
grounds removes this possibility.  
None of this is to say that Kymlicka’s theory lacks merit. His is undoubtedly one of the 
few models that have found a balance to compellingly conciliate value conflict—between the 
values of cultural groups and the values of individual equality. My concern is that when it 
comes to the crunch he slides back into precisely the kind of liberal theorizing he is trying to 
go beyond. Other directions of travel are available. It is possible, at least in prospect, to move 
beyond the liberal versus multicultural dispute and their proposed either/or predicaments: “the 
 
92 A famous and recent case, Mozert v Hawkins has been widely debated by liberals. Parents were concerned about 
the school exposing their children to viewpoints and ideas that they considered contrary to their religion without 
the school emphasising to their children that the Bible’s truth was above all other doctrines and viewpoints. They 
asked for their children to be excepted from taking this course in particular. The court sided with the school’s 
authorities and refused any exception. The Court did not suggest any form of accommodation. Parents responded 





individual or the group” and “your culture or your rights” dichotomies. One such attempt has 
been made Ayelet Shachar, whose notion of “Transformative Accommodation” is discussed in 
the following section. Shachar’s model is not specifically tailored to fit insular millenarian 
groups, but it introduces considerations of such obvious relevance to the case that it is worth 
analysing at greater length, to see if the approach to the problem it embodies, and the solution 
it implies, is more convincing and more adequate to the issues raised by The New Jerusalem 
than the approaches and arguments we have been discussing so far. 
  
Shachar’s Transformative Accommodation (TA) Model 
 
It is precisely the possibility that cultural rights as collective rights for minorities will end 
up disadvantaging or oppressing some members of the community, in particular, “minorities 
within minorities” such as women and children, that is explored in the writings of Ayelet 
Shachar (2001). Many philosophers and social scientists have theorised about group rights 
versus individual rights, on the basis of a handful of well-known cases, including those invoked 
by Kymlicka. Shachar’s key insight is to see that “principles and theoretical formulations [that] 
may seem attractive on paper… cannot [be] fully appreciate[d] …until we see them interpreted 
and applied in a variety of specific contexts” (Shachar 2001:8). The shape of the problem, as it 
is well-known, and indeed more or less as Kymlicka described it: how to uphold individual 
rights while paying due deference to the claims of groups within the framework of a 
constitutional state; how to ensure the rights of minorities without compromising liberal 
principles on the one side or imposing those principles on groups that do not share them on the 
other side?—or more sharply, how to liberalize a cultural community without destroying it 
(Kymlicka 1989a:170). What tends to follow is either an assertion of the priority of the one 
over the other or an assertion that the two can be reconciled followed by a litany of the 
difficulties involved in actually reconciling them: either what is required of the state, or what 
is required of minority groups.  
This “either/or” impasse is the point from which most discussions begin and to which 
they eventually return. Kymlicka, for example, observes that “explaining how minority rights 
can coexist with human rights, and how minority rights are limited by principles of individual 
liberty democracy and social justice is the real test of the multicultural model” (Kymlicka 
1995:6); but the real test, I think, is not merely to explain how, but to demonstrate (i) in practice 
and (ii) over time that vulnerable minorities can be protected at the same time as individuals 




Shachar’s contribution to this enterprise is to propose what she calls multicultural 
jurisdictions, rather than a monopoly of jurisdictional authority, as a solution to the paradox of 
multicultural vulnerability. This proposal moves beyond two existing approaches along the 
lines just now identified: a “Re-Universalized Citizenship” approach, pioneered by feminists 
like Young (1989) and Okin (1997), which claims that when the rights of individuals are in 
dispute with the rest of the group members, the state should side with the individual and 
guarantee individual rights by direct intervention; and the “Unavoidable Costs” approach 
(favoured by Kukathas), that maintains that individuals who do not exercise their right to exit 
minority communities have, in effect, volunteered to bear certain costs in terms of their rights 
as citizens in order to avail themselves of the benefits they perceive to lie in group membership 
(Kukathas, 1992a). Shachar’s work pays attention to the actual interactions between legal state 
and different “private orders”: minority groups like the Pueblo Indians and other indigenous 
communities seeking to maintain their uses and practices and sustain their own cultural norms. 
“Private orders”, in this frame of reference, are legal entities the existence of which is 
recognised by the state and which enjoy jurisdiction over their members that the state cannot 
override ceteris paribus. They grant the minority groups accorded this status a substantial 
degree of autonomy (see Sagy 2011) to continue uses and practices that otherwise would be 
either prohibited by or dissolve upon prolonged contact with the majority culture.  
The advocates of “Re-Universalized Citizenship” had pointed to obvious dangers with 
this kind of model. For instance, Okin (1997) argued that multicultural policies of 
accommodation were almost inevitably connected to the prevalence of discriminatory practices 
and power imbalances within minority groups. Granting protection or special treatment to 
minority groups, she suggested, seemed to come at the unavoidable cost of increasing 
oppression of the most vulnerable members of such groups (see also Eisenberg and Spinner-
Halev 2005). It empowered the group’s authorities (usually male elders) to act in ways that 
were potentially as oppressive or even tyrannical as anything the state could muster. Likewise 
it encouraged them to exaggerate the degree of homogeneity and consensus within the group 
to make their case and demands stronger before society and the state (and, of course, to buttress 
their own position at the same time). 
Shachar seeks to address these potential dangers through a method of joint governance 
that she calls Transformative Accommodation (TA). To Shachar, “the key to breaking the 
‘either/or’ impasse lies in re-examining the question of jurisdiction—that is, the methodology 
for determining which legal forum has the authority to resolve a given legal dispute according 




groups as conflicting jurisdictions, we see the multicultural challenge as an opportunity to 
mobilise multiple jurisdictions to favour the less advantaged members of any minority group 
progress is possible. We can empower individuals inside marginal groups, rather than elites; 
individuals can decide which jurisdiction is the better for them to advance a claim in or defend 
an interest in (of course subject to certain specific conditions).  
Transformative Accommodation is structured around three main principles: the 
appropriate allocation of legal authority; the no-monopoly rule; and the establishment of clearly 
delineated choice options. Shachar suggests that a minority group (or culturally-differentiated 
group) should have exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters, such as territorial borders, 
matters related to family issues, such as divorce, marriage, surname arrangements but, on the 
grounds of appropriate allocation of legal authority or sub-matter proposed, it cannot claim 
jurisdiction over the distributive aspect of family law: issues like property division, child 
support or alimony will abide by the state’s rules and therefore will be under the direct legal 
domain and jurisdiction of the state. Equally, criminal law and education would be shared 
realms between the culturally-differentiated group and the state, again on a sub-matter or 
appropriate allocation basis. 
The model is based on two further premises. First, given a clearly outlined selection of 
choices, the members of the culturally differentiated group will be in a position to reject the 
group’s jurisdictional authority and will have the right to apply for state’s judicial review; 
second, this structure generates positive incentives both for the state and the cultural group to 
make themselves, so to speak, the jurisdiction of choice but neither can bootstrap its way to 
becoming a monopoly legal system in its own right. 
Shachar goes on to test the effectiveness of the model against real legal cases, which are 
given a counterfactual treatment: If TA, then x. The idea is to show that her model would 
generate better, juster outcomes. Two cases in particular are central to her argument: “Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. María Martínez” and “United States v. Anthony Robert Wheeler”. 
The case, which came before the US courts in 1980, concerned the power of Pueblo 
Indians over their members and whether members of the Pueblo community had the right to 
appeal ordinances taken according to the community’s procedures. The Respondents were the 
Santa Clara Pueblo, an Indian tribal group that settled in the United States’s territories long 
before the Europeans settled and conquered the land, and its governor, Lucario Padilla. 
The Petitioners were Julia Martínez, a full member of the Santa Clara Pueblo, and her daughter 
Maria Martínez. They asked the US Supreme Court to reverse a tribal ordinance that denied 




granted membership to children of male members married outside the tribe. Martínez was 
married to a member of the Navajo Nation, which, according to the uses and practices of Santa 
Clara Pueblo, made her children outcasts. They were automatically ineligible for membership 
in the Pueblo and lost all their rights as a result. Martínez’s children were allowed to live with 
her on the reservation, but they were denied political rights, like those of voting or holding 
office, and were prevented from actively participating in any decisions concerning the Pueblo. 
And they would be required to leave the Pueblo as soon as her mother died and prevented from 
inheriting her land or claiming any share of the community’s assets. 
Mrs Martínez provided evidence that Pueblo’s legal decision had discriminated against 
her and her family on the grounds of sex, gender, and ancestry, in violation of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act (ICRA, 1968)93, which provides in relevant part that “no Indian tribe in exercising 
powers of self-government shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of its laws”. The case was taken first into the United States District Court for New 
Mexico, which decided in favour of the Respondents on the grounds that membership rules 
were critical to the “social self-definition” of tribes and thus “vital to the tribe's survival as a 
distinct community”. To that end, it found that striking the proper balance between equal 
protection and tribal self-determination was best left to the Pueblo’s judgment (Santa Clara, 
436 U.S. 54). The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, to which Martínez’s was an appellant, decided 
that no “compelling tribal interest” could ever justify the ordinance’s sex-based classification. 
This decision was appealed in turn to the Supreme Court, which reversed the 10th Circuit 
Court’s decision and ruled that the tribe’s ordinance was valid on the ground of Pueblo 
sovereignty, arguing a jurisdictional incapacity to rule on the matter. 
“Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martínez” (along with “The United States v. 
Wheeler” and “Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe” cases) was a seminal case because it 
established that the state had no jurisdiction over Indian reservations or their communities and 
that members of the community were subject to its sovereign jurisdiction. Shachar argues that 
if Transformative Accommodation had been available for Mrs Martínez, the outcome would 
have been different, and much preferable. 
Shachar also adduces the case of “United States v. Anthony Robert Wheeler”. In 1974, 
Wheeler was found guilty of indirectly corrupting a minor by the authorities of the Navajo tribe 
to which he belonged. A few months later, he was indicted under the same charges by a federal 
court. Wheeler was found guilty by a grand jury, but he attempted to quash the conviction 
 




alleging a violation of the Fifth Amendment, specifically the “Double Jeopardy Principle” 
which denied that “any person (shall) be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb..." (U.S. Const. Amend V). The United States District Court dismissed his case. 
He appealed their decision and shortly after, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed the 
dismissal. The verdict of the court was unanimous. Its legal reasoning was grounded on 
sovereignty. The matter was for the court to confirm if an Indian tribe had the necessary 
sovereignty to judge and punish tribal members. They found that the Navajo nation had the 
power to do so and that, since the Navajo tribe was acting as an independent sovereign, the 
“Double Jeopardy Principle” did not apply. The clause does not forbid prosecution by two 
different sovereign nations and so does not preclude the federal prosecution of a Native 
American even if he has already been prosecuted by his tribe for the same offence. As a result, 
Wheeler was prosecuted and sentenced twice. The question Shachar asks is, had the model of 
Transformative Accommodation been applied to this case, would he have been treated more 
fairly? According to Shachar, the answer is yes. 
Consider now a third case, one that Shachar does not consider, that of the children of 
parents in the New Jerusalem who wished to access state education. What does Shachar’s 
model have to say about this case?  
 
The New Jerusalem and Transformative Accommodation 
 
The Convention on The Rights of The Child94, subscribed by the United Nations General 
Assembly in November 1989 (of which Mexico is a signatory state) is nowadays the most 
widely ratified human rights legally-binding treaty ever subscribed. In Article 28, it states:  
 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to 
achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in 
particular: 
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
(b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including 
general and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, 
and take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering 
financial assistance in case of need; 
 
94 United Nations. The Convention on the Rights of The Child. Available at: https://www.unicef.org/child-rights-





(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every 
appropriate means; 
(d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and 
accessible to all children; 
(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of 
drop-out rates. 
 
The Mexican state, as a signatory party, commits to guarantee children’s rights and 
access to education. Similarly, The Political Constitution of The Mexican United States 
declares in Article 3 (Last reformed 2019): 
 
Everyone has the right to education. The State Federation, the States of the Union, 
Mexico City, and the Municipalities will provide and guarantee initial, preschool, 
primary, secondary, upper-secondary, and higher education. Initial education, 
preschool, primary, and secondary are equal to basic education and it will be 
mandatory. Higher education will also be mandatory in terms of section X of this 
article. Initial education is children’s right and it will be the responsibility of the state 
to raise awareness of its importance. 
 
Yet, the Mexican state did not intervene to force the religious authorities of The New 
Jerusalem to restore the children’s right to education. Instead, after lengthy negotiation, the 
government of the state of Michoacán secured the agreement of the authorities for children to 
attend a temporary school outside the community. By the time an agreement was reached, there 
had been considerable violence, suffering, and the effective loss of an entire academic year. 
Could the model of Transformative Accommodation have been of any utility in this case? By 
analysing Shachar treatment of the prior cases, it is possible to establish where, in her view, it 
would have brought gains. Having conducted this analysis, I shall turn to comment on some of 
the problems that I think Shachar’s model would face if put into practice. 
In “Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martínez” case, the Transformative Accommodation approach 
would have meant that Maria Martínez would have had the opportunity to choose whether she 
wanted her claim to be heard by the Pueblo authorities or by the New Mexico State’s courts. 
Even if her children had been dispossessed (as happened) by the Pueblo, she would have been 
granted the right to appeal before the judicial power of New Mexico, which would have had 
the authority to review, if not to overturn, the Pueblo’s sentence. So, at least, Martínez and 
Martínez would have been benefited from a second chance to make their case, and very 




compensation. According to TA, the state has the power to review the group’s authorities’ 
sentences in the light of potential human rights violations or individual rights transgressions. 
If the state had found that Martínez had been discriminated against on the basis of gender, it 
would have instructed the Pueblo’s governor to provide the petitioners with redress equivalent 
to the damage incurred. As Shachar puts it, “joint governance opens up the possibility to 
empower women (and other disproportionately burdened classes of group members) by 
ensuring that neither the group nor the state authority is shut out of the decision-making process 
when the individual has a legitimate interest in being governed, and served, by both” (Shachar 
2001:150). 
Regarding the case of “The United States v. Wheeler”, the TA model is succinct: “power 
over the sub-matter of conviction rests in the hands of a presiding 
judge [speaking for the state] while authority over sentencing is vested in the hands of an 
Aboriginal community (the minority group), which assumes responsibility for the punishment 
and rehabilitation of the convicted” (Ibid.:161). Again, the model envisages the exercise of 
joint governance. In criminal justice, there are always two elements: the “conviction”, and the 
“sentencing”. The first element refers to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, and it is 
in open court a procedure normally decided by a jury. The second sub-matter to be addressed 
is “sentencing”, which deals with the appropriate means of punishment, protection of the 
public, and rehabilitation of the offender, and is carried out by a presiding judge (Ibid.). A 
criminal case is not concluded until both sub-matters have been addressed. On Shachar’s 
model, Wheeler would not have been sentenced twice (as he was on the presupposition of two 
mutually exclusive jurisdictions). Rather, the state would have been in charge of the sub-matter 
of “conviction”, whereas his community would have dealt with his sentencing. 
I turn now to the children of The New Jerusalem. How would the TA model have worked 
in this case? Shachar (Ibid.:155) sketches the outlines of an answer which  
 
complies… with the joint governance ideal of encouraging input from different sources 
of authority in co-governing a given social arena, encourages the education of children 
in a setting that overcomes the “either/or” choice between excluding religion altogether 
from the curriculum (the strict separationist approach) or fully upholding and 
sponsoring faith-based schooling (the strict neutrality approach). Joint governance 
imagines public schools as spaces where children from different backgrounds can learn 
about their own communities and distinct histories (in a secure and supportive 
environment), while establishing a minimal level of commonality between them as 





Shachar cites the examples of the Netherlands and Denmark, states that financially 
support different religious schools that promote diverse religious traditions and beliefs. She 
adds that: “In Germany, the Länders organize the religious classes, that are generally two to 
three hours a week, for which students break up into different classes according to their 
religious affiliation. There need only be six to eight students of a given nomoi group to justify 
a class being held for them” (Shachar 2001:156). 
These examples tend to suggest that the TA model offers resources that would have, at a 
minimum, helped to ease some of the tensions that made the situation in The New Jerusalem 
so combustible. The Loyals objected to some of the subjects taught in the public school. They 
tried to persuade teachers and educational authorities to exempt their children from classes that, 
in their view, disputed the Bible’s tenets, and from sex education classes that offended their 
values. No exceptions or accommodations of any sort were offered. In principle, TA would 
have offered options to accommodate the religious petitions and concerns of The Loyals as 
well as the subsequent concerns of The Dissidents. Religious lessons would have been taught, 
provided by their own spiritual leaders, in accordance with the beliefs and principles of the 
community. That is what the model is about: accommodating diversity. Had the TA model 
been an option, the conflict might possibly have been avoided. 
 
Some Problems with the TA Model 
 
On the other hand, I believe that there are reasons to think that, for all its appeal as a 
model, Shachar’s model of Transformative Accommodation would have run up against 
significant difficulties in terms of operationality. The incentive structure assumed by Shachar 
does not seem to acknowledge sufficiently strongly that the same interests that drive a state to 
allow a cultural group some degree of autonomy will also cut against the impulse to press 
without stint its institutional claims to represent vulnerable group members who seek its 
protection: the more it becomes the jurisdiction of choice, the more it will raise suspicions that 
it is embarking upon a surreptitious “re-universalization” of citizenship. Mutatis mutandis, the 
same interests that encourage a group’s vulnerable members to appeal to the group’s fora to 
settle disputes may discourage subsequent appeals against the group’s sentences to the state’s 
courts. Empirical cases, such as the “Emmanuel School of Girls” in the Israeli occupied 
territories, extensively documented by Tehila Sagy (2018); the “Pueblo vs Martínez” case 
(summarized and explained above), and The New Jerusalem case that has been explored in this 




jurisdictions that they have formally recognised as autonomous (because they do not wish to 
pay the political costs associated to such potential interventions).  
In the Girls’ School case, analysed by Sagy, the court simply stepped back from 
monitoring the school’s discriminatory practices, proclaiming that its leaders had to 
compromise but that the court did not have the resources to “monitor” what happened inside  
schools (Sagy 2018:640); in the “Pueblo v. Martínez” example, the state adduced a “lack of 
jurisdiction” and dismissed the case; with The New Jerusalem, the Mexican federal government 
argued that the Naborist group was not “officially registered and, therefore, non-existent” (sic) 
as a religious group and that, as a result, the Under secretariat for Religious Affairs could not 
legitimately intervene in the case (see chapter 2). Regardless of its formal responsibilities, or 
duties, one way or the other, states will find a way to justify the denial of justice when unwilling 
to bear the political costs of enforcing it. Sagy explains why: “the state has a certain stake in 
private ordering [and it is] the power of the group in relation to the state [that] determines that 
interest” (2018:636). The case analysed by Sagy gives an account of the increasing power of 
the Haredi ultra-orthodox community in Israel, empirically confirming her theory: the more 
powerful the group, the less likely for the state to interfere with its internal affairs.  
Michael Walzer briefly mentions in On Toleration how difficult it is for liberal states to 
interfere with states that do not respect the essential rights of its members, even when having 
the power to do so, even when the oppressing states are vassal states of the liberal one, and 
even where the liberal state recognises its moral and legal obligation to interfere. He took the 
example of an ancient Indian practice of suttee (Walzer 1997:61). 
The Sati or suttee was a historical practice found predominantly among the Hindus, 
particularly in the western and northern regions of India. Once the husband had passed away, 
the widow had to sacrifice herself by placing herself on the funeral pyre of her dead spouse. If 
the widow refused, she would be “assisted” by her neighbours, relatives, and other funeral 
attendants, who would tie her up to the pyre to make sure she performed her part. This practice 
was denounced by Christian evangelists as early as 1803 but the British East India Company 
and the British Governor-General of India allowed it to continue, being reluctant to interfere 
with what they described as “religious private matters” (see Gilmartin, 1997). It was only the 
combination of Christian evangelists, William Carey among them, and Hindu reformers like 
Ram Mohan that eventually pushed the British government in India to enact the “Bengal Satti 
Regulation” that prohibited the practice in 1829.  
In the interim, thousands of women had been burned alive. A report written by a 




year of the period, which amounts to 5,997 only in the region of Bengal alone (an average of 
666 casualties per year). The same report records 635 Sati fatalities per year in the region of 
Madras, and 655 per year in the Bombay (Mumbai) region (The Missionary Herald, 1829.:124-
31). On this basis, over the ten-year period, more than 19,000 women died in these three 
regions, many of them coercively “assisted” by diligent Sati watchdogs. 
 
Walzer (1997:62) writes of 
 
(T)he extraordinary reluctance with which the British finally, in 1829, banned the suttee 
(the self-immolation of a Hindu widow on her husband's funeral pyre) in their Indian 
states. For many years, the East India Company and then the British government 
tolerated the practice because of what a twentieth-century historian calls their "declared 
intention of respecting both Hindu and Muslim beliefs and allowing the free exercise 
of religious rights… It is at least conceivable [he continues] that consociational 
arrangements might produce a similar [kind of] toleration, if the power of the joined 
communities was in near balance and the leaders of one of them were strongly 
committed to this or that customary practice. 
 
The structural similarities with the case of the New Jerusalem do not need to be laboured. 
It is another example of the way in which the distribution of power, even in relatively small 
quantities, affects the state’s willingness to intervene to prohibit practices it deplores among 
minority groups, even when it acknowledges a moral obligation to do so.  
Analogous worries apply when considering the incentive to pursue justice outside the 
“private order”. Internal group power relations allow for private ordering but at the same time, 
they deter vulnerable members from seeking state’s protection or redress. The unsuccessful 
results achieved in the empirical cases mentioned just now are scarcely untypical. Vulnerable 
group members are well aware of such precedents, and certainly of the social costs of 
challenging their private fora. The viciousness and effectiveness of the “social sanction” inside 
a small group, that Mill and many others described extensively; the high-costs related to the 
“right of exit”, and the almost null hopes the victims hold of receiving justice outside their 
communities, are just some of the discouraging subjects that prevent the oppressed from 
diversifying their access to justice. Why did The Dissidents not simply leave La Ermita and 
find somewhere else to worship their virgin? Why do oppressed people among the Pueblo or 
The Navajo Nation remain in their communities despite the treatment they have received? The 
answer has to do with the costs of leaving: the price is too high. No doubt Shachar would argue 




about by the operationalisation of multicultural jurisdictions; but there is, at the very least, a 
cart-horse problem that needs to be addressed.  
Finally, Shachar’s second premise, that is, a “free market” form of jurisdiction that 
enables members inside the group to choose the justice provider that they prefer, seems to take 
the causal processes of social reproduction too trustingly for granted. Healthy competition 
between the group leaders and the state is no more likely in practice, and may be less likely, 
than a race to the bottom. The examples outlined above show that public institutions in charge 
of delivering justice frequently and readily find reasons not to protect the rights of the 
vulnerable within powerful collectivities. Too often they lack the motivation to favour the 
disadvantaged members of powerless and politically irrelevant groups. Theila Sagy explains 
this phenomenon as a direct consequence of what she calls “the rule of conservation of power” 
(2018:631). She argues, plausibly, that “the power of a group remains a constant in relation 
both to individuals within it and to the state”. If Sagy’s understanding of power is correct (as 
the empirical evidence seems to suggest), then two basic premises of the TA model will be 
flawed premises. Neither the appropriate allocation of legal authority or the no-monopoly (of 
jurisdiction) rule will likely operate in the way Shachar assumes. 
Shachar herself explains how she sees the “Kinetic” model she has designed operating in 
practice (Shachar 2001:163): 
 
Sentencing and healing circles are by definition non-adversarial. No one 
can come under their jurisdiction unless they voluntarily choose to do 
so, either after they have been convicted, or after they have pleaded guilty 
to charges laid by the state. Yet even after this initial choice of jurisdiction, individuals 
may “reverse” the jurisdiction of the circle by turning to the state, the failsafe authority, 
if they believe that their sentence and healing process is not conducted fairly by the 
community. This “opt-out” option means that the state can theoretically take over the 
responsibilities of the community if it is too harsh (or too lenient) in its sentencing. 
Transformative accommodation also grants the community a right to use the “reversal” 
option as a means of disciplining the offender, if and when it becomes clear that that 
person is failing to cooperate in the healing process. In such cases, the offender must 
face the state’s punishment apparatus instead. This “kinetic” division of powers thus 
endows each non-monopolist power center, together with the individual,[with] the 
capacity to monitor the other power-holder’s exercise of authority. 
 
The Transformative Accommodation model is, to my mind, a step in the right direction. 
It allows us to approach the problem of reconciling groups rights and individual rights from a 
broader and more innovative perspective. And yet, life is usually more multifaceted and 




to square with the optimistic picture of mutual correction and healing painted by Shachar. 





































COMPROMISE AND TOLERATION: A NORMATIVE PROPOSAL 
 
 
This final chapter takes off from the theoretical problems that became evident in chapter 
5 and, finding existing theories of different kinds wanting in various ways, sketches a new 
answer to the core normative question of the thesis: How should modern liberal states deal with 
religiously extreme minority groups that do not respect the rights of their members? The first 
section suggests that it might be useful to think about this problem in a different way. I suggest 
that recent literature about “international” toleration, specifically the appropriate response of 
liberal states to theocratic states in the international system of states and the meaning and scope 
of toleration in that setting, has lessons to teach for the case of The New Jerusalem. In 
particular, in its “realism” about the exigencies of practical politics, it avoids some of the 
simplifying and moralizing tendencies identified in the previous chapter.95 This section also 
highlights the distinction made in this literature between the strict requirements of justice and 
the pragmatics of compromise and the tendency to present toleration as a requirement of justice, 
thus setting it in opposition to compromise.  The next section argues that the relationship 
between toleration and compromise need not be oppositional. I suggest that toleration need not 
be invoked as an alternative to compromising but can be put to work instead to imbue such 
compromise with the moral content it might otherwise lack. I conclude that a form of moral 
compromise complemented by a conditional arrangement of political toleration could be a 
viable way to deal with complex cases where toleration, as traditionally understood, seems to 
fall short of protecting individual rights within minority groups that are prone to oppress their 
minorities. I also spend some time explaining what I believe could and should be done in The 
New Jerusalem to improve the life of its inhabitants, emphasizing children’s rights. Concrete 
examples are provided of how to implement a comprehensive form of political compromise, in 
hope that light may be shed on similar cases where liberal states have to deal with insular 






95 As noted at the beginning of the previous chapter, it comes close to the “political activist” perspective discussed 




What if The New Jersualem were a state? 
 
If the New Jerusalem were a state, the Mexican government would likely tolerate it. After 
all, liberal states habitually tolerate illiberal and even theocratic states (Trubowitz 2011; 
Spinner-Halev 2000; Walzer 1997). Although they tend to think of themselves, and to represent 
themselves publicly, as having uncompromising moral commitments to certain rights and 
liberties deemed essential and inalienable, when developing and advancing their foreign 
policies, they sooner or later face the question of whether there are reasons (both practical and 
moral) to engage with states, and to overlook practices within those states, they dislike or find 
morally repellent. As Michael Blake puts it, it is widely acknowledged that it is “appropriate 
for a liberal state to ask whether there are moral reasons to regard certain non-liberal states as 
having rights to non-interference in the perpetuation of their particular forms of government. 
It is appropriate, that is, to ask whether there are at least some non-liberal states that deserve to 
be treated with the distinctive moral attitude known as tolerance” (Blake 2007:1). There are 
many reasons why states opt to avoid interference in the affairs of another state (even if that 
state overrides liberties and rights regarded as inviolable by the liberal state): many relate, one 
way or another, to the exigencies of political expediency, including the mutual convenience of 
having a stable international system and the need of skipping unnecessary confrontation and 
endless and costly wars. (See Chatterjee and Scheid 2003).  
It is worth emphasising that such exigencies, while perhaps appearing to constitute no 
more than a checklist of prudential consideration, are still a source of moral reasons per se. As 
Blake goes on to say, “To engage the mechanisms of international coercion—through 
economic sanction, say, or warfare—is to use tools that inevitably cause enormous human 
damage, in both the short and long runs. To use these tools badly, without adequate cause, is 
both morally and prudentially wrong. This sort of moral reason, however, should be 
distinguished from tolerance itself” (Blake 2007:2).  Of course, liberal theorists make this and 
like distinctions as matter of course (see e.g. Heyd 2021). Liberal states make the distinction 
too, not only in theory, not least because they do not wish to have their own loftily professed 
commitments to tolerance and liberty reduced to the worldlier and more pragmatic avoidance 
of interfering with the beliefs and practices of others because of a wish to achieve peace, 
compromise, coexistence, and social stability; but also in practice, when adopting stronger and 
weaker policies in relation to illiberal states of various kinds. 
Approaching the problem of The New Jerusalem from this direction may be the more 




treated it not as a city that falls under its legal jurisdiction but rather as a city-state within a 
state, an independent polity96, at least between elections. So its approach may be better 
understood through the lens of international toleration than via some version of domestic 
toleration, whether liberal or multicultural. At least, this will give us a counterpoint from which 
to assess the approaches discussed hitherto in this thesis from a different perspective. De facto 
The New Jerusalem has been treated by the Mexican state as a sort of sovereign state; but what 
kind of state, meriting what kind of treatment—what does toleration between states involve?   
This question has been discussed much in the academic literature at least since the 
publication of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples (1999). In his seminal writings A Theory of 
Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993) Rawls made arguments designed to establish a 
fair and secure basis for political principles of toleration. In the earlier work, his view of 
toleration was rooted in a comprehensive conception of autonomy. In the later work, his 
defence of toleration proceeded from the claim that diverse individuals would come to tolerate 
one another by developing an “overlapping consensus”: individuals and groups with diverse 
metaphysical views and different plans of life would find reasons to agree about certain 
principles of justice that included, by inference, principles of toleration. This claim relied on a 
sweepingly general historical argument about the way in which people solve their conflicts: by 
adopting the practice of toleration as means of mutual relief from something worse. The costs 
of ongoing wars of religion being too high to bear, they agreed to support a “neutral” state, 
which allows them to follow their own plans of life and bear witness to their own religious 
beliefs, but prevents them from seeking to require those beliefs of others, acting as umpire in 
disputes between individuals and groups with diverse perspectives on what beliefs are true and 
what the ends of life ought to be. The state is agnostic about the ends of life but provides the 
basic structure through which individuals and groups pursue their ends as they see fit.  
Rawls’s idea of “Justice as Fairness”, then, sets limits to political power without trying 
to evaluate the relative merits of different conceptions of the good. The principles of toleration 
it upholds will be agreed to by individuals and groups from diverse perspectives because these 
principles will appear reasonable to all of them despite their differences. The idea of toleration 
results from a political consensus that is developed on analogy to the social contract that Rawls 
describes at length in A Theory of Justice. The result is a scheme of equal basic liberties which 
 
96 As I have described in Chapter 1, The New Jerusalem could be technically regarded as a state within a state as 
the “holy” authorities of the city successfully claim and exercise the monopoly of violence throughout all its 
territory. Moreover, they systematically refuse to comply with the local and federal laws and regulations currently 




is equally accessible to all citizens. These basic civil liberties form the basis for political 
toleration. 
When in 1999 Rawls discussed the extension of this scheme of justice as fairness from 
the domestic to the international sphere, many of his previous admirers were taken aback. 
Political toleration and equality, in Rawls’s domestic view of the state, are mutually supporting: 
members of a state seek and expect to be tolerated as a specification of what equality means. 
But Rawls’s understanding of tolerance in the international arena looked quite different and 
more difficult to match with the moral equality of individuals. As Blake (2007) notices: “When 
we are asked to tolerate those whose governments are illiberal, what we are being asked to do 
is to tolerate those who themselves demand the right to be coercively intolerant. This, after all, 
is what it means for a government to be illiberal; illiberal regimes just are those regimes who 
do not seek to treat people as moral equals… to tolerate that is morally quite a different thing 
than to tolerate domestic religious pluralism” (2007:7). 
In fact, Rawls distinguishes between different kinds of illiberal regimes and different 
degrees of tolerance.  Some regimes, he thinks, are in a position analogous to individuals in the 
domestic sphere who, while they do not endorse comprehensive liberal conceptions—they 
would not, for example, agree that autonomy ought to be regarded as the defining characteristic 
of human beings—are nevertheless able to find reasons to endorse the same set of principles 
of public justice to which liberals subscribe. The principles they would endorse would be 
narrower than those that characterise domestic political justice. They would not include such 
liberal democratic rights as the rights to freedom of expression and association, freedom of 
religion, equal political participation, but they would include such basic human rights as the 
right to life and security, and the right to basic subsistence. Likewise, while they are not 
themselves liberal, they are respectful of other peoples in the relations with them, liberal and 
illiberal peoples alike (Rawls 1999a:64-75). Rawls terms such peoples “Decent peoples” 
because they conform to the minimum standards of decency enshrined in his Law of Peoples. 
“Decent peoples” stand in contrast to those Rawls calls “outlaw societies”, which violate 
the human rights of their citizens. They do not accept the principles of conduct that other 
peoples abide by and are eo ipso unreasonable, since reasonable peoples by definition endorse 
those principles (Rawls 1999a:80-81). They do so, not because they are liberal principles but 
because they are principles that express a shared understanding and experience of living 
together as diverse peoples and the basic norms of reciprocity that are required to facilitate a 
common existence. Nowadays these norms tend to be expressed in the language of human 




liberal states to specify the contents of those rights as they determine, few if any, openly deny 
universal human rights (even when they are violating them). An “outlaw state” as Rawls 
construes it denies the rights to life, security and subsistence that decent peoples recognise. As 
such, it should not be tolerated. Indeed, it may be sanctioned, or even attacked, when the self-
defence of liberal and decent peoples warrants it (Rawls 1999a:37,81,93).  However, this is not 
the same as saying that toleration and non-intervention amount to the same thing, or that their 
limits coincide with one another. 
As Kok-Chor Tan explains, tolerating another society involves much more than 
refraining from intervening by force against it. It also entails notions of acceptance and 
recognition. When liberal peoples tolerate decent peoples, “they not only refrain from acting 
coercively against them” (by not engaging in military intervention, for example) but, 
 
they are, more fundamentally, recognizing the legitimacy of decent peoples and their 
status as equals. Toleration thus expresses a certain normative attitude towards the 
subject that is being tolerated, and is not just a prescription against military action 
against the subject (Tan 2005: 691). 
 
In other words, Rawls’s international toleration, in view of Tan, should not be understood 
primarily as a principle that defines the limits of intervention but, more fundamentally, as a 
principle that defines the limits of permissible criticisms and judgments between peoples 
regarded as free and equal. If and when a state does intervene to defend human rights, it may 
be said to be acting to enforce a judgment that the rights violation is morally unacceptable. But 
judging that a human rights violation is wrong is distinct from enforcing that judgment, and, 
for Rawls, the principle of toleration in this setting is concerned primarily with the boundaries 
of judgment rather than with enforcement. In other words, Rawls’s account of toleration “deals 
with the more fundamental question of appropriate judgment rather than intervention—his 
principle of toleration sets limits on the kinds of judgment that liberal peoples may reasonably 
make, and not just the kinds of action that they may take to enforce their judgment” (Tan 
2005:691). 
This distinction between making a judgment (criticizing) and enforcing that judgment 
(intervening) is also made by Kymlicka (1995:164-66). It clarifies the point that even though 
outlaw societies fail to meet the test for liberal toleration, it need not follow that they must be 
attacked or intervened against, just as some minority cultures which are deservedly criticised 
for their cultural practices may not have those practices prohibited by liberal states. Whether 




passu, whether or not a liberal state may act with force against an illiberal minority that abuses 
fundamental rights—will depend on a variety of further moral and pragmatic considerations, 
including “the severity of the wrongs of the regime, the potential repercussions (locally and 
globally) of forceful military action, the probability of success of a military action, and so on. 
Waging war against a tyrannical regime, even purely for the purpose of protecting basic rights, 
brings into play additional considerations about the morality of going to war that the fact of 
illegitimacy in itself does not address” (Tan 2005:691).  
That toleration includes recognition and not merely non-intervention is, Tan concludes, 
an important point for Rawls’s project. It underwrites Rawls’s claim that decent peoples are 
accepted into the society of peoples not for instrumental reasons, for the sake of stability or 
peace or economic benefit, but as a matter of justice. For Rawls, their tolerance is a requirement 
of justice, not a compromise. This distinction is one to which I shall return shortly.  
Tan fills out what tolerance means on Rawls’s account by emphasising that it allows 
space for private (liberal) citizens to challenge decent peoples within the rules of the basic 
structure of the society of peoples and to organise non-violently to press for their reform (Rawls 
1999a:84). If it did not, as Tan correctly observes, Rawls’s international theory would be in 
contradiction with his domestic theory of justice, which gives individual citizens the right to 
criticise non-liberal ways of life and to organise to protest against them non-violently through 
the liberal freedoms of expression and association enshrined in his first principle of justice. The 
idea seems to be that individual liberals in liberal societies are able to promote liberal values 
globally through private non-governmental channels, not that these liberal rights are attributed 
to liberal citizens belonging to decent peoples. Critics have found this conception of tolerance 
excessively “weak” (see Blake 2007, 2003; Benhabib 2006) but it has the merit of reflecting 
the political realities of a world in which illiberal peoples exist at the level of states and inside 
those states. The making of judgments and its enforcement appear to answer to radically 
different sets of criteria. Can it help us to make sense of the problem of The New Jerusalem? 
Since its foundation in 1973, the very existence of The New Jerusalem and the 
apocalyptic and segregationist nature of its leaders put the Mexican state in an awkward 
position. For decades, successive governments have attempted to find a middle way between 
the extremes of imposing the country’s majority way of life on the thousands of inhabitants of 
“The City of the Virgin” on the one side, and giving free rein to toleration on the other, handing 
the community de facto and perhaps de jure control of its own interior life, putting the fates of 





These two positions embody in concreto the two poles that have defined and delimited 
the liberalism versus multiculturalism debate in the last two generations. Matthew Festenstein 
helpfully labels these, respectively, as “Negative Universalism” and “Liberal Culturalism” 
(Festenstein 2005:66). The first centres on a state that fulfils its purpose by guaranteeing the 
rights of individuals, not by granting differentiated rights to groups and minorities. The second 
centres on cultural identities that are regarded as normatively compelling and attempts to 
reconfigure the state, and liberal political theory, on terms that do full justice to their claims. 
At the limit, the two meet each other round the back, the state qua monopoly legal system 
determining what is and what is not the kind of group that deserves to have special cultural 
rights. Many writers, like the Mexican politicians discussed in chapter 1, have tried to carve 
out a middle way between these poles; but they have, like their counterparts, ended up swinging 
unsteadily between them, lurching from universalist prescriptions/threats of force to 
proclamations of the need to show tolerance to a religious minority. The politicians, in 
particular, have blamed this state of affairs on the unwillingness of the contending parties in 
the city to find their own middle ground, to compromise. So the Mexican state, like Rawls and 
Kymlicka, has insisted on distinguishing between tolerance and compromise.  
In the space that remains, I argue that compromise and toleration should be regarded as 
partners as much as antagonists. Compromise is not an alternative to toleration but the practical 
acknowledgement that the objection component is an ineradicable feature of toleration. It is 
not the expression of indifference, but of the fact that tolerance is difficult, sometimes (though 
not always) involving conflicts of value that make demands upon us that we cannot always, 
and perhaps never, satisfy without remainder. 
 
Compromise and Toleration 
 
Throughout my research into The New Jerusalem and the theories of toleration and 
minority groups that promise to shed light on the problems it posed, I found that, often, the 
language of toleration was shadowed by the language of compromise: politicians urged 
compromise, claimed to have found it, realized they had failed to find it, and appealed to 
toleration as an alternative to compromise: we need to tolerate because we cannot reach 
compromise. The relationship between toleration and compromise, I propose, is more complex 




The sort of compromise I am talking about, and which I link to toleration, is of a moral 
order. My understanding of compromise covers those cases in which the parties believe they 
have a moral interest in or motive for accepting or rejecting a given policy, as opposed to acting 
from purely pragmatic or self-interested motives, but where there is disagreement about what 
that interest requires. Rostbøll offers a definition that I will take as my own: a compromise is 
“an agreement in which all sides make concessions in order to be able to reach a collective 
decision and in which the concessions are motivated by the presence of disagreement” (Rostbøll 
2018:4). 
From this definition, we can infer that compromise includes the idea of mutuality and 
reciprocity. The fact that every party needs to give something or to submit a demand means 
that everyone has to make concessions. In other words: compromise implies that there is not a 
total winner as no one gets the outcome they preferred, and no-one gains without at the same 
time losing something they value. Agreement means getting, not their first choice, but a second-
best they are willing to accept because they regard the value of making a collective, mutually-
agreed and mutually-binding decision trumps the value of that first choice. All things 
considered, it is better to have an agreement of this sort than not, and it is impossible to reach 
that agreement without conceding something (not principle, but rather the idea that the world 
can be made to reflect perfectly one’s own moral point of view). One gives and, in doing so, 
gains the proverbial bird in the hand worth two in the bush. It is the continuing existence of 
background disagreement that differentiates compromise from consensus (which involves 
agreement in the form of concord) and from simple bargaining.  It was Habermas (1996:141 et 
passim) who stated that in mutual consensus one is motivated solely by the merits of the reasons 
concerning the dispute, whereas in compromise disagreement per se becomes a motive and a 
reason. In contrast, in haggling, the parties involved are pushed by the differential forces 
between to reach a modus vivendi that is apt to collapse if the balance of forces changes, like 
the house in Swift’s story that collapses when a bird lands on its roof.  
A distinguishing feature of compromise, then, is that it does not eradicate disagreements. 
Once a compromise agreement has been achieved, and once all the parties accept that the 
decision reached is the right one, they still believe that the positions they adopted ex ante were 
correct at least to some degree. Parties that agree to compromise do not agree that they were 
wrong to begin with. They only agree to compromise because they regard it is worthwhile to 
give up their first choice for the sake of a collective decision. The same decision, arrived at by 
reflection and concession, involving incremental shifts of position by all parties which 




parties would have reached consensus. Consensus precludes disagreement (because it has been 
eliminated during the process of arriving at consensus) whereas compromise is nourished by 
disagreement and by the need to overcome it without cancelling or discounting it.  
Compromise may be further disambiguated into at least three types. Following others, I 
call these Deep Compromise, Moral Compromise and Political Compromise respectively. They 
are closely related, but exhibit differences in scope and degree that, when applied to concrete 
cases, make it necessary to distinguish them clearly.  
Deep Compromise stands in contrast to “shallow compromise” (also referred to as “bare 
compromise”) (Richardson 2002; Bellamy 2012). In a shallow compromise, the parties assume 
that their opponents’ position is given, and they regard their own position as given too. 
Accordingly, they seek a middle point that is equally acceptable to both parties because it splits 
the difference between them (Bellamy, 2012). Contrastingly, parties to a Deep Compromise do 
not see their ends as wholly given or fixed, but seek a compromise in which the ends—or 
perhaps more exactly, their own understandings of the possible reasons for and against those 
ends—are modified. According to Rostbøll (2018:5), Deep Compromise differs from bare 
compromise “because it involves an element of deliberation and learning. The parties do not 
just aim to maximize their own policy preferences, they acknowledge that they can learn from 
others in the combination of arguing and bargaining that characterizes deliberation” of this 
special sort. Or as Bohman (1996:101) puts it, Deep Compromise “weeds out unreasonable 
positions and brings people closer together”97 because it forces them to articulate to themselves 
and others the reasons they have for adopting the positions they have adopted and exhibiting 
the preferences they do. In so doing they engage, of necessity, in the kind of exchange of 
reasons and mutuality that elevates their activity above a mere exercise in bargaining and 
persuasion. It is no longer a purely instrumental exercise. One might say, the effort to achieve 
compromise comes to be made not only for the sake of agreement, but for the sake of justice. 
The particular form of Deep Compromise I am proposing as a feasible solution to 
improve the current circumstances in The New Jerusalem is what I call Moral Compromise. 
Moral Compromise, to define it, is a substantial (Deep) compromise in which both the 
resolution and the conflict are morally considered by all the parties involved (May, 2005). By 
“morally considered” it is meant that the agents have a normative judgement that implies a 
particular conception of the good and therefore a moral judgement of what is the “right thing 
to do” as opposed to “the wrong” (May, op cit).   As Rostbøll (op cit: 8) explains, “A normative 
 




theory of compromise requires us to accept that citizens in pluralistic societies cannot agree on 
justice or on what the law ought to be. Compromise is needed because there is no shared 
conception of toleration or justice—if there was one, no compromise would be needed”—and 
because, in order to incarnate the principle of self-determination that is core to the democratic 
ideal, the law has to respect and reflect the status of all citizens as joint participants in self-
legislation.  
A merely or crudely Political Compromise, in contradistinction, is a form of shallow 
compromise in which the aim is to balance, or to appear to balance, concessions: as such it 
verges on bargaining and can be strategic in the pejorative sense of the word, as when one party 
gives up something to which is in reality indifferent in order to give the appearance of 
compromising or insists upon a particular principle as absolute while allowing its ongoing 
violation in the name of its ultimate realisation. The various temporary compromises enforced 
by the state upon the parties in The New Jerusalem may be thought to possess this character. 
They failed in part because the different parties, namely the Mexican state and the religious 
authorities of the holy city, belonged to different “moral universes” (compare Phillips 2005: 
133).  They did not only disagree on what was “the best” way to serve justice but on whose 
justice should be served and what the “right” way to do it was. The form of deep—substantial—
compromise needed to be reached is, as I said at the beginning of this section, political, because 
it concerns the rules governing people whom chance or choice has brought together, but it is 
of a moral order because both the resolution and the conflict have to be “morally considered” 
by all the parties involved. 
 
The Divorce between Toleration and Compromise 
 
Compromise is not toleration. Neither is toleration eo ipso a form of compromise. If it is 
claimed that, on the contrary, toleration is always a second-best option because it presupposes 
accepting something that one finds objectionable, and in this sense involves compromise, the 
reply is that toleration concerns what we ought to allow others to do, not what we would prefer 
them to do or not do, not what we have agreed with them that they and we can or cannot do.  
Consider one of the many situations that take place at present in The New Jerusalem: The 
majoritarian group of the community, The Loyals, believe that no one should be allowed to use 
mobile phones or any other modern means of communication inside the community. To do so 
goes against the will of the Holy Virgin and the prophecies of the current clairvoyant, “Mamá 




community, namely the minoritarian and more liberal group known as the Dissidents, 
fundamentally because this smaller group do not take as valid the prophecies of Mama Catalina, 
whom they regard as a fraud. The Loyals are well aware of this; and of The Dissidents’ use of 
modern technology. They tolerate the “vicious” presence of technology inside the Holy City 
for the sake of peace. (They will breach the peace on other pretexts they deem more important).  
They do not think The Dissidents are right in any way; they are not willing to compromise or 
negotiate on the issue; but they do not want bloodshed on this score, so they look the other 
way. The Loyals continue to hold that the practices and beliefs of The Dissidents are morally 
and religiously wrong and vice versa.  
This may be a reason why authors such as Bellamy and Hollis (1998) have argued that 
compromise is “more than” and expresses a higher ideal than mere tolerance. Are they right?  
My answer, paradoxically, is yes and no: compromise is at the same time “higher” and “lower” 
than toleration. It is of a “lower” order than toleration insofar as, for the tolerant person or state, 
it is a second-best policy. No partisan thinks it is the best policy in itself. Rostbøll (2018:8) 
makes the point well: “insofar as one accepts a compromise, one also compromises (some of) 
one’s principles. By contrast, if one thinks toleration is the right policy, one does not 
compromise one’s principles by accepting a policy of toleration”.  Yet, on the other hand, when 
two parties begin in mutual disagreement and achieve a political compromise, they are doing 
something quite different from, and more than, tolerating each other’s differences. Tolerating 
involves accepting people’s equal right to live as they choose as subjects of the same law. 
Compromise implies at least two parties participating in making that law and becoming its co-
authors. Where toleration demands respecting (and sometimes bearing with) rival conceptions 
of the good in a given society, compromise encodes people’s disagreements in a law to which 
all agree to be bound. Rostbøll glosses this difference by saying that “(while) toleration is an 
answer to the question of what the law ought to be, compromise is a response to disagreement 
on what the law ought to be” (Rostbøll 2018:10). 
Toleration and compromise join hands in appealing to the value or good of respect: 
respect for persons as fellow citizens, respect for the law, respect for the implications of 
diversity. In the classical account of toleration, individuals are asked to respect others’ right to 
hold and uphold different conceptions of the good98. In the case of compromise, individuals 
are asked not only to show respect for each person’s right to pursue their own idea of the good 
(as it would be required in any exercise of toleration) but to show respect for their conceptions 
 




of what the law (in particular, coercive laws) ought to prohibit or allow: their views, as much 
as ours, count for something, even when we think they are wildly wrong. If a conception of 
toleration tells us how and why diverse subjects can be equally subject to the same rule of law, 
a theory of compromise tells us how they might be included in producing these coercive laws; 
laws that will define a common good or common interest and the terms in which it may 
legitimately be pursued. Compromise gives us reasons to endorse a policy we would otherwise 
eschew: reasons which “are not aimed at correcting our first-order policy preferences, but are 
second-order reasons telling us that we should accept a compromise agreement given 
disagreement at the first-order level” (May 2005:319).  
As Bellamy argues, the reasons to seek and accept compromise are all the more pressing 
“in complex and pluralist societies, where social differentiation and ethnic diversity means that 
citizens bring very different perspectives and life experiences to bear on a problem and are apt 
to weigh it in different ways”. Finding room for all these values may not be possible: it may 
not be possible to accommodate perspective in a single harmonious kingdom of ends. The only 
reasonable moral response to this practical dilemma, Bellamy suggests “may be to appeal to 
the democratic ethos and seek a compromise under fair conditions”. This response, he 
continues, cannot be regarded as seeking the “best” balance of views through mutual moral 
correction, because no such ‘optimal’ position exists. At least, it is beyond the limits of practical 
reason for real human agents to arrive at it. Consequently, citizens and politicians must pursue 
other avenues, including “non-majoritarian electoral systems, that is those systems that use 
some form of PR rather than plurality voting and even institutionalize proportionality in the 
administrative structures, as consociational systems do, effectively institutionalize compromise 
in this way as a means of accommodating pluralism” (Bellamy 2012:458). Shachar’s 
Transformative Accommodation model would be another possible means of institutionalising 
this uncompromising commitment to compromise.  
 
Harmonizing Compromise and Toleration 
 
The normative proposal with which I would like to end is the suggestion that, whatever 
the differences between toleration and compromise, there are gains to make by treating them 
as mutually reinforcing and complementary rather than as opposed to one another. Respect 
provides an important conceptual bridge between the two; models like Bellamy’s and 
Shachar’s suggest an institutional means to the practical end of dealing with conflicts like the 




that the various participants in the liberalism versus multiculturalism debates, both in academic 
circles and in practical politics, find themselves pulled between.  
One of the most familiar charges levelled against liberal political thought and political 
practice since the eighteenth century is that its advocates look down on those who do not share 
its values and treats them as morally inferior or opprobrious beings: Toleration has been 
traditionally regarded as a virtuous activity the stronger or more rationally bestow on the 
weaker and mistaken. By generously tolerating the wrong, the morally superior beings 
dispensing toleration maintain a hierarchical relationship with the tolerated. The same charge 
has been levelled at Rawls’s theory of international toleration. In taking it upon himself to 
determine the criteria on which states are to be deemed civilised and reasonable or outlaw, 
Rawls turns the “different-thinking Other” not just into “my adversary, but an enemy of 
humanity because he fails to accept what I know is true of all humanity” (Koskenniemi 2001: 
493). On the other side, compromise is deprecated because it is seen as morally questionable, 
as something requires one to betray one’s principles (Luban, 1985).  Both Kymlicka and Rawls 
counterpose compromise to principle. 
My suggestion, following Rostbøll (2018, 2017 cf. 2011), is that if we succeed in 
integrating toleration and compromise, we can mitigate the charge of arrogance and liberal 
enthnocentricism associated with the first line of argument and the worry about abandonment 
of principles associated with the second. Let us begin with the idea that compromise can 
compensate for the potential arrogance of toleration. According to Rostbøll, “toleration 
becomes arrogant when it elevates the tolerator over the tolerated, that is, when the tolerator 
regards him or herself as having a standing that the tolerated does not have (Rostbøll 2009:633). 
There are two sides to this problem: The first is that the person who tolerates sees his 
acceptance of the other’s actions as something he bestows on the tolerated, something he grants 
and “gives” to the other from a higher place. Therefore, the tolerated becomes dependent on 
the generosity and the magnanimity of the tolerator who is willing to grant the tolerance. The 
second is that the tolerator, in so acting, takes for granted that he or she knows the best way to 
define and practice the toleration required (see Forst 2007:219). However, if we do not take the 
meaning and implications of toleration as given, but instead we think of toleration as a product 
of, or on analogy with, a political compromise, it becomes much harder to represent it, or to 
receive it, as “an imposition of the strong and arrogant over the weak and wrong others”.  
In a deep form of compromise (like political and moral compromises), the parties 
involved treat each other as equals and the result is always a product that incorporates the 




implications of questions related to justice, toleration included, should not and will not be taken 
as given, but must be the product of the compromising process as such. Likewise, if people 
should be allowed to live their lives as they see fit, according to their own sense of justice and 
their own conception of the good, other things equal, public policy should not be imposed by 
one group over other groups but should be the result of a kind of compromise between all 
groups. If states design and implement public policy and rules according to the only wish of 
the majority group, let us say the majority culture, it is likely that public policy will favour the 
majoritarian group and it will be biased toward it, advancing its culture at the expense of the 
other groups. In contrast, by incorporating other groups’ views and demands via a political 
compromise, the resulting laws and policies will be more inclusive, as inclusive as is 
practicable given the existing range of justice-respecting ways of life that obtains in a particular 
society. 
Although it is true that not necessarily all forms of compromise will eventually produce 
more tolerant policies, compromise nowise implies the abandonment of principle in pursuit of 
any agreement whatever, or an agreement for the wrong reasons. These charges against 
compromise, which run together in the “ambivalence of compromise”, embody two 
complaints: “(Compromise) is unprincipled (either) because it requires one to give up one’s 
own principles when they clash with the other side’s principles, or it is unprincipled because it 
involves a rejection of the existence of objective principles at all” (Rostbøll 2018:12).  Here 
toleration can help to delimit what sorts of compromise are morally acceptable: intolerant 
compromises should be avoided. This statement may appear too demanding; but the mere idea 
of compromise already entails a commitment to mutual respect and a commitment to respect 
the achieved agreement resulting from compromise. A politics of compromise does not respond 
only to political expediency: it contains, and expresses principle, it is not the repudiation of 
principle.  
My hope is that it may be possible to build upon the grounds of toleration and mutual 
respect via a theory and practice of compromise capable of offering new solutions to intricate 
cases like that of The New Jerusalem where toleration by itself seems not to be enough. I realise 
that there are significant difficulties with building robust and enduring agreements where 
compromise has been lacking, and that toleration and compromise are terms loaded with all 
kinds of associations that make it difficult to for all potentially compromising parties to sign 
up to institutional arrangements predicated upon them. Some differences, as Bellamy notes in 
one way and Rawls notes in another, are too great to be bridged by either toleration or 




connotations that attach to it, and toleration likewise, is an important step in the right direction. 
 
Putting the proposal to work 
 
How might this work in the case of The New Jerusalem? In practice, given different 
scenarios, compromise may yield different results. One possible scenario, unfortunately, is the 
failure to achieve compromise; another is the failure to make it last. We can fairly ask: what 
would happen then? Would toleration become then the fall-back option? I believe a 
counterfactual reading of The New Jerusalem crisis of 2012 could help elucidate the problem 
and suggest a possible answer or anwers to these questions. 
Let us begin with the immediate trigger for conflict: The Mexican authorities built the 
first and only elementary school in the community in 2010 with the consent of the religious 
“holy” authorities. As Varela (2012) states, the school was accepted by the community at first 
and was running smoothly for the first two years. Then an issue related to clothing arose: The 
“pious” rulers of the city noticed that the girls attending the school were wearing “improper” 
clothes, namely skirts that were, or looked, “too short” (Varela, op cit). They met to discuss 
the seriousness of the offence and, after some deliberation, The Loyals concluded that the 
school could continue to operate normally, provided that the teachers agreed to follow the city’s 
sacred regulations, namely that skirts would have to be worn down to the ankle and that girls 
should not be allowed to wear trousers or jeans, as these garments were considered “impure”. 
On the same principle, girls should be required to cover their heads with a veil. The Loyals 
communicated to the school teachers that the boys, conversely, were expected to have their 
hair cut very short and that they ought not to be allowed to practice any round-ball sport, as the 
ball resembled the shape of Earth’s sacred form and so to hit or kick it was a desecration 
offensive to the Virgin. Children were, however, allowed to play American football because it 
was played with an ovoid ball.  
An official petition was handed over to the school principal, requiring adjustments to 
students’ uniforms. The school categorically rejected the request. Aggrieved, The Loyals 
invaded the school and effectively prevented its teaching activities from August 2011 (Marrero, 
2014). From that point, only a few “obedient” children were given the chance to attend the 
“authorized” school in the village, the religious institute San Juan Bosco School, where 
children had to wear proper clothing at all times and were taught to read and write but only via 
the Bible and other holy texts written by its founder, Papa Nabor, especially his catechism. 




some kind of accommodation, instead of adamantly rejecting the religious petition? How 
counterproductive would it have been for the school to modify their uniforms in deference to 
the religious beliefs of the majority of the community? Could adjustments to the students’ 
uniforms have prevented a crisis that ended with the physical destruction of the school, the loss 
of two academic years for children, the further division of the already-divided community and 
the loss of several human lives? The likelihood is that a few adjustments in something as trivial 
as the uniform would have made the difference from the earliest stage of the problem. A will 
to adapt some of the standard school regulations to the particular religious needs of the 
community would have allowed the school to continue its academic activities, probably until 
the present time. Undoubtedly, pursuing compromise would have been more productive than 
the intransigence and refusal to engage in dialogue that eventuated. 
Similar thoughts are invited when we consider those petitions that the religious 
authorities submitted regarding the school curriculum.  It might well have been possible to 
include all the children of The New Jerusalem in the public school—Dissidents and Loyals 
alike—by adapting the school curriculum (within reason) to the religious needs of the 
community. There would have been several advantages of expanding the public school to 
include all children: it would have exposed them to a wider range of values, not least liberal 
values; it would have broadened their education; it would have required them to interact in an 
academic environment with the other children, whatever the opinions of their parents, and so 
taught them the virtues of civility, mutual assistance and critical thinking. All this could have 
been done if only a few contentious issues had been excluded from certain subjects to avoid 
religious conflict. Instead, no doubt for reasons of principle, the school authorities were 
unwilling to countenance any change to the curriculum, because they were unwilling to be seen 
as instruments of a project of religious domination and therefore were reluctant to compromise 
the values of a secular education. Principled tenacity has its place, but, I suggest, compromise 
in this case would have been preferable. 
For instance, if the educational authorities had agreed to make some concessions to 
accommodate religious demands, that would prevented the closure of the school and permitted 
the continuation of the wider educational life of the community. Thereupon, children would 
not have been taken out of the school to receive only religious education at home, deprived of 
an institutional setting for socialization and the acquisition of social and civic virtues. An 
openness to negotiate over religious demands and accommodate them, when possible, would 
be tantamount to showing respect for the group’s values while recognising their right to be part 




of an alien and hostile “moral universe” (see Phillips 2005:133). Surely this would have been 
appreciated by the religious authorities and the majoritarian conservative population for it 
acknowledges their right to be heard, their right to be taken seriously. The process could have 
started by carefully listening to their demands, understanding them from the inside, and ended 
in compromising with them to come up with a workable solution that could be accepted by the 
different parties. Negotiating and compromising instead of disavowing and imposing. 
What would have happened in the event of a failure to compromise? What if the parties 
remained intransigent and the leaders refused to cooperate? In one sense, we know the answer 
to that question, because there was no compromise: each party, for different reasons, was 
unwilling or unable to take the steps needed to make Deep Compromise, above all, to recognize 
a shared moral responsibility for achieving an abiding solution. From the start, the crisis 
polarized around principles that were set in absolute opposition to one another, framing the 
problem in terms that made compromise difficult.  It is striking that what compromises there 
were, even if they were narrowly political ones, occurred only when threat of force on the part 
of the state made clear that direct intervention in the internal affairs of the community was a 
genuine possibility. At that point, The Loyals gave ground, because principles could no longer 
be played as trumps: the realities of power shifted the terms of the game.  
Toleration allowed the competing parties to cleave to principle and enabled the state 
authorities to commend their own principles twice over: the principle that secular education 
was universal right, and the principle that different cultures and cosmologies ought to be 
respected.  But in practice, the results were sub-optimal, to put it politely. Had the problem 
been framed instead as I am recommending, in the spirit of Phillips’s political activist as a 
specific problem in a specific context rather than as a clash of uncompromisable principle, the 
results may have been better.  This is not to say that toleration achieved nothing in the case: on 
the contrary, it probably avoided a great deal of harm.  But it also came with costs, one of 
which was to imply that compromise was impossible without a renunciation of fundamental 
values or ultimate concerns.  The counterfactual possibilities I canvassed above imply 
otherwise: even when fundamentally opposed understanding of justice are in play, shared 
judgements may be arrived at “somewhere else in the chain” (Phillips 2005: 133). The resulting 
compromise would be political, but not narrowly so: it would be a deep compromise reflecting 









How, then, should liberal states best address challenges like the one posed by The New 
Jerusalem? The real clash between multiculturalism and liberalism does not centre on 
contrasting attitudes towards diversity, as is commonly thought. Multiculturalists indeed 
disavow policies of assimilation and cultural homogeneity as a pre-condition for economic and 
political inclusion, but so do the majority of liberals. (The liberal defence of religious freedom 
and the separation of church and state provide ample evidence of this truth). The rupture comes 
over their contrasting construals of equality and culture and could be reduced to two matters 
directly related to the composition of the word “Multicultural”. The first corresponds to the 
lexeme “Multi”, that is, the preservation of diversity through group-differentiated rights and 
other accommodating schemes, whereas the second touches on the “Cultural”, that is, the 
conviction that cultural belonging is vital to identity, which is critical for self-realization and 
the establishment of a fair society. Both lexemes clash with the liberal conception of autonomy 
and equality, setting the scene for a contest that is more often a matter of nuance and degree 
than outright opposition. 
I have examined the theories developed by the rival parties to this contest, and also 
theories like Shachar’s which attempt to move beyond the inherited terms of the problem. I set 
these theories against reality to identify some of their hidden problems. They seem to fail to 
address a complex case like the one explored in this thesis, the case of The New Jerusalem. 
Should the Mexican state continue to tolerate the oppression of the dissident minority inside 
the walls of The New Jerusalem? Should the government instead use the overwhelming 
coercive force at its disposal to enforce the rights of The Dissidents and their children, send the 
religious leaders of The Loyals to jail, treating it as an outlaw state that poses a threat to the 
rights of every Mexican citizen? What would happen to children in either case?  
Though often unfavourably regarded by political theory, I propose that a policy of deep 
compromise (moral compromise) could be a viable solution as opposed to the policy of 
toleration as indifference that has failed to avoid abuses inside the community and even to 
protect fundamental rights. A policy of compromise—like toleration—respects diversity, not 
only in the sense that everyone should be allowed to pursue their own conception of the good 
but in the sense that diversity itself should be incorporated while making coercive laws and 
policies. A policy of moral compromise places side constraints on how laws are made, and who 
should be consulted in their making and taken into account when enforcing them. This policy 





Toleration as indifference has had, to date, 48 years to show whether it was the most 
adequate response to the challenge of The New Jerusalem and a viable and valid means of 
guaranteeing peaceful coexistence in the community. The historical evidence points to failure: 
it has often produced more harm than it was intended to avoid. A more inclusive and 
participative policy is desirable.  
As I have shown throughout the chapters of this thesis, there are numerous political 
obstacles and legal hindrances to solving the conflict between the need for group protection, 
and the paradox of multicultural vulnerability; but, as Shachar (2001:148) has pointed out, the 
alternatives are utterly unacceptable: either to abandon all hope of multicultural 
accommodation or to abandon all hope of protecting vulnerable members from the abuse of 
power of their own communities. While there is no “one size fits all” solution to the problem, 
any attempt seriously committed to meeting the challenge will have to address not only the 
recognition of cultural differences, and the right of minority groups not to be directly harmed, 
subjected to neglect, or forcibly or silently robbed of the bases of their culture. It will also have 
to recognise the latent risks of harmful intra-group effects. We have to acknowledge that if we 
are to disentangle what has been, for successive Mexican governments, an irresolvable puzzle. 
I have explored in some detail the shortcomings of Kukathas and Balint’s models. I 
offered reasons for thinking we should reject the “hands-off” approach which in different ways 
they adopt. Similarly, I argued that the liberal universalist approach that proposes to treat the 
unequal as equals is flawed theoretically and practically. The first approach, at its most 
extreme, gives groups the license to oppress their less-favoured members; the second leads to 
a “your culture or your rights” dilemma that damages individual choice and denies the right of 
groups to coexist within a majority culture as bearers of their own distinctive norms and values. 
We need to go beyond this artificial dichotomy of “either/or” and to do that it is necessary to 
change the perspective from which the problems in view are approached.  
In this thesis, I have suggested that Shachar’s Transformative Accommodation model is 
a promising beginning in this direction. Her proposal for joint governance offers an attractive 
answer to the paradox of multicultural vulnerability by shifting the debate about differentiated 
citizenship and overlapping jurisdictions onto a new plane of analysis. She finds creative 
solutions that I have explained in Ch. 5., to reduce subjugation within groups. Her theoretical 
arrangement exchanges the problematic “right of exit” and its enforced abandonment of the 
individual’s culture for a dynamic incentive structure that encourages communities to examine 




bears against the legitimising of internal oppression, by empowering vulnerable insiders rather 
than elites. Members of group are empowered with legal tools that recognise them both as 
“rights-bearers” and “culture-bearers”. Her model gives individuals the ability to choose which 
jurisdiction they may prefer to appeal to for settling their disputes.  
At the same time, there are difficulties with the model that make it difficult to conclude 
that the model is workable as it stands. It seems to take an unduly optimistic view of the way 
in which its incentive structures will operate in practice and draws the wrong lessons from the 
legal cases it uses to stress test its components. These cases tend to suggest that the state’s 
authorities are reluctant (if not unable or unwilling) to interfere with groups’ internal affairs 
once they have granted them special rights. The New Jerusalem case is just another example 
that confirms this phenomenon of power, and the limitations of the model to work in practice 
despite its theoretical merits.  
This thesis does not attempt to provide a rival theoretical model that will at one stroke 
resolve the tension between group rights and individual rights. Nor does it offer blanket 
solutions to the problems that contemporary theorists of toleration have made it their business 
to contemplate or to imagine up. Instead, this work has tried to contribute to the normative 
discussion on toleration by revealing and making explicit some of the shortcomings of theory 
in the face of a real example of a modern state struggling to accommodate illiberal diversity on 
terms that are either stable or just. I have suggested a normative solution to the puzzle posed 
by The New Jerusalem though, and I have offered a glimpse, at a rather general level, of how 
moral compromise could work alongside policies of toleration to afford long-lasting 
agreements. How to shape and implement those arrangements, however, is out of the reach of 
this work. Still, I hope my research could be a starting point for other endeavours.  
The liberal theories I have examined prescribe toleration as the most feasible solution 
towards religious minority groups, except for those extreme cases of ultraconservative, insular 
religious groups that, like “outlaw states” fail to respect the basic rights of their members. In 
such cases, both multiculturalists and liberals are against toleration; what they are for is much 
less clear. I suggest an intermediate point from which to move forwards: moral compromise 
and political negotiation alongside toleration. Concretely, it will be possible to incorporate all 
the children of the community in the public school by adapting the school curriculum, to the 
extent possible, to the religious needs of the community. This will prevent children from being 
taken out of the school to exclusively-religious and home schooling. It opens up the space for 
liberal challenge from inside the community, as well as criticism from outside, without 




or modifying topics or ways of delivering education they cannot countenance, rather than 
insisting on a liberal curriculum on the one side or conceding to their demands entire and 
exiting the community. Compromising will be a better way to benefit the children, the 
community and the society as a whole. 
The argument I have advanced is that modern liberal states need to embrace 
comprehensive forms of compromise if they are to deal more effectively with very conservative 
religious groups, such as the insular community considered in this thesis. Liberalism faces the 
challenge of finding new forms of toleration that are the result of intense and thoughtful 
compromise. A moral compromise could be a long-lasting solution for a case where both liberal 
and multicultural prescriptions seem to have fallen short. The upshot will be a revivified 


























History of The New Jerusalem 
Chronology of Events 
 
1973    The Holy Virgin is said to have appeared before Mamá Salomé. 
Mamá Salomé and Papá Nabor found The Holy City of The New Jerusalem (TNJ),  
claiming to act under The Virgin’s command. 
Papá Nabor becomes the supreme leader of The Holy City. 
Mamá Salomé is appointed the first official seer of TNJ. 
 
         1981    Mamá Salomé, first seer of The Holy City, dies 
1982     The battle for succession after Mamá Salomé’s death divides the community between the followers 
of Mamá Margarita and Mamá Chuy. 
 Papá Nabor sides with Mamá Chuy and anoints her the new seer of TNJ. 
 Mamá margarita is forced into reclusion and is detained incommunicado. 
 4,000 families are expelled by force from the community in one night. 
  
1998    Agapito Gómez (a former criminal) is appointed as “The Blessed” clairvoyant of the Holy City and    
replaces Mamá Chuy as official seer of the community. 
      Seer Agapito seizes power taking advantage of Papá Nabor’s infirm condition. 
 Agapito, The Blessed, is sent to prison on accusations of rape and abuse of underage women. He 
and his armed guards are found responsible for murder and the forceful eviction of 150 families and 
31 priests. 
The Blessed is sent to prison.  
The government of Michoacán pays for Agapito’s onerous bond and releases him. 
 
2008     In February Papá Nabor dies. 
             Agapito appoints Martín de Tours as the new supreme leader. 
        In September seer Agapito dies of natural causes. 
  A crisis for succession follows when Bishop Santiago “The Greater” (Papá Nabor’s favourite man) 
demands   recognition of his position.  
  Violence erupts in the community and confronts its inhabitants. 
 Martín de Tours seizes power as the new supreme leader, despite Papá Nabor’s public refusal to   
confirm him. 
     The Community splits into two groups: “The Loyals”, followers of Martín de Tours and “The 
Dissidents”, followers of Bishop Santiago “The Greater”.  
     The Dissidents are persecuted, oppressed and forced to live on the outskirts of the community. 
      Martín de Tours appoints “Mamá Catalina” (Agapito’s daughter) as the new seer of TNJ. 
  
         2010     The first elementary school is inaugurated inside The New Jerusalem by Governor Leonel Godoy. 
 
2012     Seer Mamá Catalina claims that “The Virgin wants blood” for the devil is hidden inside the school. 
       Mamá Catalina orders the elementary school to be set on fire. 
        The Loyals burn the school to the ground, claiming to act under The Virgin’s command. 
        Children are not allowed to go to school and violence erupts between the two groups.  
The pressure of national media and human rights associations force the Mexican government to            
intervene. 
        The police are sent to the community to avoid a pogrom. 
        The police are expelled from the community by The Loyals. 
                     The Dissident’s children are forced to take classes outside the community. 
         2020    The holy authorities of TNJ refuse to follow any sanitary measures related to COVID-19. 
          The government of the state of Michoacán imposes a “sanitary barrier” banning access to the 
immediate vicinity of The Holy City to avoid further spread of the virus in the nearby villages. 




APPENDIX  2 
An epistolary dialogue between Multiculturalism (Luis Villoro) 
and Liberalism (Jesús Silva-Herzog Márquez) in Mexico 
 
 
Going beyond Liberalism? 
LUIS VILLORO99 
On 5 March 2001, Jesús Silva-Herzog Márquez published an 
article on “The March and the New Nation” in which he refers to 
a writing of mine published in La Jornada under that name. 
Despite his scorn and his inclination to sting the other with 
poisoned adjectives, I see it as a healthy exception to the usual 
verbiage. I am afraid that an ambiguity is hidden in the background 
of his article. Silva-Herzog judges my personal interpretation of 
the Zapatista ideology as a pre-liberal stance; I judge otherwise. I 
start to point out the limits of liberalism and try to overcome it in 
a new conception. If the expression were not too pretentious, I 
would say that my conception is neither pre-liberal nor anti-liberal 
but seeks to be post-liberal. About this, I have written in other less 
journalistic works that, naturally, Silva-Herzog does not know 
about. Why should he know about them? So, I have titled this piece 
of writing “Going beyond Liberalism?” At least I see three ways 
of passing beyond liberalism. Let us capitulate these briefly, 
 
1. The modern nation-state is a short episode in the history of the 
West. It is a product of the nationalism that accompanies the 
liberal-democratic revolutions. It holds that every State (power 
system) must correspond to a single nation (community of culture) 
and vice versa. It does not admit, therefore, a plurality of official 
languages, collective forms of life, normative systems, educational 
 
99 This is a short newspaper article published by Luis Villoro in the Mexican daily newspaper Reforma on 14 
March 2001 under the title “Going Beyond Liberalism?” (The translation into English is mine). This article is 




projects. The plural state is not simply “tolerant” or “hospitable”, 
it includes political and legal institutions that recognise a plurality 
of autonomous peoples and guarantee their cooperation within the 
framework of a superior unit. This conception of the State differs 
from the traditional liberal idea, both centralist and federal, for it 
is not justified in the tradition but in the self-determination of 
different peoples who agree on a political pact. The most 
reasonable current multiculturalist thought maintains that the 
recognition of collective rights of the peoples that make up a plural 
state is not opposed to individual rights but, on the contrary, is a 
condition for the full exercise of them. 
2. The original meaning of democracy. For authors like Locke, 
Rousseau, Kant and many others, the original meaning of 
democracy was to achieve an association where members were 
obeying themselves. The current representative democracy has 
been reduced to a set of procedures to choose governors to whom 
we all obey. Many current authors, from the bosom of a 
democratic thought, point out the limits of that operational 
democracy. They handle different expressions: "expanded" 
democracy (Bobbio), "participative" (Held), "radical" (Lumnis, 
Laclau100). None here proposes to eliminate the procedures of 
representative democracy, but to complement them with measures 
and laws that allow citizens to participate in power, particularly in 
matters that concern them. I am claiming for a system where the 
leaders become subjects of accountability. Is not this the meaning 
of the Zapatista’s motto "command by obeying"? Is there 
something more opposed, not only to fascism, but to any form of 
authoritarian regime? 
3. The liberal regime is based on universal competition between 
particular interests, competition in the market, in the professional 
sphere, in positions and functions… competition in politics. 
Competition necessarily engenders the exclusion of the least 
advantaged. In a deeply unequal society like ours, the less 
advantaged happen to be the majority. The conception of the 
traditional liberal state demands its neutrality in the face of 
universal competition; although it does not explicitly seek it, it 
 




implies exclusion. The community, on the other hand, has as its 
goal of achieving the inclusion of everyone. It tries to replace the 
universal competition with cooperation and solidarity. It supposes 
a State that is not neutral but committed to the common good: the 
gradual suppression of the enormous existing inequalities and the 
consolidation of solidarity projects in various spheres of social life. 
The community does not have to be contrary to the exercise of 
individual liberties. Parodying an author cited by Silva-Herzog, 
Benjamin Constant, we could distinguish a “community of the 
ancients” from a “community of the moderns”101. The first would 
be justified in traditional uses, the second in the autonomous 
election of citizens who engage with others in a covenant of 
solidarity. The first one could impose the autarchy of the whole to 
the freedom of individuals, the second would derive the autarchy 
of the whole from the agreement of the individuals that embrace 
such agreement. In the Zapatista movement I see the possibility of 
moving from the first type of community to the second one. The 
San Andrés Agreements, by vindicating the community values of 
indigenous peoples, within the framework provided by the respect 
of individual rights and freedoms, are a step towards that direction. 
 
To enter Liberalism 
JESÚS SILVA-HERZOG MÁRQUEZ102  
 
There are many types of silence. In the beautiful essay, “The 
Meaning of Silence” (Verdehalago, 1996), Luis Villoro has 
explored its deep richness. “The world is both a discursive word 
and a silent presence”. Both the universe and men are constituted 
by silence. The absence of a word serves as a sign of an experience 
and makes it up for an attitude: “the stillness that distinguishes a 
grave or placid soul; the gentle silence that hides a humble attitude 
 
101 See the classic text by Constant (1819) The Liberty of Ancients compared to that of Moderns. 
102 This is my own and entirely free translation into English of a short newspaper article published by Jesús Silva-
Herzog Márquez on 19 March 2001 in the old-favourite daily newspaper Reforma as a response to Luis Villoro’s 





or the haughty silence that reveals pride and contempt; the noble 
silence of the one who listens and the pharisaic silence of those 
who judge”. It has been a common place in the Mexican 
intellectual world to kill debate by silence. It is the prevailing 
culture of ignoring the other: that arguments that do not ratify or 
confirm my ideas have to be covered by disdain and silence. Luis 
Villoro has read my criticism of his arguments in defence of the 
Zapatista project and has insisted on his reasoning in a letter 
published by the newspaper Reforma on Wednesday 14th. 
Villoro’s lucidity forces us to consider again the reasons why I 
think that Mexico does not need to “transcend” nor to go “beyond” 
liberalism but, on the contrary, to “enter” it. I am convinced that, 
for Mexico, liberalism is not an old idea or a harmful practice; it 
is the key orientation to build a country of citizens. Villoro argues 
that the multiculturalist argument does not contradict liberalism: it 
overcomes it, he says. I think his arguments do not support that 
claim. Despite its intentions, the multiculturalist project embraced 
by the defenders of Zapatismo is definitely an anti-liberal sketch 
of the world. Let us see the notion of community that Luis Villoro 
defends. Faced with the vile selfishness of the liberal regime that 
fatally generates exclusion, the community “aims to achieve the 
no-exclusion of anyone. It tries to overcome the universal 
competition for cooperation and solidarity”. Such statement about 
communities does not provide any evidence, it does not even seek 
it. It is an essentialist thesis that lacks historical foundation. It is a 
romantic postcard, not an argument. According to that portrait, the 
communities seek the good of all, they do not intend to eliminate 
anyone, they do not want anyone to suffer and they walk together 
to reach the shared goal. The image is beautiful ... but false. 
Many people are moved by this idea of a fraternal society alien 
to the selfish bites of modernity, which frequently excludes and 
crushes. That is why the idealisation of the community cannot be 
a reasonable platform to build a “new nation”, much less to seek 
justice for indigenous peoples. This notion maintains that the 
enemy of the indigenous people is always outside their 
community. It argues that the community space is necessarily the 




environment, launched to the noble search for the common good, 
and that seeks, above all, the loving protection of their children. 
The threats that threaten the indigenous bark outside the 
community, in that rugged territory of the foreign culture. 
Multiculturalism idealises the community, that is, it falsifies its 
nature and character. Communitarians and Multiculturalists value 
cultural authenticity for they believe that the most important thing 
for an indigenous person is to be an indigenous that lives in his 
community. They stumble, therefore, by stepping on with the same 
stone with which the old nationalists collide: it is worth being 
indigenous, not because it is valuable but for indigenous’ sake, as 
Jorge Cuesta might say. I do not believe that communitarian 
traditionalism is the desirable policy in the face of exclusion. I 
think the convenient door is the one that takes us to the liberal 
house, not the one that takes us out of it. It is false that liberalism 
defends a State that is blind to inequality, a State that becomes an 
accomplice of social exclusion. When it is well understood, 
liberalism has a remarkable vocation for justice and fairness. The 
very Adam Smith —that insensitive ogre that many quote without 
reading him carefully— said that the second duty of the State (after 
securing peace) was to protect every member of society from the 
injustice or oppression of any other member of society.103 Yes, 
from other members of the society, though it may sound little 
“postmodern” and even unfriendly to the devotees of novelty. I 
think that the desirable policy in the face of the exclusion of the 
indigenous should not be a community sign but a social democratic 
seal, namely the left wing of liberalism.  
The other point that, in my opinion, confesses the anti-
liberalism of Luis Villoro’s argument is his notion of democracy. 
I agree with Villoro that it is desirable to somehow vivify 
representative democracy. There is no doubt that there is a malaise 
in the world with the performance of democracy. However, I do 
not see in the Zapatista discourse an idea of a more democratic 
democracy. It is regarded as a brilliant proposal the motto “to 
command by obeying”. The phrase is charming, but perhaps so 
because of its vagueness. All power can be justified thus—some 
 




say that they command obeying God, others claim that they obey 
reason, and there are others that obey the orders of the people. 
Every policy declares itself obedient to a venerable principle. The 
phrase “to command by obeying” is beautiful ... and banal. What 
matters —and here I recall liberal constitutionalist Benjamin 
Constant— are the institutional mechanisms of command and 
obedience. If the leader is the people, how will we know their will? 
How it is expressed, through what procedures? What are the limits 
of political command and what are the borders of obedience? 
The motto, of course, does not say anything about that because it 
is nothing more than a slogan. What amazes me is that a 
philosopher as rigorous and serious as Luis Villoro, the author of 
“Believe, Know, Master” accepts as valid and reasonable a simple 
slogan. Here is the topicality of the liberal project for Mexico: to 
take institutions seriously. No one can doubt that it is desirable that 
political power obey Mexican society. Yet, since that entity is 
ungraspable, capricious and wants many things at once, what we 
can try best is to obey the law. The construction of a constitutional 
State, the great project of liberalism, is not an issue exceeded but, 
on the contrary, one of the pending and more important historical 
issues of Mexico. For this, it is necessary to turn away from that 
contempt of the Zapatistas for politics. In any form of politics, they 
smell nothing but rotten matter. We should also resist and deny 
their contempt for all forms of legality. They seem to regard in 
legality nothing but tramps of the powerful. The legal procedures 
(those formalities that the so-called progressive despise greatly) 
are the tutelary deities of civilization, as Constant has opined. And 
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